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CHAPTER 1

Introduction
So the principles which are set forth
in this treatise will, when taken up by
thoughtful minds, lead to many
another more remarkable result; and
it is to be believed that it will be so
on account of the nobility of the
subject, which is superior to any
other in nature.
—Galileo Galilei (1638)

Command and Control
Assessment Challenges

N

ATO and its member nations are in the midst of a
revolution in military affairs. There are three major
dimensions to this revolution—a geopolitical
dimension, a technological dimension, and a closely
coupled conceptual dimension. This multidimensional
revolution poses significant new challenges for
analysis in general and for command and control
assessment in particular.
The changed geopolitical context is characterised by
a shift from a preoccupation with a war involving NATO
and the Warsaw Pact to a concern for a broad range
of smaller military conflicts and Operations Other Than
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War (OOTW). Analysts will increasingly be called upon
to provide insights into these non-traditional operations.
Advances in technology, particularly informationrelated technologies, offer military organisations
unprecedented opportunities to significantly reduce the
fog and friction traditionally associated with conflict.
At the same time, they may prove to be challenges in
themselves across a wide variety of realms—technical,
organisational, and cultural.
To the extent that they can be achieved, significantly
reduced levels of fog and friction offer an opportunity
for the military to develop new concepts of operations,
new organisational forms, and new approaches to
Command and Control (C2), as well as to the
processes that support it. Analysts will be increasingly
called upon to work in this new conceptual dimension
in order to examine the impact of new informationrelated capabilities coupled with new ways of
organising and operating.

Definition of Command and Control
C2 has been defined by NATO as Military Function
01: “The Organisation, Process, Procedures and
Systems necessary to allow timely political and military
decisionmaking and to enable military commanders
to direct and control military forces.” (NATO 1996) C2
systems are further defined in NATO documents to
include: headquarters facilities, communications,
information systems, and sensors & warning
installations. (NATO 1998).
Other terms are used in NATO member nations that
are synonymous with, or closely related to, C2. These
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include Command, Control, and Communications or
Consultation (C3), and Computers (C4), and
Intelligence ([C3I] or [C4I]), and Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR). The term CIS is sometimes
used to refer to command information systems. More
recently the term “C2” has referred to the collaborative
and consultative processes that are an inherent part
of coalition operations.
For the purposes of this Code of Best Practice (COBP),
the term C2 is intended to be an umbrella term that
encompasses the concepts, issues, organisations,
activities, processes, and systems associated with the
NATO definition of C2 as well as the other terms
enumerated above.

Uniqueness of C2 Analyses and Issues
The focus of military research and analysis has
predominantly been on the physical domain. C2 issues
differ in fundamental ways from physics dominated
problems. C2 deals with distributed teams of humans
operating under stress and in a variety of other operating
conditions. C2 problems are thus dominated by their
information, behavioural, and cognitive aspects that
have been less well researched and understood. This
focus creates a multidimensional, complex analytic
space.
Military operations involve multi-sided dynamics
encompassing friendly, adversary, and other actors
including:
• Action-reaction dynamics;
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• Tightly connected interaction among subjective
elements such as cultures, morale, doctrine,
training, and experience and between those
subjective elements and the combat arena;
• Non Governmental Organisations (NGO);
• Private Volunteer Organisations (PVO);
• International organisations;
• International corporations; and
• Transnational, subnational, criminal, and
terrorist organisations.
C2 issues are difficult to decompose and recompose
without committing errors of logic. Moreover, the
composition rules, by which the various factors that
impact C2 interact, are poorly understood except in
arenas that have been previously studied in detail.
Finally, the C2 arena is weakly bounded by issues
that on initial examination appear quite finite, but prove
to be linked to very high-level factors. For example,
tactical performance may be tied to national culture.
Analyses of C2 are also often constrained by factors
that are beyond the boundaries of the research. For
example, security policies may restrict data availability
and otherwise constrain the analysis. The availability
of data often limits the scope of an analysis. Moreover,
the time and resources available to conduct an analysis
are often severely constrained because the decision
processes being supported are being driven by outside
planning, operational, or budget and decision
processes. This should be seen as a challenge rather
than a problem. Uncertainty and risk associated with a
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lack of appropriate data need to be embraced as part
of the analytical approach. It is unreasonable to expect
that data would be available for the performance of
future systems and processes that do not yet exist. An
experimental component and a modelling and
simulation component need to be integrated into modern
C2 analyses in order to close the gap in knowledge
and data.
Finally, because of the complexity of C2 processes
and systems, analysis in this area requires the ability
to understand how Dimensional Parameters (DP),
Measures of Performance (MoP), Measures of C2
Effectiveness (MoCE), Measures of Force
Effectiveness (MoFE), and Measures of Policy
Effectiveness (MoPE) are linked and impact on one
another. The cumulative set of these measures is
denoted as Measures of Merit (MoM) in the COBP.
Determining the precise nature of these relationships
nearly always proves to be an analytic challenge.
Taken together, all these factors mean that C2 modelling
and analysis are more uncertain and therefore more
prone to risk than their equivalents in conventional
weapon and platform analyses. Indeed, C2 issues have
long been regarded as difficult to analyse. Many
operational analysis (OA) studies have simply assumed
perfect C2 in order to focus on other variables. As a
result of these characteristics of C2 analysis, these
endeavours will require a heavy element of research
within each analysis. This COBP is intended to assist
the community in dealing with, and overcoming, the
barriers to effective analysis of C2.

6
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Differences Across the Mission Spectrum
There are significant differences among the different
parts of the mission spectrum (e.g., MoM) that the
assessment team needs to take into consideration.
Table 1.1 highlights the differences between traditional
combat and OOTW.

Table 1.1. Comparison of Symmetric, Conventional Warfare and
OOTW Missions & Principles Mission

In symmetric conventional warfare, the mission tends
to be relatively stable, there is a clear focus on the
enemy, and the military has a common understanding
and commitment.1 Conversely, in OOTW the mission
is often more dynamic. This is captured by the often
pejorative term “mission creep.” In many of the
operations in question there is no “enemy.” This is
obviously true for operations such as humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. In addition,
peacekeeping activities involve protagonists who must
be treated even-handedly if the operation is to be
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successful. In the latter missions, political-military
ambiguities frequently result in uncertain
understanding of the goals and objectives of the
mission and a limited commitment.2 (Starr, Haut &
Hughes, 1997)

Principles
Military theorists have frequently propounded basic
principles of conventional warfare. Three often cited
principles include the need for unity of command, the
importance of hierarchical decisionmaking, and the
criticality of achieving surprise in operations. A recent
book has proposed alternative principles for OOTW.
(Alberts & Hayes, 1995) It cites the need for unity of
purpose, consensus decisionmaking, and
transparency of operations.

Information
In conventional warfare, the issue of information
gathering and management focuses on the issue of
“known unknowns” (e.g. Where are the enemy’s
battalions?). For that case, the key question is how to
get the needed information (e.g. What are the key
signatures for the targets in question? What sensors
should we task to exploit those signatures?). Clearly,
the focus is on the enemy military and one objective is
to assemble a complete, timely, and accurate common
picture of the air-land-sea situation. The result is a
very large, time-sensitive database, but one that is
relatively well structured (e.g. enemy order of battle).
Conversely, in OOTW, the problem of information
gathering and management is dominated by “unknown
unknowns.” Thus, the primary question to address is
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what information to get. The information focus is much
more diffuse because of the myriad of military, political,
economic, and social factors that must be considered.
Consequently, situation awareness is much more
complex. Political considerations often make it prudent
to limit the dissemination of information, creating a
tension between the desire to create shared
awareness by increasing information sharing and the
need, for political and/or security reasons, to limit
information sharing. The resulting databases are
frequently larger and less structured.

Analysis
Over many years, the military operations research
community has become relatively adept at analysing
key aspects of symmetric conventional warfare. As an
illustration, analyses of ground warfare often focus on
battalion-level operations and techniques have emerged
to integrate across those results to derive insights into
campaign outcomes. The focus is on military systems
and organisations, and the techniques in question
involve a broad set of methods (e.g., mathematical
programming, decision theoretic approaches) and tools
(e.g., models and simulations). Analyses of C2 issues
remain among the most challenging, even in warfare
contexts. In addition, analyses of OOTW often require
consideration of individual behaviour. It has proven very
difficult to integrate across these results to derive a
comprehensive understanding of the problem. The issue
is compounded by the many factors that have to be
considered in the analysis process (e.g. military, political,
economic, social). This has led to the application of
“softer” analytic approaches (e.g., extensive reliance
on expert elicitation). Moreover, the very nature of
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warfare appears to be changing. For example,
asymmetric threats are becoming more common,
information technologies are impacting C2 processes,
and organic structure and dynamics are changing
rapidly and in ways we do not fully understand.

Types of C2 Assessments
The assessment team could be called upon to support
a wide variety of sponsors (e.g. acquirers of C2
systems, long range planners and programmers,
developers of requirements, operational commanders,
and trainers). These sponsors will bring different
problems to the assessment team (e.g. assessment
of alternative systems or concepts, identification and
selection of alternative courses of action in an
operational context). Some of these will deal with a
specific mission (e.g. air defence) while others will need
to deal with the entire mission spectrum from forward
presence to high intensity conventional war.
Specific problems that the team may be called upon
to address:

Requirements Analysis
• Derivation of specific C2 requirements from
broad statements of objectives; and
• The establishment of a minimum, standard, or
expected level of performance.
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Assessment of Alternatives
• Comparison and selection of alternative systems
that may be very dissimilar but are designed to
achieve a similar purpose;
• Assessment of the utilisation of a system in a new
or unexpected application domain or mission;
• Trade-offs between C2 systems and combat systems;
• Analysis of the impact of an organisational change;
• Determination of the most cost-effective
approach to achieving the desired objective; and
• Comparison of a replacement system or
components of a system.

Research Issues
• Effectiveness of human decisionmaking as a
function of system performance or other factors;
• Effectiveness of C2 training; and
• Impact of collaboration on C2 quality.

Support to Operations
• Course of action analysis;
• Real time assessment of mission effectiveness; and
• Rehearsal assessment.
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Purpose and Scope of the COBP
This COBP offers broad guidance on the assessment
of C2 for the purposes of supporting a wide variety of
decisionmakers and the conduct of C2 research
described above. It should be noted that this COBP is
focused upon the assessment challenges associated
with the nature of C2 and does not attempt to
specifically address the unique properties and
constraints associated with each of the many C2related problem domains.
Given the increasing interdependence among the
elements of a mission capability package 3
(organisation; doctrine; C2 concepts, processes,
systems; materiel; education; training; and forces), C2related analysis cannot easily be done in isolation from
a more comprehensive mission analysis. This COBP
is meant to support analyses that go beyond the
traditional boundaries of C2 analyses.
This new version of the COBP for C2 assessment was
developed by SAS-026 building upon the initial version
of the COBP produced by SAS-002. This new COBP
is a synthesis of decades of expertise from various
countries and hundreds of analyses. The COBP was
developed using a set of case studies to test out the
varied advice and guidance received, and incorporates
feedback from users of the initial version. Lastly, SAS039 provided a peer review of the final draft product.
The earlier version focused on the analysis of ground
forces at a tactical echelon in mid to high intensity
conflicts. Consequently, the initial version of the COBP
did not completely address the full range of important
issues related to C2. In developing this new version of
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the COBP, SAS-026 explicitly focused upon OOTW,
the impact of significantly improved information related
capabilities, and their implications for military
organisations and operations. In addition, SAS-026 was
cognisant of the fact that NATO operations are likely to
include coalitions of the willing, which might involve
Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, others partners
outside of NATO, international organisations, and
NGOs. NATO operations may also be “out of area.”
Feedback from users of the original COBP also
identified a number of ways in which the original COBP
could be improved. These areas were addressed
during the development of this version of the COBP.
Cost analyses continue to be explicitly excluded for
two reasons. First, cost analysis is a mature discipline
that experienced operational analysts already practice.
Hence, C2 issues are not unique in the arena. Second,
most nations have already developed approaches to
cost analysis and cost effectiveness that are consistent
with their national approaches to accounting. Because
these national practices differ among NATO members,
no single approach would be appropriate.
As this COBP is being drafted, novel experiments with
new information-related capabilities, particularly
networking and ways to accomplish their assigned tasks
abound. Advances in technology are expected to
continue at an increasing rate and spur both sustaining
and disruptive innovation in military organisations. It is
to be expected that this COBP will need to be
periodically revisited in light of these developments.

Chapter 1

13

Overview of COBP Assessment
Philosophy
The COBP assumes that the objective of a C2 system
is to exercise control over its environment, through
either adaptive or reactive control mechanisms, or
some combination of those two approaches. This
provides the context and point of departure for the
assessment of C2.
Analysis of C2 should consider all the relevant actors,
military command levels, and functions involved and
should investigate issues of integration across
disparate organisations, military command levels, and
functional domains over time. Consideration should
also be given to the robustness and security of
information systems and to human computer interface
issues. Human behavioural, physiological, and
cognitive factors, along with organisational and
doctrinal issues, must be considered in C2 analyses.
C2 assessments must also consider a range of
missions, adversary capabilities, and adversary
behaviours. Moreover, it must be understood that
adversaries will use asymmetric tactics and techniques
to deny or exploit differences in technology, force size,
information systems, or cultural factors. Hence,
scenarios and analyses that deal with an appropriate
set of all these dimensions should be considered in
either the main research design or in the excursions
to assess risks and uncertainty.
The evaluation of C2 issues depends in important ways
on both distinguishing and linking dimensional
parameters, measures of performance, measures of
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C2 effectiveness, and measures of force and policy
effectiveness. Modelling and other tools must be
designed to support this requirement.
Tools and data used in C2 analysis should conform to
good OA processes and practices and, to the extent
feasible, should be subject to Model Verification,
Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A) and to Data
Verification, Validation, and Certification (VV&C).
Interoperable analytical infrastructures (e.g. data
dictionaries, glossaries, models, tools, data sets) are
necessary to facilitate the efficient proliferation and
reuse of study results and data within the broader
interdisciplinary research community.
Because the complexity of C2 and the requirements
for its analysis are often underestimated by
decisionmakers, a continuing dialogue between
analysts and those decisionmakers is necessary both
to scope the problem properly and to ensure that the
analytic results are properly understood. Part of this
process includes performing sensitivity analyses and
other common practices designed to ensure the validity
and reliability of the results.
Changes to C2 systems will often lead to changes in
military concepts, command approaches, doctrine,
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), and related
factors, which must also be considered in the analysis.

Current State of Practice in C2 Analysis
Assessment of C2 issues typically employs classic
tools of OA. Relatively few specialised tools and
methods have been developed for C2. Moreover, those
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specialised tools generated to deal with the unique
aspects of C2-focused research are generally not as
well understood as those used in more traditional
warfare modelling domains. C2 analysts will often find
themselves having to develop tools and approaches
appropriate for their research agendas. However, a
general analytic process can be identified that will
enhance the likelihood that an OA analyst can conduct
successful analyses.

Organisation of the COBP
This COBP is organised into four themes. The first
theme deals with study dynamics, problem formulation,
and the development of a solution strategy. The
second theme identifies and discusses in depth the
essential elements of assessment: measures of merit,
scenarios, human and organisational issues, data, and
tools. The third theme addresses issues related to risk
and uncertainty while the final theme describes the
range of assessment products.
This represents a significant enhancement of the initial
COBP. In particular the first, third and fourth themes
were not treated in detail in the initial version of the
COPB. In addition, material has been added to the
second theme to address the unique assessment
challenges associated with OOTW.

Brief History of SAS-026
SAS-026 builds upon almost a decade of work that
began with the formation of the Ad Hoc Working Group
on the Impact of C3I on the Battlefield by Panel 7 of the
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NATO Defence Research Group in 1991 to assess the
state of the art in C2 analysis. Based on the
recommendations of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Panel
7 constituted Research Study Group-19 (RSG-19) to
address issues of methodology, measures of merit, and
tools and analysis. The panel also addressed issues of
improving a nation’s capability to examine C2 acquisition
and decisionmaking. At the October 1995 RSG-19
planning meeting, the group determined that the primary
product of RSG-19 was to be a Code of Best Practice
for assessing C2. As part of selected RSG-19 meetings,
workshops would be conducted to support the
development of the major sections of the COBP.
Workshops were conducted on Measures of Merit
(Canada), Scenario Development (Netherlands), C3I
Systems, Structures, Organisations, and Staff
Performance Evaluations (Norway), and Models Used
for C3 Systems and Analysis (US/UK). Representatives
from the nations in parentheses took the lead in
organising the workshops and summarising the results.
The minutes of the workshops provide further
illustrations of the techniques presented in the COBP.
At the October 1996 meeting, the group took up a
request by Panel 7 to conduct a symposium on
modelling and analysis of C3I, which was scheduled
at the July 1997 meeting for January 1999. This
symposium was a forum for presentation and
discussion of the COBP and related topics.
At the July 1997 meeting, in response to a query by
Panel 7, the group discussed, acknowledged, and
agreed on the need for a follow-on group to SAS-002.
An exploratory group on organisational change (SASE05) was formed to recommend a way ahead.
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SAS-E05 recommended the formation for a follow-on
activity to SAS-002 to accomplish four objectives:
• Demonstrate and assess the initial version of
the COBP;
• Revise and extend the COBP;
• Identify research areas; and
• Facilitate the adoption of the COBP.
The SAS panel concurred in May 1999 and approved
the formation of SAS-026, which began its 2 1/2-year
plan of work in a symposium in January 2000.

Chapter 1 Acronyms
C2 – Command and Control
C3(I) – Command, Control, Communications (and
Intelligence)
C4(I) – Command, Control, Communications, and
Computers (and Intelligence)
C4ISR – Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CIS – Command Information Systems
COBP – Code of Best Practice
DP – Dimensional Parameters
MoCE – Measures of C2 Effectiveness
MoFE – Measures of Force Effectiveness
MoM – Measures of Merit
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MoP – Measures of Performance
MoPE – Measures of Policy Effectiveness
NGO – Non Governmental Organisations
OA – Operational Analysis
OOTW – Operations Other Than War
PfP – Partnership for Peace
PVO – Private Volunteer Organisations
RSG-19 – Research Study Group-19
TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
VV&A – Verification, Validation, and Accreditation
VV&C – Verification, Validation, and Certification
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1

As an illustration, General Colin Powell, then Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, summarised the mission in Desert Storm by
stating that “First, we will cut off the enemy and then we will kill
it.” (Pentagon Briefing, Wednesday January 23, 1991.)
2
As an example, the US Congress has continually sought to
impose an arbitrary deadline for US forces to withdraw from
Bosnia.
3
Mission capability packages include all of the elements
necessary for an operation. (Alberts, 1996).

CHAPTER 2

Preparing For
Success:
Assessment
Participants,
Relationships,
and Dynamics
For hypotheses ought…to explain the
properties of things and not attempt to
predetermine them except in so far as
they can be an aid to experiments.
—Isaac Newton (1687)
We have run out of Money—now we
have to think.
—Ernest Rutherford (1871-1937)

Overview

T

his chapter is organised into three parts. The first
discusses the roles played by the significant players
associated with a Command and Control (C2)
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assessment and how these roles affect the design and
conduct of the assessment. The second part identifies
the major phases of a C2 assessment and their iterative
nature. The concluding section addresses the subject
of professional ethics and standards of conduct.

Assessment Participants
Like their subject, the organisation of C2 studies
involves complex interrelationships. It is crucial for the
analytical team to establish which individuals and
organisations are involved at an early stage of the
study. It is prudent for the analytical team to map the
roles described below onto the individuals and
organisations involved and to understand their
interrelationships. An example of such a mapping is
at Figure 2.1. Appendix 1 to this chapter provides a
brief explanation of the organisations involved.
Due to the dynamic nature of such projects, those
involved should not be surprised if the nature of the teams
involved might have to expand or change with time.

Assessment Team
The assessment team is working for the sponsor or
client (sponsor). The team consists of a senior team
leader (who may also be referred to as the project
manager), a core set of analysts, subject matter
experts including military officers, and supporting staff
who are working on the study on a day to day basis.
The team provide the legitimacy and authority for the
study. The sponsor will provide the terms of reference,
access to needed information, and identify the desired
products. It is important for the analytical team to
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understand exactly why the sponsor wants the study
and what the sponsor wants to do with the results.

Decisionmakers or Problem Owners
The decisionmakers are the individuals or
organisations that are expected to make decisions
wholly or partially based on the output or findings of
the study. If there is no decision to be made (i.e. this
is an exploratory study) then the decisionmakers could
be referred to as problem-owners. It is important for
the assessment team to understand exactly what type
of assessment the decisionmakers want the study to
support. The decisionmakers may or may not be in
command of or part of the sponsor’s organisation.
Complex problems may arise when the decisionmaker
is several steps laterally away in the organisation from
the sponsor and study team.

Stakeholders
The stakeholders are the persons or organisations that
are directly or indirectly affected by the study outcome.
Stakeholders may also play other roles. The
assessment team must be aware of the potential for
conflict when the stakeholders do not include the
sponsor or decisionmaker. Complex problems may arise
in the provision of data for the study, as it is the
stakeholders who may have to provide the data, set
the security or releasibility of that data (and hence the
study), and/or agree that the data are representative.
For these reasons it is essential that the analysts
establish a working relationship with the stakeholders
early in the process.
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Bill Payer
The bill payer is the organisation or individual official
paying for the study. It is important for the assessment
team to know the level of resources available. Bill
payers will normally have a direct interest in the
outcome of the study and may be one or more of the
other players. Contractual authorities have the legal
authority to let contracts on behalf of the bill payer.

Existing Study Teams
The assessment team must be aware of and sensitive
to the existence of teams in other related study areas.
Should such teams exist, the assessment team should
endeavour to exploit the work done and available skills
and techniques. Such external teams may also be
appropriate for membership in peer reviews.

Future Study Teams
The assessment team must be aware of and sensitive
to the needs of future analyses and assessments. Data
collection, method documentation, and the archiving
of data, methods, models and results are fundamental
responsibilities of all professional analysts. Method and
data should be (as far as is practicable) disseminated
and published.

Peer Reviewers
Outside experts brought in to look at the work and
provide constructive criticisms are called peer
reviewers. Peer review teams could be composed of
specialists and other study teams in related subject
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areas and should include representatives from all key
disciplines in the assessment.

Data Providers
Data providers are the individuals and organisations
that possess data and information useful to the
assessment team. Many of these will be stakeholders.
The motivation to provide data to the study must be
developed by the analytical team and the sponsor.

Assumption Providers
Assumption providers are the individuals or
organisations that can provide “givens” such as future
doctrine, performance data, force mixes,
organisational structures, and scenarios. Creation of
a positive relationship with these organisations is
important to the study.

Data Collectors
In some C2 analyses, where data must be extracted from
real world experiences, exercises, experiments, and
wargames, teams of data collectors and subject matter
experts will be required. The identification of people with
the appropriate background and training as data
collectors is an important element of such studies.
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Relationships Among Participants
and the Conduct of the Assessment
Relationships
Figure 2.1 illustrates how complicated the participant
roles and relationships can be in a real C2 assessment.
This particular figure represents the organisations
involved in the recent Immediate Reaction Task Force
(Land) (IRTF(L)) C2 Concept evaluation that
completed at the end of 2001 (Candan & Lambert,
2002). Appendix 1 to this chapter provides a brief
explanation of the organisations involved. Although not
all projects will be this complex, many important C2
assessments will.
Through the prudent act of mapping the roles of the
participants of the study, the potential conflicts of
interest and complex interactions can be identified.
One method to mitigate these is to present or conduct
this activity openly and discuss with all involved so
that all potentially affected participants are aware of
the possibility of future conflict and the fact that all
participants fall into one or more roles within a project.
In the event of conflict with other participants in the
project the assessment team should address the
issues in a neutral and independent manner.
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Figure 2.1. Example of the Mapping of Roles onto
Players—for a Complex C2 Project (the Evaluation of
Immediate Reaction Task Force (Land) C2 Concept)

Understanding the Context of the
Assessment
The relationship among the assessment team, the key
sponsor, and the stakeholders is of paramount
importance and perhaps, more than any other single
factor, will influence the course and success of the
effort. Accordingly, adequate attention needs to be paid
to understanding the situation facing the key sponsor
and stakeholders as much as the subject under study.
The assessment team should be aware that the
different participants will have divergent perspectives
and may have divergent agendas.
Therefore the assessment team should understand the
background of the individuals involved, their
organisational settings, roles and responsibilities, their
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history, and their current situation. Contact with analysts
who have worked with this sponsor and review of prior
analyses for this sponsor facilitate this objective.
It is good practice to build and maintain long-term
relationships with the sponsor and stakeholder
organisations. This will yield substantial dividends in
the form of easier communication, greater trust, and
stronger support.

A Continuing Dialogue
It is important that a dialogue with the sponsor and
stakeholders is maintained by the assessment team
throughout the study. As there is no single “language”
that will describe the study problem, it is important to
spend time at the beginning of a study to establish a
common “language” that both the assessment team
and the sponsor and stakeholder can understand. This
point may seem obvious in a NATO setting in which
the participants speak many different natural
languages. However, it is equally important in a single
language setting because common words and phrases
have different meanings for different organisations,
services, and even individuals within a single
organisation. Regular meetings and contact will
minimise misunderstandings. From a professional
point of view, Operations Research (OR) and
Operations Analysis (OA) analysts will always wish to
inform the sponsor and stakeholders of key
developments and/or challenges as the study unfolds.
Regular and routine interactions need to be built into
the project plan. If there are multiple sponsors and
stakeholders and other key actors, the assessment
team should try to meet them jointly, particularly when
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decisions need to be made. Separate meetings will
often lead to inconsistent guidance and will place the
assessment team in a position of trying to
accommodate differing interests.
The development of a collectively agreed upon Study
Glossary that captures the definitions of words, phrases
and acronyms used in the study is a useful tool.

Terms of Reference
A good “term of reference” covers goals, scope,
products, schedule, and resources. These will
determine the focus of the assessment and establish
limits or freedoms granted to the assessment team
within the sponsor’s and stakeholder’s organisations.
Letters of introduction and instructions to actors within
the sponsor and stakeholder organisations may also
be useful.

Understanding How the Output of the
Study Will be Used
It is important to know at an early stage in the project
what the products of the study are to be used for by
the sponsor and stakeholder organisations. The
expected end product will set the tone and relative
importance of the project in the eyes of the sponsor,
stakeholder, and other actors. The assessment team
needs to establish and understand the products
needed or desired by the sponsor and stakeholder.
For example, a study could be used to create a
significant impact on the stakeholder’s domain, gain a
greater understanding of the issues, produce an
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improved capability to perform future work, and/or
make contributions to the body of knowledge.

Budget
The sponsor will have limited resources with a study
budget in mind. When the sponsor’s resources are
limited to a level below what is required to support a
quality study, the assessment team will need to
suggest strategies to address the shortfall. Alternative
approaches include decomposing the problem and
only undertaking the core part of the study that is
affordable, linking the sponsor to other actors that have
an interest in the same or a similar problem and who
could contribute resources, and/or stretching the
project over a longer time so that resources from future
budget cycles become available. In developing
strategies that involve doing only a part of the study to
satisfy budget constraints, care must be taken to
ensure that the product that will be produced provides
a meaningful answer or contribution and does not
depend upon a follow-on effort that may or may not
be funded.
It may take a complete iteration of the assessment
phases of the project to establish the complete scope
of the project and the resources required. Therefore it
is good practice in large C2 projects to allow the
assessment team to perform a rapid first pass of all
the phases of the project to help establish the budget
required. This is contrary to the usual practice of setting
the budget in stone immediately following the initial
Problem Formulation or Solution Strategy phase (see
Section 2-E below).
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Relationships
Figure 2.1 illustrates how complicated the participant
roles and relationships can be in a practical C2
assessment. This particular figure represents the
organisations involved in the recent Immediate
Reaction Task Force (Land) (IRTF(L)) C2 Concept
evaluation that completed at the end of 2001 (Candan
& Lambert, 2002). Although not all projects will be this
complex, many important C2 assessments will be.

Building an Assessment Team
Skills Available to the Assessment Team
Following initial problem formulation (Chapter 3), the
precise skills and experience required by the
assessment team will need to be established. Typically,
the assessment team will need to be interdisciplinary.
The wide range of skills and experience required can
be allocated between a full-time core team and a
collection of consultants or part-time team members.
As an example, an ideal breakdown of the skills available
to the assessment team involved in the evaluation of
the Immediate Reaction Task Force (Land) C2 concept
study1 is given below:
Skills: Core Team
• Project management;
• OR/OA skills: simulation, wargaming,
mathematical programming, database creation
and management, brainstorming and problem
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structuring, scientific/military report writing/
editing;
• Cross military experience—i.e., OR/OA
personnel with military experience or military
personnel with OR/OA knowledge;
• Organisational theory; and
• Data collection (e.g., questionnaire and form
design).
Skills and Experience: Consultants and Part-time
Team Members
• Military (or access to practical experience of
problem under study);
• Training and exercise planning (if an exercise is
to be used as a vehicle for the study);
• Communications and information systems
specialists for the systems of the organisation
under study;
• Human computer interface expertise;
• Operations Other Than War (OOTW) related
issues (e.g., C2/Headquarters [HQ], media, civilmilitary cooperation—theory and practice);
• Social scientists (e.g., political, psychological,
economic, cultural, legal);
• Military history;
• Command experience;
• Deployment analysis;
• Intelligence/threat/area of operations expertise; and
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• Legal/contracts/administration expertise.
As another example of the skills required for C2
Assessment Studies, the skills required to provide OR
support to C2 elements (such as OR/OA support to
an operational HQ) is also analogous, as illustrated in
Table 2.1 (RTO, 1999).

Table 2.1. Knowledge, Capabilities and Skills Needed
by OR/OA Cell Team Members

Background of the Assessment Team
Building a C2 assessment team with this full breadth
of knowledge, capabilities, and skill requires a longterm commitment by the mother OR/OA organisation
to prepare a corpus of potential team members through
recruitment, education, training, and opportunities for
appropriate field experience.
Following the identification of the skills required for
the team, those analysts made available for the team
should ensure that they leave a basic understanding
of the military fields under consideration. Gaps in
experience should be rapidly filled through background
reading, short courses, field experience, or additional/
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alternative analysts with the appropriate experience
and skills.

Forming the Assessment Team
In a study that involves dispersed and disparate
organisations and teams, the effort to command and
control the study group must be recognised and effort
and time built into the study plan. This can be, for
example, through maintenance of distributed working
environments such as web portals, information
campaign material and travel time to meetings. In these
cases the senior team leader will revert to a role more
akin to a project manager.
It is one thing to assemble a group of people, quite
another to forge them into a coherent effective team.
Sufficient time and a facilitating process should be built
in to the project plan for the group of individuals to
coalesce into a team.

Interdisciplinary Assessment
Team and Outside Relations
It follows that C2 analysis, particularly for OOTW issues,
should be done by an interdisciplinary assessment
team. Experienced analysts know that their work owes
success in no small measure to efficient working
relationships within the assessment team and with the
customer of analysis. Building good working
relationships among representatives of different
scientific cultures, such as OR/OA and IT analysts
grounded in (hard) physical sciences and mathematics
on one hand and (soft) social scientists on the other,
requires sufficient mutual understanding of
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methodologies and tools. In fact, differences in scientific
cultures can outweigh differences in natural cultures
provided that all members of the assessment team have
sufficient command of a common language. Therefore,
in addition to leadership and project management skills,
the head of the assessment team must have a good
general idea of the current state of all disciplines involved
in order to compose an efficient team and facilitate
interdisciplinary cooperation throughout the analysis.
Good personal and working relationships with the
customer of the analysis are essential for
understanding every aspect of the problem and being
able to arrive at a problem structure and solution
strategy that meets the customer’s immediate needs
in the light of the strategic objectives of the respective
OOTW. Knowing the customer’s position in the
command hierarchy and the degree of influence he/
she wields through informal relationships over
stakeholders and actors, the co-operation of which
might be essential for an implementation of analysis
results, and understanding the respective
consequences associated with alternative solutions is
important for assessing their acceptability and
organisational risk.
It is equally important for the assessment team to
establish working relationships with the potential
subjects of study in the early stages. This is essential
for capturing the nature and problem relevance of formal
and informal relations between all organisations, groups,
and individuals that are subjects of the study, finding
out about their motivations and agendas, and eliciting
firsthand information that is critical for solving the
problem such as their capabilities and the conditions
attached for their employment. However, the analyst
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should be careful not to allow this effort to gain greater
understanding of the problem to introduce bias.

Assessment Phases, Process,
and Dynamics
It is important to realise that all of the elements of the
C2 assessment are interrelated. Hence Problem
Formulation, Solution Strategy, Measures of Merit,
Scenarios, Human/Organisational Factors, Models/
Tools/Data, and products are all interdependent.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the major phases and iterative
nature required for C2 assessments. The Assessment
Process diagram was the most difficult thing for the
SAS026 team to agree upon. In essence this diagram
is at the heart of the COBP (Starr, 2001). The
remainder of this chapter discusses the key points in
this diagram.

Figure 2.2. C2 Assessment Process
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Problem Formulation
The output of Problem Formulation (Chapter 3) specifies
the “what” of the assessment. C2 studies tend to be
complex and feature multiple attributes, some of which
may not be apparent at the start of the study. Neither
the assessment team nor the sponsor should be
surprised if the issues initially presented for study are
replaced by other issues that are closer to the underlying
causes of the initial problem or, in some cases,
symptoms presented. A consequence of the dynamic
nature of problem formulation is that the solution strategy
and any of the other elements of the assessment may
change as the study progresses. Problem formulation
should therefore be consciously and routinely iterated
during a study—especially when new attributes start to
appear. As a minimum an iteration should occur
immediately following the establishment of the initial
solution strategy and the assessment of study risk.
Additionally, the sponsor should be aware that the
nature of the assessment team, sponsor, or assumption
provider teams might also have to expand or change
with time. This has implications for planning, budgeting,
and tasking.
In nearly all C2 studies the assessment team will study
only a subset of the whole problem space due to the
sponsor’s sphere of interest. This fact must be
recognised by the assessment team. An initial study
of the complete problem space is essential to establish
this realisation. This will help the assessment team to
understand the context of the study and provide advice
to the sponsor on the actual underlying causes to his
problem and consequently the requirement to involve
other participants.
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Solution Strategy
The next step is to develop a Solution Strategy
(Chapter 4) that specifies the “how” of the assessment.
Arising from the Solution Strategy agreed upon and
adopted by the sponsor are a set of terms of reference
(e.g., Statements of Work [SOW] for contracts) that
will determine what work is to be conducted, the
contractual obligations, deadlines, and resources.
Although these must be established as an
experimentation campaign plan 3 and study
management plan (project plan) before work on the
project begins in earnest, flexibility must be built-in due
to the iterative nature of C2 assessment. The
assessment team must be aware of any preconceived
“solutions” that have been proposed by the sponsor,
stakeholders, and/or decisionmakers and explicitly
deal with these as appropriate, avoiding another
pressure to be steered in a particular direction. The
assessment team must note if its results are being
steered in a particular direction and follow ethical
behaviour in performing the study (see the end of this
chapter). In many cases a risk-based approach to C2
assessments can usefully complement the more
traditional cost-effectiveness approach. In particular,
this helps decisionmakers to deal with the uncertainties
of the real problem.
From a professional point of view analysts should always
defer the selection of a particular method until the problem
has been formulated and a solution strategy has been
defined. Recognise and beware of “preconceived”
solutions that could influence the assessment.
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Review
Once there has been a preliminary formulation of the
problem and development of a solution strategy, it is
imperative that an initial review be conducted. This
review should be conducted from multiple perspectives
(e.g. with respect to the sponsor’s initial problem, the
feasibility with respect to resources including team
skills and schedule, soundness of the proposed
analytic approach). As a result of this review, changes
will usually be made in both the problem formulation
and the solution strategy.

Measures of Merit, Scenarios, and
Human/Organisational Factors
At this stage the assessment team must specify the
hierarchy of Measures of Merit (MoM) (Chapter 5),
incorporate and identify relevant human and
organisational factors (Chapter 6), and specify the
appropriate scenarios (Chapter 7). As suggested by
the diagram, there is no unique sequence for doing
these tasks. Iteration is required to ensure that these
tasks are done in a coherent, consistent fashion. When
all of these tasks have been completed, the team has
specified the key variables to the necessary level of
detail with adequate considerations for assessment
validity and reliability.
When developing the MoM it is very valuable to involve
the sponsor in establishing the linkages between the
MoMs and the hierarchy of MoM. This is because then
the sponsor will then appreciate the dynamics of the
problem and the requirement for breadth in the study.
Although a full set of MoM must be derived in
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accordance with the best practice noted in Chapter 5,
the MoM should be prioritised to focus on providing
support to the objectives of the study and be practical
and cost effective.
When selecting appropriate scenarios it is good
practise to utilise scenarios (if they exist) from a
standard set of scenarios approved for use within the
assessment and sponsor organisation. The sponsor
must always be approached for approval of the
scenarios. It is bad practice to design a scenario to
prove a point.

Models, Tools, and Data Requirements
The next step is to iteratively identify the methods and
tools (Chapter 8) and data (Chapter 9) required to
perform the assessment. One of the major challenges
of the assessment is to identify and gain access to
models, tools, and data that are appropriate for
exploring the issues of interest. The challenges come
in several dimensions:
• First, there is a limited set of tools that deal
effectively with the C2 dimension of the problem.
• Second, for even this limited set, it is often
difficult to access and modify the tools to reflect
the variables of interest.
• Third, there is often a paucity of useful data and
previously validated parameters.
As a result of the establishment of the MoM for the
study and the data that underpins those MoM and
models, a data collection and analysis plan should be
formulated. The sponsor should also be made aware
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of the difficulties associated with getting appropriate
data, cost of the data collection and analysis plan, and
the implications to the study if the required resources
are not set aside and budgeted to collect, collate,
process, and analyse the data.

Assess Study Risk
At this point in the process the assessment team
should take a look at the risks and uncertainties
(Chapter 10) associated with the decisions made with
respect to all of the tasks performed to date (e.g.,
consistency between the scenarios and the data,
models and availability of data, tools and analysis).
The sponsor must be made aware of these risks and
uncertainties and the strategies developed by the team
to mitigate them. If the risks associated with the
successful completion of the study are perceived as
being too high, the solution strategies should be
revisited and adjusted accordingly.

Peer Review
When the risk and uncertainties are perceived as
manageable, a peer review should be conducted. Peer
reviews are not used enough because they tend to be
time-consuming, seen as raising costs, or perceived
as threatening. In addition, research teams often want
to perfect their results and methods before revealing
them. The key is to build a peer review into the study
from the outset. The sponsor should be informed as
to the importance of the peer review. Peer reviews
should be built into the budget and reviewers invited
to look at the terms of reference, interim products, and
draft reports so that they are knowledgeable about
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the effort and motivated to support the project. In later
stages of the study, the peer review can improve
presentation and also act as a mechanism to make
the results known to the professional communities.
Over time the assessment team should develop a
relationship with high quality peers and use them as a
pool of reviewers.
Peer reviews are not a luxury but a necessity.

Conduct of the Study
At this point we are in a position to execute the
assessment. The assessment team leader should
keep a study notebook or journal in which all
assumptions and decisions are documented so that
they are available for detailed discussion. Detailed
administrative records need to be kept regarding the
data, metadata, models, and analytical and
documentation tools. This will enable replication of
parts of the C2 analysis should the need arise. An
effort should be made to create data sets (not just the
project results) that will be available to other
researchers. The resources required to make such
data available to external bodies needs to be made
clear to the sponsor. The conduct of the study will not
usually be linear. It should be anticipated that multiple
iterations will be conducted and that lessons learned
from initial data collection and analysis efforts will
inform subsequent activities.

Study Products
The team must recognise the importance of presenting
the results of the assessment in a clear and
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comprehensive manner, taking into consideration the
style of the decisionmaker (Chapter 11). It is
particularly important that these results illuminate
rather than obscure the uncertainties associated with
the assessment.

Ethics
Professional operations research organisations, such
as the Military Operations Research Society (MORS),
have developed professional codes of ethics (Annex
C). The assessment team should also be guided by a
set of professional ethics and standards of conduct to
ensure the integrity and quality of the analysis. This
means that the assessment team should, inter alia:
• Maintain an open and honest dialogue with the
sponsor and other key players within the project
in order to minimise misunderstandings;
• Ensure that C2 assessments are organised and
conducted in a balanced fashion that adequately
identifies and represents all perspectives,
options, and relevant evidence;
• Inform the sponsor and other key players of:
• any constraints, assumptions, or
circumstances that threaten a balanced
assessment; and
• the risks and uncertainties associated with the
methods and data used in the project, and
• strategies to minimise the risks.
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Chapter 2 Acronyms
ACE Resources – Allied Command Europe Resources
– (Part of SHAPE)
AF(N) – Regional Command (North)
AMF(L) – ACE Mobile Force (Land)
ARRC – ACE Rapid Reaction Corps.
C2 – Command and Control
CDE – Concept Development and Experimentation
CPX – Command Post Exercise
FTX – Field Training Exercise
HB(A) – UK Historical Branch (Army)
HQ – Headquarters
IRTF(L) – Immediate Reaction Task Force (Land)
JCSC – Joint Sub-Regional Command South Centre
JCSE – Joint Sub-Regional Command South East
JFCOM – US Joint Forces Command
KIBOWI – NL Army Exercise Driver
MND(C) – Multinational Division (Central)
MoM – Measures of Merit
MORS – Military Operations Research Society
NC3A – NATO C3 (Consultation, Command &
Control) Agency
NL MOD – Netherlands Ministry of Defence
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OOTW – Operations Other Than War
OA – Operational Analysis
OR – Operations Research
PRL – SHAPE Policy Requirements Land
SACLANT OA – Supreme Allied Command Atlantic
Operational Analysis Cell
SFS – Strike Force South
SHAPE – Supreme HQ Allied Powers Europe
SOW – Statements of Work
WPC – Warrior Preparation Center (Ramstein Germany)
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 2: Participant
Mapping of the Evaluation of the
Immediate Reaction Task Force
(Land) C2 Concept—An Explanation
of Figure 2.1
Background
The Immediate Reaction Task Force (Land) (IRTF(L))
command and control concept was proposed in 1998
as a mechanism to modernise the ACE Mobile Force
(Land) (AMF(L)). The IRTF(L) concept is predicated
on the enlargement of AMF(L) from brigade size up to
division size with a single streamlined headquarters
and a chain of command using embedded mini-Task
Group HQ cells. This was evaluated between 1999
and 2001 as a test case for the NATO Concept
Evaluation and Experimentation (CDE) process using
a series of FTX, CPX, wargames, simulations and
historical analyses.

Assessment Team
In the case of the IRTF(L) study the assessment team
was led by NC3A OR Division, with contracted experts,
analytical and military support from KS Consultants
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and UK DERA. Free analytical support was also made
available at peak periods from US JFCOM and
SACLANT Operational Analysis (such as the exercises
of the experimentation campaign).
The sponsor was SHAPE Policy and Requirements Land—
who were tasked with the evaluation of the C2 Concept.
It was clear to the assessment team as to why the
sponsor wanted the study—a straightforward
evaluation of the military utility (to NATO) of the C2
Concept. However at the end of the study the results
were combined with other issues, and decisions were
made on the future of the unit under study. This was
something that was not foreseen by any of the
participants at the start of the project.

Decisionmakers or Problem Owners
The sponsor’s task was to provide advice up the chain
of command to SACEUR and ultimately the Military
Committee on the efficacy of the C2 Concept. Although
the HQ ACE Mobile Force (Land) was the subject of
the study it was also party to any decision regarding
its own future modernisation. It is commanded directly
by SACEUR via SHAPE.
SACLANT CDE, however, was not in the command
chain, but was seen as a decisionmaker within the
context of the study as it was interested in the
experience of the team in conducting the study as a
test case to illustrate the value of NATO Centred CDE
to the Alliance.
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Stakeholders
The ACE Mobile Force (Land) was the main
stakeholder as it was the subject of the study. As a
decisionmaker, data and assumption provider and also
possible member of a future study team it was in a
very powerful position, and was approached and
treated with much respect by the assessment team.
After a shaky start (where neither side was sure of the
other’s intentions) a good working relationship was
established over the period of the project.
The Netherlands MOD—in the form of the Royal
Netherlands Army—was the provider of the Command
Information System (ISIS) used as the digitisation
vehicle for the evaluation of the concept. As such it
was directly affected by the exercise program used
for the experimentation and also the future of the
concept and AMF(L).
The Military Committee was also a stakeholder,
representing the Nations of NATO that contribute
troops and staff to the AMF(L), and these nations would
be directly affected by any decision on the concept.
ACE Resources at SHAPE were also a stakeholder as
they were required to sanction and organise any manning
changes proposed for the HQ—including the temporary
additional manning required for the evaluation.

Bill Payer
Monies were mostly provided from the slice of the
NC3A Scientific Program Of Work (SPOW) controlled
by SHAPE PRL. In the initial stages of the project
additional monies were also provided by SACLANT.
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Monies also had to be sought from the SHAPE
Exercise budget to pay for movement of the exercise
observers in order to attend the exercises.
Throughout the project the NC3A was the contractual
authority to let contracts on behalf of the bill payer.

Existing Study Teams
An extensive literature search was conducted for the
study—with the majority of recent references occurring
within the UK and US. Exploratory trips (organised
through US JFCOM) to US Battle labs and UK facilities
(through UK DERA) revealed the current state of
knowledge with respect to measuring C2 performance
in exercises and evaluating new C2 concepts. In
response to this the data collection methodology was
based initially on the Fort Leavenworth, US Army
Research Institute ACCES method.

Future Study Teams
It was identified at an early stage that there could be
future related projects. In particular those relating to
expeditionary and initial entry forces. The probable
NATO organizations that could be involved in such
studies were NC3A, SHAPE PRL, AMF(L),
Multinational Division (Central), Strike Force South and
the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. Of course there would
probably be future study teams within the nations—
but these plans are not visible to NATO. Consequently,
as the assessment team was very likely to be involved
in such future work; all data was archived and routinely
written up and published.
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Peer Reviewers
The assessment team were not able to arrange a
formal Peer Review of the solution strategy adopted.
This mechanism does not yet exist for NATO centred
studies. What was achieved the submission of the
problem to the SAS026 panel as an example for testing
the coverage of the revised COBP. This yielded some
practical advice and helped the assessment team
better understand the dynamics of the project.

Data Providers
Most of the data for the evaluation were derived from
NATO training exercises run by or for AMF(L),
MND(C), SFS and Joint Sub Regional Commands
South East and South Centre. In all cases relationships
had to be curried by the assessment team and sponsor
to allow access to the HQ and Exercise Control for
the exercise observers, and for background materiel.
In two cases national exercise training centres and
exercise drivers were hired by the assessment team
to support command post exercises (Warrior
Preparation Center, and the KIBOWI exercise driver).
Historical data for the study was also provided from
the UK Historical Branch (Army)—which was
approached via the contracted UK members of the
assessment team.

Assumption Providers
The assessment team was in the fortunate position to
actually be one of the assumption providers—through
NC3A’s and the sponsor’s involvement in the NATO
Defence Requirements Review. The owner of the C2
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Concept however remained HQ AMF(L) itself, and
therefore remained the authority as to its conceptual
and physical implementation.

Data Collectors
In the case of the IRTF(L) study, data was largely
extracted through observation of HQ activities during
exercises and team-in-the-loop wargames. In all of
these exercises Subject Matter Experts (SME) were
used to observe functional and cross functional
activities in the HQ. Most of the military SMEs were
provided by Regional Command AF NORTH and its
subordinate commands across Allied Command
Europe (ACE). Additional data collectors were also
provided by the German University of the Federal
Armed Forces and US JFCOM. UK DERA provided
military analysts to lead some of the activities involved
in capturing the HQ processes.
1

As developed independently by the SAS-026 panel in February
2001 in response to a presentation in the IRTF(L) project. In
fact, this was fairly close to what was available to the team.
2
Linear programming, dynamic programming, queuing theory,
inventory control, network analysis with PERT, game theory and
simulation.
3
Required if the C2 Assessment makes use of a series of linked
events such as seminars, wargames, command post exercises
(CPX), field training exercises (FTX), etc.

CHAPTER 3

Problem
Formulation

First find out what the question is—
then find out what the real question is.
—Vince Roske

Definition of Problem Formulation

E

ffective problem formulation is fundamental to the
success of all analysis, but particularly in Command
and Control (C2) assessment because the problems
are often ill-defined and complex, involving many
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dimensions and a rich context. Problem formulation
involves decomposition of the analytic problem into
appropriate dimensions such as structures, functions,
mission areas, command echelons, and C2 systems.
Problem formulation is an iterative process that evolves
over the course of the study. It is essential even for
small studies or where time is short—it will save time
later and help ensure quality.
The problem formulation phase should identify the context
of the study and aspects of the problem-related issues.
The context of the study includes:
• Geopolitical context that bounds the problem space;
• Political, social, historical, economic, geographic,
technological environments;
• Actors;
• Threats;
• Aim and objectives of the analysis, including the
decisions to be supported;
• Generic C2 issues;1
• Relevant previous studies; and
• Stakeholders and their organizational affiliation
(including both stakeholders of the problem and
stakeholders of the study).
The aspects of the problem include:
• Issues to be addressed;
• Assumptions;
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• High-level Measures of Merit (MoM);
• Independent variables (controllable and
uncontrollable);
• Constraints on the values of the variables
(domain and range);
• Time constraints on delivery of advice to the
decisionmaker; and
• Whether this is a single decision or (possibly one
of) a chain of decisions to be made over time.
The problem is not formulated until the assessment
team has addressed each aspect of the problem. In
simple terms, problem formulation can be seen as an
iterative process. First, the team must identify the
variables that bound the problem space. Then they
must determine which of these are outputs (dependent
variables) and which of these are inputs (independent
variables). The team proceeds by iterating to build an
understanding of how these relate to each other. It
should be viewed as a voyage of discovery. In most, if
not all, cases of C2 assessment, the knowledge
domain under study is in fact a system characterised
by rich interaction and feedback among all the factors
or variables of interest. The choice of dependent
variables results from a clear specification of the issues
and products needed to satisfy the terms of reference.
Independent and intervening variables are also chosen
based on the purpose of the analysis.
In the initial problem formulation iteration, it is critical
to begin with an understanding of the REAL problem
rather than a determination to apply readily available
tools, scenarios, and data.
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Within the NATO context, a number of documents are
available or under development that may assist in
understanding the study context. They are listed at
the end of this chapter.

Principles of Problem Formulation
There is no universally acceptable approach to
problem formulation. However, best practices exist that
can be applied. The principles associated with problem
formulation are addressed in two categories: those that
are appropriate for all C2 assessments and those that
are appropriate for assessments of C2 for Operations
Other Than War (OOTW).

Principles Appropriate for C2 Assessments
Explicit problem formulation must precede construction
of concepts for analysis or method selection. This is
not a trivial exercise, especially in C2 assessments.
Proper resourcing of problem formulation activities will
improve the overall efficiency and quality of the study.
An understanding of the decisions to be supported by
the analysis and the viewpoints of the various
stakeholders (e.g., customers, users, and suppliers)
is essential to clarifying the study issues. This
understanding should be fed back to the stakeholders.
A careful review of previous and current work must be
carried out as a valuable source of ideas, information,
and insight. This review should also serve to identify
pitfalls and analytic challenges.
Problem formulation must not only provide problem
segments amenable to analysis, but also a clear and valid
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mechanism for meaningful synthesis to provide coherent
knowledge about the original, larger problem. The
formulated problem is thus an abstraction of the real problem
that can be defined in terms of dependent variables that
relate to this real problem and coherent settings for the
independent variables that can be interpreted in terms of
decisions and actions by the customer.
Problem formulation must be broad and iterative in
nature, accepting the minimum of a priori constraints
and using methods to encourage creative and multidisciplinary thinking, such as proposing a number of
hypotheses for the expression of the problem. It must
be recognised that change is inevitable in many
dimensions (e.g., understanding of the problem,
requirements, technologies, co-evolution of concepts
of operation, command concepts, organisation,
doctrine, systems). Thus the assessment process must
anticipate and accommodate this change.
Practical constraints such as data availability, study
resources (including time), and limitations of tools
should be treated as modifiers of the problem
formulation rather than initial drivers. Such constraint
may, in the end, drive the feasible solutions, but it is
important to recognise this as a compromise rather
than an ideal. Proper problem formulation takes
substantial time and effort!
It is important that problem formulation address risk
from multiple perspectives. In addition to sensitivity
analysis of the dependent variables, risk analysis
techniques should be used to directly explore options
to mitigate risk (Chapter 10).

58

NATO Code of Best Practice for C2 Assessment

C2 assessment often involves impacts on defense
business outside the context of a particular campaign
or operation. The study must address these impacts.

Principles Appropriate for OOTW C2
Assessments
Problem formulation must address the geopolitical
context of the problem and seek to identify the “broad”
C2 issues contained within the terms of reference for
the study. There are no universal societal “norms.”
Therefore, care must be taken in attempting to transfer
the experience in one OOTW to another.
OOTW C2 assessments often involve policy-related
impacts outside the context of a particular military
operation. Therefore, MoM hierarchies must contain
measures of policy effectiveness.
An historical perspective is critical to understanding
OOTW because social conflict and structures often
have roots far back in history. However, it must be
remembered that present-day social behaviour is not
driven by historical events themselves, but by presentday perceptions, processes, and prejudices which
have evolved from the past.
A key risk in complex OOTW studies is allowing the
problem formulation process to focus prematurely on
subsets of the problem because they are: a) interesting;
b) familiar; c) pre-judged to be critical; or d) explicitly
called out by the customer. This requires great discipline
by the study team, especially where the team’s previous
experience is biased in favour of particular parts of the
problem space. The assessment team needs access
to subject matter experts from a broad range of
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disciplines (e.g., social scientists, historians, and
regional experts in OOTW assessment).

Problem Formulation Process
During the early stages of problem formulation it is
important to quickly cover the whole problem and
produce an initial formulation (i.e., an explicit
expression of the problem) (See Figure 3.1). This
prevents premature narrowing of the assessment and
serves as an aid to shared situation awareness within
the study team.

Figure 3.1. The Formulated Problem

The process begins with the sponsor presenting the
assessment team with a problem to assess and an
articulation of broad constraints (e.g., schedule,
resources). Based on a preliminary assessment of the
problem, the team identifies the key issues to address.
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This identification of key issues leads to a
characterisation of the context for the study (e.g.,
relevant geopolitical factors, identification of the key
actors and threats, identification of generic C2 issues,
review of prior studies). Based on the results of this
characterisation, the analysis team identifies what it
perceives as the real issues to address. It is vital for the
team to engage in a dialogue with the key sponsor and
stakeholders to get “buy in” for these issues. Once that
is achieved, the team must identify and characterise
the remaining elements of the problem formulation
phase. To facilitate that activity, the analysis team should
identify/create and apply selected problem formulation
tools and techniques (e.g., brainstorming, Delphi
analyses, directed graphics, influence diagrams). The
results of that activity will include a summary of the
assumptions, high-level MoM, independent variables
(both controllable and uncontrollable), and constraints
on the variables. Once it is coordinated with the sponsor
and stakeholders, the end product documents what is
to be done in the analysis. The next key activity will be
to develop a solution strategy that describes how the
study is to be done.

Bounding the Problem/Issues and
Assumptions
In dealing with fuzzy or uncertain boundaries, the
problem formulation process needs to explore and
understand the significance of each boundary before
making (or seeking from customers) assumptions
about it. This involves keeping an open mind, during
the early stages of problem formulation, about where
the boundaries lie and their dimensional nature. This
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is difficult because it makes the problem modelling
process more complicated. A call for hard specification
too early in the problem formulation process must be
avoided. In the end, of course, the problem must be
formulated in order to solve it, but formulation should
be an output from the first full iteration, not an early
input to it.
In formulating an OOTW problem, we are trying to
bound a complex system. This is partly a process of
understanding boundaries which exist in reality (e.g.,
mission statements, geographical areas and the timing
of a procurement process) and partly imposing artificial
boundaries in order to illuminate the structure of the
problem and constrain the scope of the analysis. To
avoid the trap of over-specification, boundaries
(especially self-imposed ones) should be kept porous,
allowing for cause and effect chains to flow through
the external environment of the portion of the complex
system that the boundaries define.
While clear definitions and hard conceptual boundaries
are ultimately necessary in order to create a
manageable problem space, care must be taken to
avoid coming to closure prematurely.

High-Level MoM
Identification of high-level MoM should start with ideal
measures of the desired benefits before considering
what can be practically generated by analysis (the latter
may force the use of surrogate MoM, but these must
be clearly related to the desired measures).
A structured analysis of potential benefits2 should be
carried out as a basis for constructing appropriate
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MoM. Mapping techniques, such as cognitive and
causal mapping, are a good way to express the various
relationships within the problem space and to identify
‘chains’ of analysis (i.e. links among the independent
variables and between the independent and dependent
variables). These lead to resultant structure in terms
of independent and dependent variables, and hence
to high-level MoM.

Problem Formulation Tools
It is useful to identify, develop (if necessary), and apply
appropriate tools to support problem formulation.
Representative tools and techniques include:
techniques for supporting expert elicitation, influence
diagrams, causal maps, system dynamic models, and
agent-based models.
Problem Formulation is fundamentally a social process
of developing a shared understanding. People skills
such as the ability to facilitate a ‘brainstorming session’
or to elicit information and context, are thus important.
‘Throwaway models’ (which may be simple simulation
models, causal maps, system dynamic models, etc.)
may be developed as part of the process, and then
discarded as insight is gained.
Tools and approaches used for problem formulation
must be consistent with other tools and techniques
likely to be considered for the subsequent analysis in
order to produce a sensible ‘multi-methodology’
approach to the entire problem and its solution.
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Constraints on the Variables
The formulation of the problem is completed when the
constraints on either the independent or dependent
variables have been identified. Constraints on the
dependent variables represent “acceptable” thresholds
or limits. For example, one could place a constraint
on blue loss, time to accomplish a mission, collateral
damage, or some combination of factors. Constraints
on the independent variables represent either feasible
or acceptable limits on such factors as human
performance, C2 system performance, or even
supplies. They also could represent doctrinal or legal
processes that act as constraints.

The Next Step
The next step in the C2 assessment process is the
development of a solution strategy. It should be noted
that the team is not finished with problem formulation
at this point but is now ready to proceed to build a
solution strategy. As work progress on the
development of a solution strategy, it will also certainly
be necessary to revisit the specification of high-level
MoM and the constraints. This chapter concludes with
a discussion of the products of problem formulation.

Products of Problem Formulation
Figure 3.2 depicts the essential elements of the
formulated problem.
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Figure 3.2. Problem Formulation

A checklist can be used to ensure that all the aspects
described in the definition have been covered. These include:
• Precise statements of the question being researched;
• A list of independent variables;
• A list of high-level MoM; and
• A list of assumptions and constraints.

Diagrams
Typically, the problem formulation phase should also
produce a number of diagrams such as influence maps
which summarise the key issues and interactions.
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Data Glossary
The problem formulation phase must begin to create
a glossary of key data elements, metadata,
information, and terms.

Chapter 3 Acronyms
C2 – Command and Control
MoM – Measures of Merit
OOTW – Operations Other Than War
TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
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CHAPTER 4

Solution Strategies

Operations research is a scientific method.
Executives have often in the past used some
of the techniques…to help themselves arrive
at decisions…But the term “scientific methods”
implies more than sporadic application and
occasional use of a certain methodology; it
implies recognized and organized activity
amenable to application to a variety of
problems and capable of being taught.
—Philip M. Morse and George E Kimball,
Methods of Operations Research
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The Study Plan

A

conscientious effort is required to create and follow
a study plan that guides data collection and
analyses and prepares for the use of the insights and
data to be collected to contribute to a solution to the
problem at hand. The study plan consists of two interrelated parts—the formulated problem (the What) and
the solution strategy (the How). The output of the initial
problem formulation provides the assessment team
with an operating definition of what needs to be done.
The output of the solution strategy phase provides the
team with an operating definition of how this will be
accomplished. As the project unfolds, there will usually
be a significant amount of iteration that modifies both
the problem formulation and the solution strategy.
Without a study plan, it is unlikely that needed efforts
will be properly scoped, prioritised, scheduled, and
resourced. Even if the way ahead seems clear, the
articulation of a formal Solution Strategy is necessary.
The objective of this phase of the study is to develop
a feasible approach to go from the specification of what
is to be done to how it is to be done. This involves
developing an approach that will result in the team’s
ability to collect the data necessary to determine the
values of the Measures of Merit (MoM) for specified
values of independent variables. The characteristics
of data collection instruments and analysis tools and
techniques will determine the resources required, the
time needed, and the risks inherent in the solution
approach. When compared to the study constraints
and the problem formulation, it will be determined
whether the solution approach is both feasible and
satisfies the requirements of the problem formulation
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(e.g., measures the right things). Figure 4.1 depicts
what is involved in moving from a problem formulation
to a solution strategy.

Figure 4.1. From Problem Formulation to Solution Strategy

Key Definitions
Solution Strategy
A solution strategy consists of the specification of a
set of sequential and parallel analytical steps, often
involving several methodologies and tools. The
solution strategy is designed to begin with what is
known, and by execution of the specified steps, leads
to what one desires to know—an illumination of the
issues. The strategy can be:
• simple—calculate mortgage payments by finding
the input values for the payment equation and
then evaluating the result;
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• moderately complicated—define input variables,
output variables and precision requirements,
create a designed experiment and run the
experiment with appropriate measurements
including the regression analysis; or
• extremely complex—identify the relevant
variables and systems of variables, specify how
they might be measured, hypothesize how they
are related, and design research strategies that
allow for complex adaptive systems or other
“messy” structures or processes.
The solution strategy must take the outputs from
problem formulation, refine and operationalise them,
and develop a plan to collect and analyse appropriate
data (including the development and/or selection of
models, the design of collection instruments, and the
selection of analysis tools) to understand the
relationships among the relevant variables associated
with MoM, the scenarios, and human and
organisational factors. (Figure 4.2)

Measures of Merit (MoM)
MoM are a set of variables that focus the assessment
on the issues of interest. In most analyses, these are
the dependent variables. In many cases there are
significant inter-relationships among the MoM.

Human Factors
Human factors consists of a set of variables that
characterise concepts including beliefs, cultural norms,
stress, fatigue, fear, arousal, morale, intelligence, and
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level of experience. In Command and Control (C2)
assessments these are typically independent or
intervening variables.

Organisational Factors
Organisational factors consist of a set of variables that
characterise organisations, such as cohesion,
command structure, explicit and tacit relationships,
information flows, and organisational cultures. These
are also typically independent of intervening variables
in C2 analyses.

Scenarios
Scenarios consist of the evolution in time of several
elements: a context (e.g., a characterisation of a
geopolitical situation), the participants (e.g., intentions,
capabilities of blue, red, others), and the environment
(e.g., natural, weather and manmade, mines). In C2
assessments, the purpose of scenarios is to ensure
that the analysis is performed within the appropriate
range of opportunities to observe the relevant variables
and their interrelationships.

Model
A model is a physical, analogue, or symbolic
representation of relevant aspects of reality for a
purpose. It is an abstraction of reality. A model
emphasises particular aspects (a subset) of reality.
The assessment model of primary interest is the
assessment team’s model (conceptual or in some
analytic manifestation) of the C2 problem including the
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variables of interest, their hypothesised relationships,
and any prior assumption about their values and
linkages. The assessment team may also employ or
develop other models or simulations in order to perform
analysis or explore risks and uncertainties. Some teams
will employ more than one of these analytic tools.

Tool
A tool facilitates the exploration of relationships among
model variables and/or develops “solutions” (e.g.,
maximise value subject to constraints). A tool may be
as simple as a checklist or an algorithm, or it may be
an extremely large simulation. A simulation is the
instantiation of a model that serves to facilitate the
exploration of the relationships among the variables –
it generates data for analysis and generally
emphasises the passage of time. Models and
simulations are frequently subdivided into categories
of constructive, virtual, and live.
Occasionally, the distinctions among a tool, model,
and data are subtle. For example, in a linear program
the model is the set of formulas that specify the
objective function and the constraints. The tool is the
simplex method (or similar algorithmic solution
method). The data is an instantiation of the formulas
(provides values for the coefficients and constants).
In the case of a simulation, the simulation environment
and simulation engine are the tools, the coded
simulation embodies the model, and the input values
to the simulation comprise the data. Often, the
simulation code and the data, together, are required
for a complete definition of the model.
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Data
Data are the values associated with the variables. Data
may be ratio, interval, ordinal, or nominal in scale. Data
may originate from empirical observation; be derived from
models, simulations, or analyses; be established from
subject matter experts; or be established by assumption.

Developing a Solution Strategy
The development of a solution strategy is an iterative
process that strikes an artful balance between what
the team would like to do and what, given the state of
the art, the available data, tools, schedule, and
resources, is possible to do.

Prerequisites
The solution strategy should not be designed before
the problem formulation process is substantially
complete (Figure 4.1) and the problem formulation
products specified in Chapter 3 are available to the
team. This means that:
• The “real” question to be answered is known;
• The assumptions have been articulated;
• The high level MoM have been identified;
• The independent variables have been identified; and
• The constraints associated with the variables
have been identified.
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However, the assessment team should always
remember the inherently iterative nature of the
process. Adjustments may prove necessary in the
problem formulation as the solution strategy matures.

Steps in Developing a Solution Strategy
As an initial step, the team should elaborate on the
MoM to specify the detailed MoM that are to be
evaluated. This is sometimes referred to as developing
operational definitions for the MoM—definitions that
specify the metric to be used, the instrument, and the
context in which the measurement is to take place.
Often the value of a particular MoM can not easily be
observed or measured and one or more surrogate
measures are used in its place. In any event, the
development of the set of MoM to be used in the study
anchors the process that will eventually lead to a
solution strategy.
This process (Figure 4.2) revolves around the
conceptual model that the assessment team builds,
and is at the heart of that process. It is best practise to
make this model explicit and have it serve as the
common picture that develops a high quality of shared
understanding among the team, sponsors,
stakeholders, and other key study participants. The
initial conceptual model consists simply of the MoM, a
first cut of the hypothesised relationships among them,
assumptions about variables and their relationships,
and constraints. Later iterations include additional
independent variables that are known or assumed to
affect the values of the MoM or the nature of the
relationship among them, increasingly detailed
specifications of relationships, and specific values or
ranges for the independent variables.
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Figure 4.2. Solution Strategy

The identification of human and organisational factors
that impact model variables and relationships serves
to flesh out the basic conceptual model generated in
the problem formulation phase.
Scenarios then need to be derived to provide
opportunities in an appropriate context for data
collection and exploration of the variables and
relationships contained in the conceptual model. The
data the study requires are, in large measure, a
derivative of the scenarios utilized and the design of
the assessment.
The design of an assessment also requires
specification of methods and tools and how they will
be employed. Methods and tools are required to
explore the relationships among the independent
variables and between the independent and dependent
variables. Complex solution strategies may be
necessary. In these cases, multiple analyses will be
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implied. The problem must be divided into parts, each
part requiring analysis with its own set of tools.
Frequently the tools that are available do not provide
interfaces from one part of the analysis to the next.
Taken together, the detailed specification of the MoM,
the development of a conceptual model including the
relevant human and organisational factors, the
specification of a set of scenarios, and a data collection
and analysis plan (that consists of the methods and
tools to be used) constitute a solution strategy.
The solution strategy developed needs to be tested to
see if it can be expected to address the issues at hand,
within schedule and resource constraints, and with
accepted levels of uncertainty and risk. However,
uncertainty and risks are being continually assessed
throughout the process of developing a solution
strategy. The team should also consider the form of
study output and its relevance to the decisionmaker.
Iteration of these ideas with the stakeholders
throughout the study helps to avoid surprises and to
ensure that the basic assumptions underlying the study
have not changed.

Iterating the Study Plan
Figure 4.3 depicts the iterative nature of the process
involved in developing the Overall Study Plan, linking
problem formulation and solution strategies together
with the inputs from study sponsors and stakeholders.
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Figure 4.3. Overall Study Plan

A first order feedback loop is shown between problem
formulation and solution strategy, with both processes
having iterative internal processes. An analysis of the
study of risk and uncertainty provides the control
mechanism that drives the iterative process to an
acceptable result.

Study Management Plan
The team should also create and maintain a Study
Management Plan (SMP) to guide the direction,
management and co-ordination of the project team. The
SMP should include a detailed, time-phased execution
plan for the study and a Work Breakdown Structure
(WBS).1 The SMP should show the requirements for all
the team products and their delivery dates thereby
creating delivery milestones for the execution of the
study. It should show the planned dates for all scheduled
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meetings including progress meetings and technical
interchange meetings. The plan should also include a
time-phased manning plan identifying the types,
quantities, and period of performance for all members
of the study team. The SMP should include details of
the controls that will be applied to supervise any
contractor performance. The team should maintain a
current version of the SMP during the study period of
performance. The SMP would typically include the
associated supporting plans:
• Study glossary;
• Analysis plan;
• Tool deployment and modelling and simulation plan;
• Data collection/engineering plan;
• Configuration management plan;
• Explicit consideration of risk and uncertainty;
• Quality assurance plan;
• Security plan;
• Review plan; and
• Plan of deliverables.
The elements of an ideal SMP are defined and
discussed below.

Study Glossary
The assessment team should create and maintain a
study glossary comprising all relevant definitions
needed in the study. It should aim to create a general
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study glossary that is improved by every study that
uses this glossary. As a starting point, the NATO AAP6, “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions,” or the
Joint Publication 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms,” should be used.

Analysis Plan
The assessment team should also create and maintain
an analysis plan for the study. The analysis plan should
describe the analyses in detail. This description should
include the analysis methodology, the tools to be used
for analysis, the input data requirements, the Essential
Elements of Analysis (EEA), the MoM to be used to
evaluate the results, and any analysis assumptions.

Tool Deployment and Modelling and
Simulation Plan
The team may create and maintain a tool deployment
and modelling and simulation plan covering the needs
of each task for numerical simulations or other applied
means of operations analysis (OA). It should describe
the use of tools and models and simulations in the
feasibility study (FS). The plan should include a
description of each tool to be used, a list of the key
assumptions and caveats for each tool, an analysis of
the suitability of each tool in addressing the functionality
and performance issues in the FS, the source of input
data for each tool, the available output from each tool,
and should detail any changes to these tools that are
intended. The plan should indicate how data
traceability from one tool to another will be maintained.
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The modelling and simulation plan may be included
as part of the analysis plan in simple studies.

Data Collection/Engineering Plan
The team should create and maintain a Data
Collection/Engineering Plan (DCEP) which covers data
and metadata necessary to describe:
• The scenario;
• The essential elements of analysis in the analysis plan;
• The MoM to be used to evaluate the result (also
in the analysis plan); and
• The input and output parameters of tools to be
used within the study.
The DCEP describes and documents who owns the
data, where the data can be found (including open
sources like the Web), necessary methodologies and
procedures to prepare the data, and assumptions and
constraints connected to generated data, etc. The data
definitions used in the DCEP have to be harmonised
with the study glossary.

Configuration Management Plan
The team should create and maintain a configuration
management plan. The plan should ensure
identification, traceability and control of the descriptions
of the system elements, interfaces and architectures
considered in the FS, as well as associated
documentation. The plan should show how the study
database must be controlled and updated. The plan
should follow NATO STANAG 4159, “NATO Materiel
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Configuration Management Policy and Procedures for
Multi-National Joint Projects” (1992), as a guideline.
The plan should also ensure that the description of
the system configuration being simulated or analysed
can be precisely identified, as well as any system or
technology improvements considered, with respect to
an identified baseline configuration.

Study Risk Register
The team should also identify and assess the technical
and schedule risks concerned with the successful
completion of the FS. The list of risks identified should
be maintained in a study risk register, which shows
the probability of occurrence of each risk and its impact
on the FS. The register should include the risk
mitigation activity for each risk and the expected
improvements to time and performance. The study risk
register should be regularly maintained, should be
available to the assessment team by arrangement, and
should be presented at each progress meeting. The
Generic Risk Register (GRR) developed during the
SAS-026 efforts (Chapter 10) is recommended.

Quality Assurance Plan
The team should create and maintain a quality
assurance plan. The plan should declare all relevant
quality standards and procedures that are to be applied
in the course of the study, and should describe the
quality organisation to be used, including the principal
quality officers and their lines of authority. The policy
and requirements for quality assurance in NATO are
given in the following documents, which should be used
as guidelines:
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• STANAG 4107, “Mutual Acceptance of
Government Quality Assurance and Usage of
the Allied Quality Assurance Publications
(AQAPs),” 6th Edition (March 1998).
• AQAP 100, “General Guidance on NATO Quality
Assurance,” 2nd Edition (March 1995) or
equivalent/comparable national standards.

The Security Plan
The team should create and maintain a security plan.
This plan should contain the approach to the utilisation,
storage, publication, dissemination, and control of
classified and unclassified materials.

Review Plan
The team should create and maintain a review plan.
For every critical phase of the study, preferably marked
by respective milestones, reviews of the study have
to be planned and executed. Participants should go
beyond the members of the study team to include peer
reviews. The review results should be documented.

Plan of Deliverables
The team should also create and maintain a plan of
deliverables for each phase of the study. This includes
what is to be delivered, when it is to be delivered, to
whom, in what form and format, and how many copies.

Chapter 4 Acronyms
C2 – Command and Control
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DCEP – Data Collection/Engineering Plan
EEA – Essential Elements of Analysis
FS – Feasibility Study
GRR – Generic Risk Register
MoM – Measures of Merit
OA – Operations Analysis
SMP – Study Management Plan
WBS – Work Breakdown Structure
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A WBS is a decomposition of the effort into its constituent parts
(or tasks) and the assignment of assets to the component tasks.
Assets may be people’s time, facilities, or other elements
required to complete the task. WBS are common in construction
and engineering projects.

CHAPTER 5

Measures of Merit

It’s best to know what you are looking
for, before you look for it.
—Winnie the Pooh, from A. A. Milne

I

n order to understand the impact of Command and
Control (C2), it is necessary not only to analyse and
measure the effect of C2 on military operations, but
also the effects on the components of the constituent
systems. No single measure or methodology exists
that satisfactorily assesses the overall effectiveness
of C2. Therefore, a multi-faceted and sometimes multiphased approach is necessary. The benefits of C2
should be evaluated through their impact on the
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fulfilment of the military and policy objectives, and the
impact of C2 should be measured in terms of specific
qualities that are relevant to these objectives. A set of
scenarios provides the contexts in which Measures of
Merit (MoM) are determined.

MoM Challenges
During the last two decades, many new automated
C2 systems have been developed and fielded.
However, the determination of both the performance
and the effectiveness of these systems has proven to
be a complex problem. Recognising this, the Military
Operations Research Society (MORS) has sponsored
several workshops on MoM since 1985. The
workshops have led to the development of an analysis
framework, Modular Command and Control Evaluation
Structure (MCES), for the measurement of
performance and effectiveness within a conceptual
model for C2. Based on the MORS workshops, the
US Army’s Training & Doctrine Command Analysis
Center (TRAC) developed the C2 Measures of
Effectiveness (MoE) Handbook in 1990. This
document and the measurement tools developed for
the Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment System
(HEAT) and the Army Command and Control
Evaluation System (ACCES) represented the then
established best practices.
The AC/243 Panel 7 Ad Hoc Working Group (AHWG)
on the Impact of Command, Control, Communications
& Intelligence (C3I) on the Battlefield acknowledged that
the specification of measures of effectiveness is difficult.
The 1992 final report recommended that a hierarchy of
measures be established as an important step in
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understanding overall system effectiveness, and that
systems be analysed at different levels of detail. The
types of measures were grouped relating to C2 system
performance, force/commander effectiveness, and
battle outcome. To quote from the final report,
“Measures…are often inadequate and too model or
scenario specific. In addition, they have often been
generated in ad hoc ways, suggesting a lack of formal
analysis in their development.” Since then, RSG-19,
SAS-002 and SAS-026 have canvassed the field, and
have brought together the best ideas and practices in
order to support MoM development and applications
within C2 assessment.1 This version of the Code of Best
Practise (COBP) extends this thinking and includes the
Operations Other Than War (OOTW) domain.

Definitions
It has been recognised that a single definition for
measures of performance (MoP) and effectiveness
(MoE) does not exist. MoM is recommended as a
generic term to encompass different classes of
measures. The measures are defined in hierarchical
levels related to each other, each in terms of its own
boundary. From the conceptual viewpoint, it is
important to keep in mind the level of analysis and the
context in which the measurements are made.
Within the MCES framework, MORS has developed a
four-level hierarchy of measures from high-level force
effectiveness to low-level rudimentary measures of
physical entities, which were adopted by RSG-19. In
the context of OOTW, a fifth level is added, Measures
of Policy Effectiveness (MoPE), to characterise the
contribution of military actions to broader policy and
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societal outcomes. For OOTW, political factors are
paramount and considerations such as media
coverage, local regional stability, and sustainment of
community societal standards must be taken into
account. Military missions may not directly achieve
policy objectives, although they often strive to provide
an environment more conducive to these objectives.
However, MoE of military tasks should quantify
performance against military missions, not the overall
political aspirations.
The Code of Best Practice has adopted the following
five levels of MoM:
• Measures of Policy Effectiveness (MoPE), which
focus on policy and societal outcomes;
• Measures of Force Effectiveness (MoFE), which
focus on how a force performs its mission or the
degree to which it meets its objectives;
• Measures of C2 Effectiveness (MoCE), which
focus on the impact of C2 systems within the
operational context;
• Measures of Performance (MoP), which focus on
internal system structure, characteristics and
behaviour; and
• Dimensional Parameters (DP), which focus on
the properties or characteristics inherent in the
physical C2 systems.
Figure 5.1 emphasises the diminishing impact of a
particular MoM as the circle widens.
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Figure 5.1. Relationships of Measures of Merit

Measurement Objectives
The important issues raised by decision-makers
require a sense of the degree to which C2 performance
may improve force and policy effectiveness. Therefore,
C2 assessments are often called upon to provide
convincing evidence of the expected improvements
in mission effectiveness that can be attributed to
improved C2. The ideal approach may be to define a
single measure that reflects the military and political
objectives of the missions under consideration.
However, the determination of such a measure is
generally not feasible, although not necessarily
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impossible for particular classes. In most
decisionmaking problems, it is necessary to define
several measures that together provide the necessary
insights. A major reason for this is that a single
measure may not provide sufficient scope and/or detail
to analyse the impact of specific C2 elements,
particularly second and third order effects or
unintended consequences. Many analyses are
conducted precisely in order to enable trade-off
between important equities which can only be seen if
a set of MoM is generated for analysis. The set of
MoM selected must be comprehensive to ensure that
all factors are considered.
MoM are used to compare different options on equal
terms, and serve a wide range of purposes, including:
• Establishing a standard or expectation of
performance (for new requirements);
• Establishing the bounds of performance of a system
as well as the effects of imposed constraints;
• Comparing and selecting alternative systems that
may be very dissimilar but are designed to
achieve a similar purpose;
• Assessing the utilisation of a system in new or
unexpected application domains or missions;
• Identifying potential weaknesses in specific areas
of an organisation or system (areas of high error
potential or high user workload);
• Analysing the impacts of organisational changes;
• Analysing training effectiveness;
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• Determining the most cost-effective approaches
to achieve desired objectives;
• Comparing a replacement system, or
components of a system, against predecessors
or competitors;
• Assisting in generating and validating
requirements and deriving specific C2
requirements from broad statements of objectives;
• Evaluating the effectiveness of human
decisionmaking in the C2 cycle;
• Determining the degree of mission success; and
• Determining the return to normality in OOTW.

Characteristics of MoM
The development of an operational definition of the
measure, the development of instruments, the
application of the instruments to collect of appropriate
data, and the establishment of relationships among a
group of MoM vary in difficulty, effort, cost, precision,
generalizability and other characteristics. These
differences are often related to the type(s) of MoM
involved and the domain in which the measurement
needs to take place.
C2 Assessments involve measurement of variables
that exist in the physical, information, and cognitive
domains.2 In general, the development of operational
definitions, instrumentation and data collection for
variables to be measured in the physical and
information domains are more straightforward and
require less effort and expense than dealing with
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variables that are measured in the cognitive domain.
Furthermore, the former can be measured more
“precisely,” are easier to comprehend, and are less
subject to interpretation than the latter.
In general, DP, MoP related to systems, and MoFE
tend to be measured in the physical domain (e.g.,
bandwidth, computing capacities, time to accomplish
a task, force exchange ratios) while MoP related to
measures of C2 effectiveness (quality of awareness,
shared awareness, and trust) and MoPF (will of an
adversary, public opinion) tend to be measured in the
cognitive domain.
As one goes up the hierarchy of MoM, the measures
tend to become more context, task, or mission specific.
For example, the performance characteristics of systems
(DP) apply to systems in general but MoFE are usually
limited to a set of tasks or missions. MoFE for combat
are very different from MoFE for various OOTW. If done
well measures of C2 effectiveness will be scenario
independent so one can compare C2 effectiveness
across a range of missions and circumstances.
Except for DP any of the MoM can be either an
independent or dependant variable in a given
assessment with any of the independent variables
being either “controllable” or not. The difficulty in
establishing relationships among the MoM varies as
a function of the level of the independent variable.
The Assessment Team should recognize and plan for
the difficulties associated with using various MoM and
should avoid substituting easier to deal with but less
relevant MoM. It is always better to try to measure
(estimate, approximate) MoM that reflect first order
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effects than to precisely measure MoM that do not
adequately reflect key aspects of the problem.

Measuring MoM
This section outlines measurement theory concepts
that apply to ensure that the right measuring
instruments are selected and applied correctly. By
definition, measurement is the assignment of values
to observation units that express properties of the units.
Four levels of measures relate numbers to properties
of interest: nominal (e.g., artillery vs. infantry), rank or
ordinal (e.g., worst to best), relative or interval value
(e.g., change in temperature), and absolute value or
ratio (e.g., 2 kilobits per second). Analysts must ensure
that the specific MoM adopted are at the appropriate
levels of measurement.
The key properties for quality assurance are reliability
and validity. Other significant properties include
practical issues, such as the effort required to collect
appropriate data and the convenience of measurement
(e.g., whether the collection process itself interferes
with the conduct of an exercise or experiment). Ideally,
measurements should be easy to capture and easy to
apply. There are clearly trade-offs to be made between
MoM that may closely track the property of interest
and that are costly and/or difficult to measure and those
that are less strongly related to the property of interest
but that are easier to measure. The effort required for
collection bears no direct relationship with validity, but
reliability may be related to cost. Reliable
measurements require repeated observations and
appropriate sample sizes. Reliability represents
accuracy and consistency. A cost-effective
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measurement plan provides enough data for useful
and definitive conclusions. However, cost and/or
convenience of measurement may be an overriding
factor in system evaluation.
Failure to take validity and reliability into account raises
the risk of generating false conclusions. Validity and
reliability are not absolutes, but matters of degree.
Validity is the degree to which a measure characterises
the attribute of interest and only that attribute. Complex
concepts often require multiple measures to provide
valid information. In order to make a valid link between
the performance of a system as a whole against
performance of its components, the measures must
correspond to critical tasks. Reliability represents
accuracy and repeatability. A measure may be reliable
but not valid, or it may be valid but not reliable.

Validity
The properties of validity may be categorised into five
types: internal, construct, statistical, external, and expert.
• Internal validity is defined as the establishment of
causal relationships between variables of
interest. This is necessary to accept a
hypothesis that a given measure is responsible
for a specific effect on another measure;
• Construct (also referred to as content) validity
means that the target objects, and only the target
objects, are measured;
• Statistical validity implies that sufficient sensitivity
is involved in order to determine relationships
between independent and dependent variables.
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Statistical tests control two types of errors in
measurement. Type I, or alpha, is the probability
of rejecting a claimed hypothesis that is true,
Type II, or beta, is the probability of accepting an
hypothesis that is not true;
• External validity implies that the results may be
extended to other populations or environments; and
• Expert validity refers to the degree to which
measures are accepted by those knowledgeable
in the field.
A MoM should meet the validity-related criteria outlined
in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Validity Criteria of Measures

Reliability
Reliability involves the expectation of errors associated
with measurements. It is defined as the accuracy of a
measurement, as reflected in the variance of repeated
measurements of the same phenomenon. The key
principles of reliability are consistency (repeatability)
and accuracy. The variance associated with
measurement must be known or estimated to interpret
results and to discriminate between real effects and
measurement effects.
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The reliability-related criteria that MoM should meet
are outlined in Table 5.2. Additional criteria that have
proven usual in the past are outlined in Table 5.3.

Table 5.2. Reliability Criteria of Measures

Table 5.3. Other Useful Criteria

Practical MoM Issues
The assessment of C2 requires the application of a
framework to yield values for appropriate MoM.
Analyses of C2 systems and processes often reveal a
complex hierarchical composition. A structured
resolution/functional decomposition approach may be
related to the organisational structure to yield
performance measures for the organisation as a whole,
individual components within the organisation, and
specific tasks within the organisational cells.
If the analyst assumes that C2 effectiveness is positively
correlated with overall military unit effectiveness, MoM
could be obtained by addressing the outcomes or
products of such unit activities. Goal-level evaluation
attempts to define the ability of the specific military
formation to make the system state match the goal
(directive) provided by the superior headquarters. These
are measures of force effectiveness. The degree to
which the system state matches the desired goal states

Chapter 5

101

indicates a level of effectiveness. Alternatively, C2
effectiveness may be viewed as dependent on the
functional processes of the C2 system, with measures
obtained mainly at the task level.
A C2 assessment framework encompasses several
factors that must be considered iteratively, as
discussed in the introductory chapter. Typical factors
important for the identification and selection of MoM
include the:
• Assessment configuration, e.g., storyboard,
testbed, constructive simulation, field trial;
• Assessment goal or purpose;
• Context, assumptions, and constraints;
• Scenarios or stimuli;
• Collection means, e.g., subject matter experts,
automatic data logging;
• Analysis plan; and
• Interpretation of results.

Categories of Measures
A common thread in the approaches for C2
assessment is the functional decomposition of the C2
cycle. C2 effectiveness depends upon the functional
processes of the C2 system, and the evaluation of
functions may be determined by data measured at the
task level.
The evaluation of tasks provides the most detailed
insight into C2 activities. The primary measures are
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expressed in terms of time consumed and accuracy.
Task analysis must be performed prior to evaluation,
with the identification of task definition and the critical
elements for successful task completion.
Measures of a C2 system’s behaviour may thus be
reduced to measures based on time, accuracy, or a
combination which may be interdependent. Time
based measures are quantitative, while accuracy
measures may be quantitative or qualitative.
For C2 tasks, time-based metrics include the:
• Time taken to react to an event (time to notice
process and act upon new information);
• Time to perform a task (time to make decision);
• Time horizon for future for predictive analysis; and
• Rate of performing tasks (tempo).
Metrics for accuracy include:
• Precision of the observed system(s) performance;
• Reliability of the observed system(s) performance;
• Completeness (known unknowns, unknown unknowns);
• Errors (alpha, beta, omission, transposition,
severity); and
• Quality of information produced.
Some accuracy measures may be calculated in units
of time, e.g., the time taken to detect an error. Quality
of decisions is difficult to evaluate objectively, except
by focusing on outcomes. The processes involved may
have to be examined to obtain objective measures, or
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subject matter experts may be consulted to make an
evaluation. Accuracy of information implies both the
accuracy of the data and the accuracy of the
interpretation of the data.
Time based and accuracy measures often bear an
inverse relationship, implying a trade-off between speed
of performance and accuracy of performance. Speed
of performance must be specified in terms of minimum
desired accuracy or completeness, and accuracy
measurements in terms of time available. Therefore,
the specification of thresholds or standards for metrics
must be referenced in terms of imposed constraints.
Examples of time and accuracy based measures are
compiled in Table 5.4. Table 5.5 provides some
additional examples, specifically MoP and MoCE.

Table 5.4. Examples of Time- and Accuracy-Based Measures
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Table 5.5. Examples of MoPs and MoCEs

Example Headquarters C2 MoM
C2 measures may also be divided into sets
corresponding to the sequential steps of the C2 cycle.
These include:
• Monitoring and understanding: information
transmission, values, times, effect, comprehension;
• Planning: information exchange, coordination,
impact, flexibility, process quality; and
• Directing and disseminating.
The MoM for C2 can also be focused on four levels: a
network of headquarters, a single headquarters, the
individual cells within the headquarters, and
performance of specific tasks within the cells.
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OOTW MoM
While national NATO policies require that military
forces be prepared for high intensity conflict, forces
have been increasingly involved in low-intensity
conflicts and C2 analyses for OOTW are therefore
becoming important. OOTW include force deployment
to create or maintain conditions for a political solution
in order to avoid escalation into hostilities. Threats to
international and national security may also unfold from
natural disasters, terrorism organised crime, civil
unrest, migration, or other territorial intrusions. Most
OOTW are inherently joint or combined operations.
While the determination of MoM has been stated as
difficult to obtain, OOTW offer even greater challenge
for MoM. Traditional MoFE such as loss exchange
ratios, combat effectiveness, or duration of the
campaign are rarely applicable to OOTW. In such
operations, military forces may play important roles
but political concerns may limit the scope of imposable
solutions. Public and political pressures may result in
shifts in the selection of criteria for MoM e.g., more
emphasis may be placed on personnel casualties and
less on equipment losses.

OOTW MoPE
While MoFE and MoCE provide measures of success
for military operations, MoPE measure the degree of
attaining political objectives. In some cases, such as
humanitarian assistance or nation building MoPE may
measure the degree of improvement in the quality of
life of the populace.
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MoFE usually were the highest MoM used within the
analysis of Article V missions 3 assuming that
effectiveness is directly related to the higher level
MOPE such as “winning the war.” However, such an
assumption may not always apply to OOTW. For
example, military actions that would be highly effective
in accomplishing mission objectives in war might be
quite counterproductive in OOTW. In fact, the value
of military actions in OOTW is not so much a question
of physical effects, but rather how military actions and
their physical effects are perceived by the various
actors and the population in the theatre, how the
military actors interpret the behaviour of the other
actors and the critical mission task conditions such
as, for example, political interest and media attention.
McCafferty and Lea developed low-level military-related
measures (MoCE) to cover OOTW (McCafferty and Lea,
1997). The MoM, which are classified as MoCE, include the:
• Time between the arrival of friendly forces in the
area and their deployment;
• Time between deployment of friendly forces and
contact with adversary forces;
• Length of time adversary forces were under
observation without posing a threat to friendly forces;
• Length of time friendly forces are in potential
danger (i.e., adversary forces have the
opportunity to fire on friendly forces); and
• Time horizon of friendly C2 processes (how far
into the future they are focused).
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Mobility may be important for OOTW, as well as
sustainability and self-sufficiency in theatre, with the
implication of emphasising measures of reliability and
maintainability. Moreover, the perception of the
capabilities of deployed forces acts as deterrence or
coercion on the parties in conflict.
Some examples identified by McCafferty and Lea are:
• Opportunities to employ forces, which reflects the
range of military capabilities available;
• Strategic deployment, which is related to
deploying and recovering the right force to
theatre efficiently and in time;
• Endurance, to maintain an effective force in
theatre for an extended time;
• Mission objectives, to measure the success of
achieving military objectives in OOTW; and
• Successful termination, to deal with progress to
the desired end state (the criteria may be political
and thus not measured by military activities).
One class of effectiveness indicators in OOTW is
provided by transition measures, which focus on the
progress in the transfer of responsibilities to the followon military force or civil agency. Transition measures
focus on the degree that follow-on organisations
assume tasks and responsibilities.
Progress toward success may be tracked by normality
indicators, which are indirect measures of the effects
of military involvement in OOTW, although causal
relationships are difficult to prove (Lambert, 2000).
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These MoPE may be obtained by evaluating the extent
to which conditions have been restored.
Normality indicators measure the level of improvement
in the quality of life of the general population, and may
be defined as “relative measures of the state of
normalcy characterising an element of the civil
environment, through data collected on a regular basis
and assessed to have the frequency, quantity,
consistency and coverage required to make a useful
objective assessment of the changes occurring in the
civilian populace.” (Department of National Defence,
Canada, 1999). Normality indicators can be grouped
in categories and adapted to meet the changing
requirements: political, socio-economic levels of
development, cultural, legal and technological.

Table 5.6. Normality Indicators

Limitations of normality indicators include:
• Inexperienced personnel available for data
collection and analysis. A mix of inexperienced
civil and military personnel are often assigned to
collect data in fields foreign to them; training may
be necessary to assure reliable and valid data;
• Temporary effect due to military presence for data
collection. The mere presence of military personnel
collecting data may affect normality measurements;
• Difficulties in obtaining valid and reliable data
calibrated against baselines. It may be difficult to
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establish the threshold for “normality” if archive
data is not available;
• Extrapolation in space and time from a specific
locality. It may be inappropriate to extrapolate civil
progress to an entire region. Sampling is important;
• Limited resources and constraints for collection
and analysis. Data must be collected
consistently but may be occasionally
unobtainable due to physical inaccessibility or
lack of personnel;
• A “snapshot” which may not provide trends if
infrequently obtained. Trend analysis requires
sufficient data and sampling rates; and
• During OOTWs, the relevant MoM may change
over time, particularly the lower level MoCE and
MoP. For example, during the earliest phases of
NATO operations in Bosnia, tracking weapon
systems and knowing how many of them were in
cantonments was a major MoM. Once the forces
were separated and most weapon systems under
control, emphasis shifted to the disruptive activities
such as road blocks and ethnic harassment. As
these behaviours became less frequent, NATO’s
emphasis shifted to normality indicators.

MoM Hierarchies: Some Examples
Modular Command and Control Evaluation System
Evaluation of C2 effectiveness requires a
comprehensive approach for the preparation of the
evaluation process, the collection of data, and its
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interpretation. MCES addresses both the managerial
and analytical aspects of evaluation and was originally
developed for the systematic comparison of C2
systems. The objective of MCES is to guide analysts
in the identification of appropriate measures for
estimating the effects of C2 on combat.
MCES prescribes a process of measurement, but does
not identify either a measurement system or a set of
measures. Similarly, while calling for the collection of
data, MCES does not provide details on how data are
to be collected. MCES does provide guidance on how
good measures and good collection procedures are
characterised, but leave the details of the
measurement, data collection, and analysis plans to
the analyst.
MCES considers C2 as consisting of three components:
• Physical entities (equipment, software, people);
• Structure (interrelationships of entities); and
• Processes (C2 functions).
The boundary of a C2 system here is defined as a delineation
between the system studied and the environment. The US
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) C2
MoCE Handbook adds mission objective as the top layer
of the hierarchy of C2 components.
MCES focuses on measures as opposed to models,
but includes the cybernetic loop model of generic C2.
It consists of seven procedural steps.
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HEAT
While originally developed for theatre-level combat
applications, the HEAT system has proven robust. For
example, it has been used to assess US Department
of State crisis task force performance, military
operations in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti, and several
exercises focused on peacekeeping, and humanitarian
assistance missions. The underlying C2 process of
monitoring, understanding, and developing alternative
actions; predicting the consequences of each
alternative for each possible future under
consideration, decision; developing and promulgation
of plans and directives and requests for support;
seeking information; making reports; and responding
to inquiries are all relevant across the ranges of OOTW
missions. HEAT has been modified since 2000 to
include measure of the quality of collaboration, which
is often a key process in OOTW.
ACCES
ACCES is a derivation of HEAT, which was developed
primarily for joint theatre-level operations. ACCES
reorganised HEAT concepts into army doctrinal
language and doctrine, but shares the same
philosophy. ACCES has been applied to numerous
division and corps command centre assessments. It
represents a comprehensive set of practical and
objective performance measures for C2 activities. The
primary focus of ACCES is the overall performance of
a command centre or network of command centres,
at various stages of the C2 process, from the collection
of data to the conversion of data to intelligence to the
implementation of plans and directives. The underlying
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approach to ACCES is that C2 comprises
interdependent sub-processes which can be observed
and measured. ACCES considers C2 as an adaptive
control process, where information collected from the
outside is processed internally to generate plans that
may be adapted to reflect new information. ACCES
takes the view that the overall effectiveness of a
command centre can be judged by the viability of its
plans. A good plan is one that can be executed without
the need for modification beyond the contingencies
stated in the plan and that remains in effect throughout
its intended life.
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT)
MAUT is similar to ACCES in the sense that both use
functional decomposition and function-specific
evaluation metrics. The major differences are that MAUT
can be used with any set of metrics (including those
from ACCES), which must be specified by the analyst.
MAUT assigns weights to the MoM at each level of the
MoM hierarchy and utility values or scores at the lowest
level. MAUT then aggregates upwards the weighted
scores to provide composite scores of effectiveness.
MAUT, if properly used with appropriate application of
judgmental weights, will allow integrated analyses based
on multiple MoM. While this is often satisfying to
decisionmakers (it provides a single index of quality),
analysis should always monitor the components of such
indices as they may provide insight into strength and
weaknesses of the C2 system. For example, many
OOTW C2 problems involve a variety of objective
functions and trade-offs. MAUT results should always
be assessed by sensitivity analyses.

Chapter 5

113

Many applications of MAUT assume additive
composition of MoM. However, this is a very restrictive
assumption that needs to be validated in each case.
In addition MoM may interact suggesting that the
aggregation of MoM is at partly multiplicative (Keeny
and Raiffa, 1976; Sarin, 2000).
Collaboration C2 Metrics
The following collaboration metrics have evolved out
of work done by Evidence Based Research, Inc. for
the United States Office of Naval Research. These
collaboration metrics focus on individual and team
cognitive/awareness, team behaviour, and team
products. Individual cognitive metrics measure
collaboration, team members’ understandings about
their mission and their team, and team cognitive
metrics apply the individual cognitive metrics to
quantify the level of awareness in a team. There are
four classes of these metrics:
• Averages of the understanding among team members;
• Extent of alignment of these understandings;
• Maximum level of understanding anywhere within
the team; and
• Presence of gaps in understanding throughout
the entire team.
Team behaviour metrics measure the key behaviours
indicative of effective teams. These behaviours include
smooth and efficient synchronisation, efficient
information exchange, adaptability, effective workload
distribution, and team member engagement. Team
product metrics measure product quality and team
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efficiency and are the bottom-line “proof of the pudding”
metrics, applicable whether a team or a single
individual produces the product.
Other metrics under consideration are: task
performance, workload, level of engagement (buy-in),
synchronisation, information needs workload and
handling, workload awareness and handling, and
problem awareness and handling.

Other Considerations in the
Selection and Interpretation of MoM
Effects of Uncertainty
In order to state a level of confidence in the
interpretation of MoM, the underlying assumptions
must be clearly stated and uncertainties recognised.
Uncertainties manifest themselves in several ways that
may affect MoM. They may be grouped as follows:
• Study assumptions—(uncertainties in the
scenario, model input);
Relevance to the purpose of the evaluation,
uncertainties in the military objective,
knowledge of enemy concept of operations,
intentions, capabilities, weapon performance,
uncertainties in terrain data, etc.
• Modelling assumptions—(uncertainties in the
model, structural uncertainty); and
Human performance, parameters, objects,
attributes, processes, effects of constraints,
effects of aggregation and de-aggregation,
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deterministic (usually high hierarchical level
but low resolution) versus stochastic models,
especially in OOTWs; and
Uncertainties about the implications of value
changes in lower-level MoM with respect to
the values of higher-level MoM (e.g.,
increases in arrest rates at late stages of an
OOTW may be negative, while increases in
arrest rates at early stages may be positive).
• Model sensitivity—(uncertainties in the outcome)
Hypersensitivity to input variations, (instability
or chaos theory), effects of model nonlinearities and non-monotonic behaviour
(effects of thresholds), decisionmaking for
local versus global optimisations, etc.; and
Sensitivity analysis may be applied to identify
uncertainty. By varying the assumptions and
input data within the plausible ranges,
excursions in the analysis verified by the
subject matter experts provide insight into the
effects of uncertainty.

Impact of Technological Changes
The rapid pace of technological change involving
information systems is causing major changes in the way
C2 is perceived and executed, leading to potential changes
in the way war fighting commands are organised. For
example, the last decade has seen the emergence of
collaborative technologies, which enable new ways to
command and control military forces and for them to
interface with other actors. To keep pace with and to
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evaluate the impacts of these changes, the nature of these
changes and impacts need to be understood so that the
appropriate MoM can be developed.
One approach to doing this postulates those
differences likely to occur between today’s C2 and
future C2, and then describes an evaluation
methodology, including MoM, to measure the impact
of the changes. Other approaches are Social
Construction of Technology (SCOT) (Bijker, 1989),
Socio-Technical Networks (Elzen, Enserink and Smit,
1996) and Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Latour, 1997).

Conclusions
No single measure or methodology exists that
satisfactorily assesses the overall effectiveness of C2
systems. As a minimum, the following factors must be
considered in conducting an analysis of C2:
• Determine the appropriate levels of MoM hierarchy;
• Identify specific MoM which are practically obtainable;
• Specify means of collection of MoM;
• Assure the validity and reliability of measures for correct
interpretation with quantifiable levels of confidence;
• Be aware that variation in measurements (e.g.,
due to human factors) may well cause
unacceptable levels of uncertainty. Hence the
analyst must pay particular attention to
measurements related to the human element;
• Consider that while MoPE and MoFE may provide
the most persuasive measures from the military
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perspective, MoCE and MoP are the most readily
derivable by operations analysts; and
• Account for the principles of reliability and validity
to avoid the risk of generating false conclusions.

Recommendations for Generation and
Selection of MoM
The principal objective for MoM is to determine
judgements of the degree to which C2 or changes to
C2 may improve force effectiveness and to provide
convincing arguments for the improvements. It is
important to stress that the purpose is to assess the
contributions of C2 in terms of how C2 improves the
effectiveness of military missions, and not the quality
of the C2 process itself. However, to arrive at these
assessments and assign attribution to the C2 system,
the C2 system must be included in the analysis. To
achieve this objective, the following steps are required:
• The objectives for the assessment must be
established and clearly stated;
• Selection of MoM should not be done in isolation
from consideration of the assumptions,
constraints, models, tools, scenarios, or other
elements of the analytic plan and assessment
process. The assumptions used in the model
and/or evaluation must be stated along with their
potential impact on the results;
• A detailed assessment of reliability and validity of
the selected measures needs to be made in
order to determine a level of confidence in
measures; and
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• For C2 acquisition analyses, the generation of
measures should occur in parallel with the
development of the system, so that as the
system is being matured, developers can know
the standards to which they are being held.

Summary of the Challenges and Issues
in the Evaluation of C2
• Correlation of MoPE and MoFE with C2 process
measures (e.g., battle outcome against lowerlevel measures) is difficult;
• Separation and linkage of the respective
relationships between C2 and users,
organisations and military objectives requires
some effort;
• Aggregated measures (e.g., as obtained from
ACCES or MAUT) have limitations in the
diagnosis of C2 success or failure. A careful
analysis is required to provide a comprehensive
assessment of highly complex C2 systems
based on a small number of summary measures
of outcome and process;
• The assessment of the reliability of measures in
an environment where sample sizes are small
will remain difficult and may require the use of
non-parametric statistics;
• The analyst must pay attention to the complex
task of establishing and measuring control
variables in order to achieve correlation of
measures against a wide spectrum of scenarios
and staff;
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• Defining criteria to differentiate measures must
be established;
• Verifying measurement criteria (e.g.,
discrimination) must be ensured;
• For the near future, collecting data to support C2
measures will remain labour intensive because
C2 processes remain human intensive;
• Many of the measures for information processing
concern completeness of the information.
Deciding what makes information complete
requires coordination and cooperation between
the assessor and the user;
• The relationship between outcome and process
may be complex because C2 is an integrated
system with continuous feedback;
• The analysis of uncertainties and measures of
central tendency and dispersion are both
significant when examining C2 issues; and
• A Command Post Exercise (CPX) is a useful
venue for evaluation of C2. However, the costs
involved generally preclude conducting a CPX
solely to evaluate the C2 process or a C2 system.
Cost control is increasingly leading to the use of
laboratory and human in the loop experimentation
to develop knowledge and insights.

Summary of the Challenges and Issues
for OOTW MoM
• Cost/benefit: cost in time and effort for data
collection and analysis may outweigh benefit;
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• Standardisation of data collection, evaluation,
and analysis with many diverse nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), UN
agencies, and militaries;
• Factors outside military control: other agencies,
policy restrictions;
• Creation of a rich and comprehensive set of MoM
to preclude reliance on a limited number of MoM
as the key to success;
• Availability and consistency of information (e.g.,
in OOTW, a possible consequence of different
factions controlling geographic areas);
• Merging of strategic, operational, and tactical
domains; and
• Clear recognition of roles and responsibilities of
all participants.

Chapter 5 Acronyms
ACCES – Army Command and Control Evaluation System
AHWG – AC/243 Panel 7 Ad Hoc Working Group
ANT – Actor Network Theory
C2 – Command and Control
C3I – Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence
COBP – Code of Best Practise
CPX – Command Post Exercise
DP – Dimensional Parameters
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HEAT – Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment System
MAUT – Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
MCES – Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure
MoCE – Measures of C2 Effectiveness
MoE – Measures of Effectiveness
MoFE – Measures of Force Effectiveness
MoM – Measures of Merit
MoP – Measures of Performance
MoPE – Measures of Policy Effectiveness
MORS – Military Operations Research Society
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
OOTW – Operations Other Than War
SCOT – Social Construction of Technology
TRAC – TRADOC Analysis Center
TRADOC – US Army Training & Doctrine Command
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CHAPTER 6

Human
Organizational
Factors

If I had time…to study, I think that I
should concentrate almost entirely on
the ‘actualities of war,’ the effect of
tiredness, hunger, fear, lack of sleep,
weather…It is the actualities that make
war so complicated and so difficult, and
are usually neglected by historians.
—Field Marshall Archibald Wavell, 1883–1950,
Author of Soldiers and Soldiering
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Importance of Human and
Organisational Factors

T

he human dimension largely distinguishes
command and control (C2). Key differences
between C2 analyses and traditional military
operations analysis (OA) applications include the need
to deal not only with military organisations, but also
with distributed military teams (and organisations)
under stress and their decisionmaking behaviour as
well. Moreover, in operations other than war (OOTW),
consideration must be paid to the behaviour of and
interaction with non-military organisations, political
groupings, and amorphous groups such as crowds and
refugees. Thus, the formulation of the problem and
the development of solution strategies cannot be
completed without explicit consideration of both human
and organisational issues.
The human factors of interest fall into three major categories:
• Human behaviour related to performance
degradation, such as stress and fatigue, and as
a consequence of social interactions among
individuals and members of groups;
• Decisionmaking behaviour (cognitive questions)
including the cognitive complexity of the issues
and the capacities of the commanders or other
decisionmakers of interest; and
• Command style.
By contrast, organisational factors deal with
relationships among groups of individuals, including
connectivity, roles, and organisational structures.
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Since both human and organisational factors can affect
C2 performance, the operations analyst must consider
their impact early in the research design process and
review a priori assumptions about them in an iterative
manner throughout the entire analytical process.
Human and organisational factors must be considered
as part of structuring the problem, selecting measures
of merit (MoM), defining scenarios, developing solution
strategies, and selection of tools.
The first key consideration when structuring the
problem is whether individual decisionmaking and
behaviour of individuals or groups is important to the
C2 processes under analysis. If the research question
can be answered without considering differences
between individual decisionmakers and groups then
the additional complexity that issue introduces should
be avoided. For example, in addressing a C2 issue
that deals, all other things being equal, with a simple
change in connectivity (which headquarters will have
which linkages to others), human behaviour may not
be important to the analysis at least as long as combat
missions are involved. However, the same change in
connectivity might affect relations with non-military
organisations and individuals essential for mission
success in OOTW suggesting their response must be
accounted for in an appropriate manner. Thus,
deciding on the importance of human issues in OOTW
and identifying the issues at stake requires a good
general understanding of human behaviour and its
underlying motivations beyond military common sense
as well as knowledge about relevant cultural factors
and the interests of the parties involved.
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Human Factors
Human Performance and Behaviour
Human performance affects behaviour and vice versa.
Human performance depends on psycho-physiological
variables (e.g., stress, fatigue, sleep deprivation, hunger,
and alertness) and on ergonomic and external factors
limiting performance and behavioural freedom.
Individual and group behaviour is the result of social
interaction. It includes interactions by military
commanders and their troops, underlying psychological
processes and factors (e.g., fear, morale, and values),
and the cultural, educational, and religious background
of individuals. There is significant historical evidence
that inferior combat potential as measured in terms of
numbers of personnel and weapon systems may be
compensated for by superior human performance in
battle (Dupuy, 1979).
Any time human performance and/or behaviour are at
issue, parameters and/or models will be needed to
reflect those issues. For example, systems that involve
human activity, such as watch or command centres,
need to be studied in ways that reflect differences in
C2 performance that can be traced to human
performance/behaviour issues. In addition, differences
can arise from experience or training, coalition features
(e.g., language, national doctrine, command style), or
service/branch-unique doctrine and practice. These
kinds of individual performance and behaviour issues
may be modelled in two ways. They can be treated
stochastically, in a manner that reflects their
occurrence in “real” systems depending on situational
factors (black box approach), or in terms of process-
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oriented behavioural models, describing the
psychological processes behind the observable
behaviour of individuals or groups in a given situation
(Long Term Scientific Study SAS-017 on Human
Behaviour Representation, Final Report, Chapter 2).
The decision that human performance and behaviour
may vary meaningfully will have a clear impact on the
choice of models and analytic approaches (e.g.,
stochastic processes or action-theoretic models such
as Norman’s Activation Trigger Scheme (ATS) for
simulating the dynamics of actions or reactions)
(Norman, n.d.).
Where human performance is considered to be a
meaningful factor (e.g., C2 within command centres
when wearing chemical protection gear), some
experimentation may be necessary to develop realistic
parameters for the impact on error rates or the pace
of work. In other cases, such as simple fatigue, human
factors specialists may be able to provide valid
parameters from work in other contexts. Such
specialists are often valuable members of research
teams. In any case where the workflow and work rate
within command centres is relevant, human
performance parameters must be considered. In
addition, human performance issues will have some
effect on decisionmaking. Error rates increase as
people become tired and overloaded, altering the way
they work and the information they consider.
However, research on how to represent human
behaviour and its impact on performance in models is
still in an early stage. This is particularly true in the
context of OOTW. Those operations require the cooperation of non-military actors. In addition, military
mission objectives include providing security and
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assistance in the reconstruction of conditions in the
theatre of operations and helping to stabilise the
situation to a degree that ultimately permits the military
forces to leave. The use of force in OOTW is limited in
degree and kind to responding appropriately to threats
for defensive and protective purposes and to coercive
actions for enforcing compliance with agreements.
Military actions that would be highly effective in
accomplishing mission objectives in war might be
counterproductive in OOTW. In fact, the value of
military actions in OOTW is not so much a question of
physical effects, but rather how military actions and
their physical effects are perceived by the various
actors and the population in the theatre, how the
military actors interpret the behaviour of the other
actors, and the critical mission task conditions (e.g.,
political interest and media attention). Thus, a careful
analysis of mission tasks by human science experts
is indispensable for modelling and assessment of C2
options in OOTW (Baeyer, 2001).
It follows that, in addition to the traditional composition
operations research/operations analysis (OR/OA)
assessment teams, assessors of C2 for OOTW must
possess hands-on experience with such operations
and relevant non-military organisations (e.g., private
aid organisations). The assessment team must also
have access to experts from the fields of political
science, cultural anthropology, demography, sociology
(including media impact research), social psychology,
and individual psychology. These experts will
contribute the expertise for diagnosing the relevance
of, and differences in, performance and behaviour of
actors and for the formulation of hypotheses for
assessing the “human issue risk” of analysis results.

Chapter 6

133

In addition, they may contribute to the modelling of
behavioural processes in analysis tools used to test
C2 system sensitivity via parametric variations of
human performance and behaviour parameters.
However, well-documented empirical knowledge on
human performance in military operations is scarce
and little is known about its relevance in circumstances
other than those prevailing when the underlying data
were collected. Similarly, experience and
systematically compiled data on behaviour and
response of individuals and groups to actions and
situations in OOTW are still limited and theories on
human behaviour are mostly untested in the context
of military operations. Therefore, dealing with human
issues in C2 analyses reduces to the problem of
addressing decisions under risk and uncertainty when
each of the C2 design options is tested for the range
of possible hypotheses on the implications of human
issues for C2 effectiveness.

Human Decisionmaking
Increasingly, assessment teams have to deal with
issues where individual decisions are important. This
is especially true for OOTW in which even tacticallevel decisions by a lower level military leader may
have strategic implications because of media
presence. This represents a major challenge because
the variety of human behaviours involved makes
modelling decisionmaking very difficult. Fortunately,
there are some approaches that can be used to cope
with these difficulties. The correct choice, however,
will depend on the research issue(s).
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In some cases the analyst is asked to assume that
decisionmaking will follow established doctrine and
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). In these
cases, the challenge is to craft a set of rules or look up
tables that reflect the existing guidance correctly. Hence,
a model that replicated the “correct” set of decisions
would be useful for assessing simple C2 issues such
as the impact of new communication and information
technology or changes in connectivity or supporting
relationships within the force. However, maximising the
benefits of technical and organisational changes in a
C2 system might require an appropriate adaptation of
doctrine and TTPs. Therefore, testing the impact of
established rules should be part of the analysis.
Testing the impact of rules is an indispensable
prerequisite for models that have built-in sets of rules
that are not driven by approved TTPs, but rather by
opinions of subject matter experts or modellers whose
rationales have been neither validated nor accredited.
Considerable knowledge exists on how to organise
and validate such expert elicitation. Here again,
specialised team members may be helpful. Simple
adoption of models developed from subject matter
experts will put the assessment team at considerable
risk of accepting false conclusions. When such models
must be adopted, they should be explored in detail to
uncover their driving assumptions and subjected to
sensitivity analyses (Chapter 9). Where this cannot
be done, these models are best avoided when C2
assessments are performed.
From human factors research on stimuli that influence
human decisionmaking we have learned that human
decisionmaking capability is degraded in some
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situations and enhanced in others. These stimuli may
originate from, inter alia:
• Biological/physiological processes (e.g., physical
overexertion [fatigue], use of bio-chemical
substances, and/or sensory deprivation);
• Cognitive sources (e.g., confusion arising in
unfamiliar or unknown situations);
• Psychological processes (e.g., processes
causing emotions and stress);
• Social processes (e.g., group dynamics that
coerce or reinforce individual decisionmaking
depending on accepted social norms,
organisational infrastructure and procedures);
• Environmental factors (e.g., darkness, austere
and/or uncomfortable environments); and
• The decision support tools and technologies that
humans use (e.g., information displays and decision
support software). It is important to look beyond
technology at whether or not human decisionmaking
is improved, or even constrained in some cases, by
using computerised decision aids depending upon
their functionality and configuration.

Types of Decisions
The nature of the decisions being supported by C2 systems
will also enable the assessment team to make intelligent
decisions about how they influence the analysis. Three
useful decision types can be distinguished:
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• Automatable decisions;
• Contingent decisions; and
• Complex decisions.

Automatable Decisions
Automatable decisions fall into the category of “simple
decisions.” The range of decision options is finite and
known, and the criteria for selecting among them are
clear. Basic sensor-to-shooter decisions are simple
decisions that are usually automated for the sake of
timely response (e.g., anti-aircraft or missile defence
systems). Similarly, the selection of patrol routes,
inspection strategies, and many logistics decisions
relevant for OOTW can be automated. For example,
scheduling can be seen as an optimisation problem in
which time, space, and priorities are traded off to
generate a “best” answer. Even though the decision
environment is constantly changing due to factors such
as weather and mechanical problems, scheduling
decisions are characterised by rules and algorithms.
Models of automatable decisions of this kind can be
built relatively easily.
However, where the C2 system employs humans to
make these choices, some error rate parameters will
be needed if the results are to be meaningful. For
example, error rates may increase if the time available
to make a decision is insufficient or physical demands
induce fatigue. Even where the operational concept
calls for the use of automated systems, the analyst
should explore the quality of the data, information, or
knowledge used to drive the process and the likelihood
that humans will be involved in collection or fusion.
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In these fully automatable decisions the assumption
is that “to know is to decide.” In these cases, if
uncertainty were adequately reduced, the correct
course of action or decision would be obvious. In that
case, decision theory classifies the problem as a
“decision under certainty.” These problems are trivial
except for the determination of the utility function in
case there are more than two selection criteria that
need to be considered and/or when constraints need
to be accounted for to complete the analysis (Keeny
and Raiffa, 1976).

Contingent Decisions
The next level of decisionmaking complexity is best
thought of as contingent decisions. These are cases
where the commander has thought through the situation
and developed a set of alternative actions or decisions
that are appropriate to the situation, but further information
on the operational environment will be needed to
determine which is the proper course of action. In other
words, “to know is to decide, but knowing is not yet
possible.” In some NATO countries the research
community terms this “opportunistic decisionmaking.”
In most cases a lack of clear, precise knowledge is
unavoidable. For example, the commander in a
defensive posture may recognise that the adversary
has several potentially viable options. The adversary
may not even know which alternative he will choose. In
such a case, the defending commander would both
develop courses of action to meet likely contingencies
and also undertake a variety of information collection
activities designed to provide as much warning as
possible when the attacker selects a main attack option.
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Modelling contingent decisions is much more difficult
than modelling automatable decisions, but is similar
in that an underlying set of rules or algorithms still
drives the process. The added complexity comes from
the need to find the time when information is adequate
to select one of several actions. The best models for
that purpose are essentially hypothesis testing models.
They align information about the operational
environment against a finite set of alternative futures
and perform probability calculations to determine when
the commander has enough confidence to act or to
estimate the information gain in terms of the expected
value added to decisions as new information arrives
(Sherrill, 1996). Information entropy is also a valuable
measure of the information state of the commander. It
can also be extended to a measure of information
dominance (Perry and Moffat, 1997).

Complex Decisions
Finally, “complex” decisions are very difficult to model.
These require the decisionmaking system to:
• Recognise when a decision needs to be made;
• Identify the relevant set of options;
• Specify the criteria by which they will be judged; and
• Determine when the decision will be made.
Examples of complex decisions include the definition
of missions at the operational level, decisions to
change the fundamental activity of the organisation
(e.g., shift from the offence to the defence), and the
process that creates courses of action in response to
events on the battlefield or in OOTW. Except when
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doctrinal answers are available, complex decisions are
very difficult to model and even more difficult to validate
or accredit. Most successful efforts dealing with
complex decisions have used “human-in-the-loop”
techniques and relied on the quality and variety of
experts employed for reliability and validity. Some
promising research on modelling complex decisions
in military operations has been completed in the UK
and this is in the process of being incorporated as the
core of the next generation of closed form simulation
models of conflict being developed by Defence Science
and Technology Laboratories (DSTL) (Moffat, 2000;
Moffat, 2002) Similar research on tactical decision
automata is going on in Germany to improve the
capability of simulation systems for analysis as well
as training and staff exercises support (Hofmann and
Hofman, 2000, von Baeyer, 2001).

Command Style
Assessment teams often encounter the argument that
decisionmaking depends on the “commander’s style.”
Moreover, they are told, systems must be designed to
support commanders with differing styles. Because it
is an elusive and multi-dimensional concept, command
style represents a challenge to modelling. However,
this factor can be accommodated if the analyst is able
to develop a clear concept of the alternative command
styles that must be recognised and their consequences
for military decisionmaking.
Attributes of the Commander
Differences in command style may be reflected by
appropriate attributes such as the background and
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training of commanders, their decision and order style,
risk tolerance, and operational experience. For
example, in conjunction with field experience, the
background and training of commanders affect the
richness of their understanding of the military situation
and their capacity to influence it.
Organisational Style
Another not totally unrelated topology deals with the
degree to which the commander uses a formal
decomposition of the situation versus a holistic, integrated
vision. The decomposition style of management is
associated with hierarchical and segmented work, as in
the Napoleonic or classic German general staff. This
heavily structured process allows centralised control and
tight coupling between the structure of the problem, the
structure of the supporting staff, and the flow of
information within and between command centres. The
classic centralised commander imposes his style on the
C2 process and impacts key organisational issues as
well as decision style.
The alternative command style is an open and holistic
one in which senior staff and commanders from related
command levels are directly involved in a broad
development of courses of action and implementation
plans. This more open process also has implications
for the information flow within and between command
centres. While decisions are still made authoritatively
at the centre (by the commander or senior staff), they
tend to generate loose guidance (mission type orders)
and to enable lower level commanders and their staffs
more latitude in implementation.
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Risk Style
Another topology applied by some practitioners is the
degree to which individual commanders (and
doctrines) are risk averse versus attracted to risk. Most
military enterprises have some properties that impel
commanders to minimise risk. The fact that lives,
national treasure, and serious national interests are
involved in warfare suggests that risk averse strategies
will tend to dominate. However, some military
commanders are more comfortable with greater risk.
Indeed, outnumbered or otherwise disadvantaged
forces must often take risks in order to prevail. To the
extent that the relative risk aversion of commanders
is relevant to the C2 analyses underway, assessment
teams will need to define and model variables that
represent this factor (Schultz, n.d.).
Recent research on Bayesian decisionmaking had
indicated that the perception of risk as measured by utility
loss relative to a goal value and perception of future
outcomes can in combination give insight into the way
these affect command decisionmaking (Moffat, 2002).

Orders Style
Commanders, and national command styles, have also
been shown to differ in the degree of detail contained
in directives to subordinates. At one end of the
spectrum is the commander who issues detailed orders
that specify what is to be done, how it is to be
accomplished, and when and where the specified
activities are to occur. At the opposite end of the
spectrum is the commander who issues “mission type
orders” which simply specify the mission to be
accomplished and leave decisions about the detailed
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objectives, forces to be employed, critical terrain, and
timing up to the subordinate commanders. In between
are those who specify a series of linked objectives
(cross the river, take the high ground in the north, and
be prepared to defend or carry the attack north-east
into the valley) and supporting detail (e.g., forces
available, rough timetable keyed to the objectives) but
leave subordinates with considerable discretion within
that guidance. Both the speed of the C2 process and
the distribution of C2 work across command centres
(particularly planning and operations management) will
vary greatly depending on the commander’s style on
this dimension. National doctrine and practice may also
influence this factor.

Other Typologies
Other typologies of command styles are, of course,
possible and may be more relevant to particular C2
analyses. Human behaviour experts (e.g., cognitive
and organisational psychologists and anthropologists)
should be recruited to the project team if novel
categories are developed. However, the most
important issue when dealing with command style is
whether it is included in the analysis at all. The C2
research related hypotheses under analysis should
dictate the forms of command style examined.
However, the impact of command style should only
be examined because it appears to be necessary to
answer the analytic question(s) of interest. Otherwise
it tends to introduce a level of complexity that may
confound the other analyses underway.
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Organisational Factors
All elements of the C2 system are ultimately related to
one another. The linkage between human and
organisational issues, however, is particularly direct
and close. Properly done, organisational design
reflects the interaction among the tasks to be done,
the people available to perform them, and the systems
or tools that support those people. Hence, the “proper”
organisation of C2 depends in large measure on the
capabilities, training, and experience of the people in
the C2 system.
Organisation is a serious subject in military analyses.
For centuries the military has sought to implement
unambiguous relationships and responsibilities. Unity
of command is a central principle of war. When it has
been lost or comes into question, as in OOTW, the
professional militaries of the world have found
themselves very uncomfortable. Fortunately, military
organisational issues are driven by a fairly small and
finite list of principles. Assessment teams asked to
work on C2 issues can use the known list of factors as
a checklist about organisational differences to
determine whether they need to build organisational
matters into their research designs. This includes the
issue of informal relationships that may have evolved
in order to overcome organisational deficits and thus
streamline day-to-day operations. In fact, an
organisational design and command style that are
supportive of building informal relationships may
provide the flexibility for efficiently handling the
manifold demands facing commanders in OOTW.
Also, it should be recognised that organisational
implications which are perceived as detrimental to the
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interests of the affected individuals and groups
inevitably would jeopardise cooperation, technical and
procedural improvements in C2 notwithstanding.

Organisational Differences
The principal differences between military
organisations are related to structure, function, and
capacity. Any change or innovation that can be
introduced in a C2 organisation falls into one of these
three categories which, therefore, may be used to
guide analysts when structuring a problem.
Structural differences include:
• The number of echelons or layers in the
command structure;
• The span of control for nodes in the
command structure;
• The pattern of linkages between those nodes
(e.g., hierarchical, spokes of a wheel, multiconnected, networked);
ž Permanent versus transitory organisational
relationship; and
ž Formal versus informal relationships.
Functional differences include:
• The distribution of responsibility: where functional
activities are located (e.g., intelligence, logistics,
command, civil military cooperation [CIMIC]);
ž The distribution of authority (ideally colocated with responsibility);
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ž The distribution of information;
ž Functional specificity (e.g., fire support vs.
infantry or close air support vs. defensive
counter air) vs. general and integrated
military capabilities (mission tailored task
forces); and
• Degree of ambiguity in command relationships.
Difference in capacity is related to differences in:
• Personnel (e.g., quality, training, experience);
• Communications systems and architectures;
• Information processing systems and
architectures; and
• Field training and operational experience.
All these dimensions can be modelled, some more
easily than others. However, the assessment team’s
challenge is to identify those organisational factors that
are relevant to the C2 analyses underway. This issue
must also be addressed knowing that organisational
factors are interrelated: changing one may change
others. For example, the decision to eliminate a level
of hierarchy within a military organisation may have a
profound influence on the span of control. Similarly,
changing the distribution of information so that it no
longer follows the chain of command may have
profound implications for the ambiguity of command
relationships. Similar effects can be expected when
coalition operations involve ad hoc members.
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Treatment of Organisational Factors
Because of the large numbers of organisational
variables that may be relevant to the analysis of C2
issues, they must be approached carefully and
systematically. When possible, organisation theory
expertise should be brought into the assessment team.
Review of organisational issues is treated in a twostep process guided by a hypothesis testing logic. The
first step should assess whether any organisational
variable is being manipulated directly. For example, a
decision to move from warfare domain task forces1 to
mission tailored task forces with air and land units
planning and operating together under a joint
commander would be seen as a direct manipulation
of organisational factors and should be studied as
such. The second step, a search for indirect effects of
organisational factors, may be more difficult and will
require that the assessment team use the list of
possible factors as a checklist and think through
whether they may be altered in a prepositional (if, then)
logic. An assessment team that posits a relationship
between the C2 analysis and an organisational issue
should be able to make a clear statement of the
hypothesis and the causality anticipated. This will
enable the research design to cover not only the gross
effect anticipated, but also the underlying causal
mechanism(s) that will be present if the proposition is
correct. Adopting this hypothesis approach is also a
safeguard against assuming that organisational issues
are easily or well understood and can be treated by
assumption. In fact, the organisational arena, like that
of human factors, is one of the most difficult in C2
analysis and must be approached with care and rigour.
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For example, the small group literature makes a clear
prediction that multi-connected groups will be able to
generate better answers to complex problems, but will
take more time to do so than either hierarchies or star
shaped groups. The causal mechanism in that theory is
greater dialogue and the representation of more
independent viewpoints. Moreover, these richer
discussions are expected to take more time. All other
things being equal, multi-connected groups that are found
to generate better answers to complex problems should
also engage in more dialogue and be found to have
considered more information and or solutions. Modellers
who want to take advantage of this factor to explore
alternatives to traditional hierarchical military
decisionmaking must also include the negative features
in their C2 models (e.g., demands for more time from
already overburdened staffs and slower decisionmaking).
Roles
The concept of a role comes from sociology. A role is
a set of behaviours expected by the self and others.
For most military systems the roles of commander and
key staff are well understood and arise from a
combination of tradition, training, experience, and
rational planning. Because of their origin, roles are
often a convenient way of capturing the doctrine about
responsibilities within the C2 system.
Roles can be used to capture “syndromes” or sets of
related attributes within a C2 system. For example,
an object oriented program might have different
functional organisations and their leaders might be
defined as having different attributes that reflect their
decisionmaking responsibilities and the information
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they would receive or be able to obtain from the
information network. When assessing new C2
systems, analysts will often need to search for potential
role gaps or role overlaps. Either of these would be
dysfunctional in military operations over time. Changes
in information structures also have considerable
potential for creating problems of this type.
Role gaps, role overlaps, and even role conflicts may
be more of a problem in OOTW because military
organizations have to assume new roles not
embedded in their tradition and experience and
requiring them to cooperate with a variety of nonmilitary actors and organizations pursuing their
particular objectives and the roles of which are ill
defined in many cases. Thus, rather than being a
source of friction, changing or adapting existing
information structures may be part of the decision
problems that the C2 system must address in order to
eventually bring about a secure and stable situation in
the theatre of operations through overarching “unity
of command.”

Human and Organisational Issues
and Technology
The foregoing discussion of human and organizational
issues revealed that human performance and behaviour
as well as the organizational design of C2 systems,
and therefore the effectiveness of C2, depend on the
available communication and information technology.
In fact, a C2 organization resembles a system
composed of interacting human, organizational, and
technological elements as depicted schematically in
Figure 6.1 adapted from Mandeles et al. (1996).
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Figure 6.1 is meant to illustrate that the character and
performance of a C2 system may change as anyone of
elements in these three categories changes. Moreover,
since the human, organizational and technological
elements are closely linked in most cases, optimising
each one of them at a time under ceteris paribus
assumptions for the other two rarely ever results in an
efficient C2 system (Schot and Rip, 1996).

Figure 6.1. Representation of the C2 System, based
on Mandeles et al. (1996)

In particular, the assessment of the human-technology
relationship is a critical requirement that implies
challenges that can be both social and technical in nature.
Without adapting human thought and behaviour patterns
and organizational structures it may be impossible to
exploit the potential of new technology. On the other hand,
the performance of new communication and information
technologies may exceed human capabilities of
processing information (information overflow) and thus
result in a degradation of human performance and overall
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effectiveness of a C2 system, the improvement of
technical parameters notwithstanding.
The challenges of adapting technological capabilities
to meet human capabilities and the requirements of the
social interaction processes of commanders and staff,
and non-military actors and populations in OOTW,
require socio-technical assessment approaches of the
kind that evolved in the fields of science and technology
studies (STS), technology assessment (TA) (Rip.1995),
and constructive technology assessment (CTA) (Van
de Poel, 1999).

Integrated Analyses
Because the issues arising from human and
organisational factors are so complex and so tightly
coupled, C2 assessment teams often use integrating
tools to define the key dimensions relevant to their
analyses and explore the relationships between and
among them. Integrating tools are those that use
selected key factors with powerful influence to cut
through the clutter and detail implied by trying to study
everything and concentrate instead on the most
important elements in the problem. These key driving
factors are used to conduct a simpler analysis that
can then be augmented by sensitivity analyses and
analytic excursions to ensure that the problem has
been fully and properly understood.
For example, Figure 6.2 has been used to illustrate
the relationship between the time available to make a
decision, the complexity of the decision, and the
uncertainty of the information available about the
situation. These three factors also reflect the risk or
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opportunity inherent in a military situation. The more
complex a situation, the less time available, and the
greater the uncertainty of the available information,
the greater the risks (and opportunities) present.
While each of these three dimensions can be examined
independently, considerable insight can be derived
from examining them as a related set. This examination
normally begins as an exercise in hypothesis
generation, but can, as research is accomplished, be
converted into a component of a knowledge base. That
is, as evidence confirming or calling for revising the
key hypotheses is generated, the graphic becomes a
way of conveying known relationships and generating
new propositions about regions or subspaces that have
not yet been examined empirically.
In some sense, one corner of this cube represents the
worst of all C2 worlds—almost no time available, an
enormously complex problem, and considerable
uncertainty about the situation. Past research suggests
that when these conditions exist the decisionmaker has
no choice except to use “best professional judgement”
to match the operational situation to some class of wellunderstood military situations and act accordingly.
(Hayes, 1994). However, decisionmaking theory also
indicates that the wise commander will take short-term
actions designed to create more time and/or more
information and thereby relocate the problem to a
“better” portion of the space. A “risk averse” commander
will clearly attempt this transformation of the situation.
However, a more risk oriented leader may attempt to
cut through the fog of war with decisive action.
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Figure 6.2. Decisionmaking Drivers

The opposite corner of this analytic space, defined as
ample decision time available, limited complexity, and
low uncertainty, provides the ideal situation for
decomposition of the problem and development of
“optimal” military plans. Many innovations in C2
systems are designed to move the situations facing
commanders of friendly forces toward this region.
Indeed, Van Creveld’s analysis of C2 defines it as a
search for greater certainty (Van Creveld, 1985).
This cube also emphasises an imperfectly understood
dimension of C2 systems and the decisionmaking they
imply. That dimension is the speed at which the situation
is changing (the pace of operations) in relation to the
time required to make and implement a military decision
(the speed of the C2 system). Where the speed of the
C2 system is faster, proactive decisions are possible.
When the pace of operations is faster, decisions must
be reactive. The commander who is capable of making
decisions that transform the operation from reactive to
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proactive is rare and enjoys vision not only about what
is, but also about what is possible.
This key relationship (pace of operations to speed of
the C2 system) is the driving force behind the observe,
orient, decide, act (OODA) loop and the resulting
guidance to seek to “turn inside the enemy’s C2 loop.”
However, C2 analysts must constantly discipline their
analyses away from assuming that speed alone is a
desirable attribute of a C2 system or organisation.
Making and implementing bad decisions quickly will
result in more rapid failures, not military success. As
is discussed in detail in Chapter 5: Measures of Merit,
multiple dimensions of performance need to be
analysed whenever C2 systems are assessed.
However, this requirement to look at multiple
dimensions in order to assess C2 does not obviate
the value of performing integrated analyses of human
factors and organisational issues.

Conclusions
• Issues of human performance and behaviour
should be incorporated in models used to
analyse issues that require human activity either
in the form of performance parameters or
appropriate sub-models on behaviour.
• Decisionmaking that is rule or algorithmically
based can be modelled directly, but error rates
should be estimated if humans are involved in
the relevant decisionmaking.
• Simple decisions are programmable (with
appropriate error rates), but also require
estimations of when decision would be made.
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• Complex decisions can be treated with “human in
the loop” tools and techniques, but new
techniques are being developed and applied
(see Chapter 5).
• Style of command and decisionmaking should
be considered in C2 analyses that focus on
specific decisionmaking.
• Organisational issues can be decomposed into
constituent elements for analysis.
• Hypotheses or propositional structures are often
the most useful approach to human factors and
organisational issues.
• Integrated analyses involving roles or selected
aspects of a problem space often provide a
cohesive approach to the complexity inherent in
human factors and organisational issues.
• Research in organisations and human factors is
expanding and analysts are advised to consult
the available literature. Experts in this area
should be included on the interdisciplinary C2
assessment teams.
• Operational knowledge of human issues is still
weak in many areas. Systematic effort is
required for organising a consistent program for
experiments on human issues.

Recommendations
• Human and organisational issues are not closed
topics and should be considered early in the
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process of C2 analysis when the problem is
formulated and a strategy is adopted.
• Test the impact of established decisionmaking rules
that reflect existing guidance as part of an analysis.
This is an indispensable prerequisite for models.
• The assessment team should explore the quality
of data, information, or knowledge used to drive
the automatable decisionmaking process.
• Early on, the assessment team should establish
working relationships with the potential subjects
of the study but be careful not to allow this to
introduce a bias.
• Human factors and organisational expertise
should be included in all C2 assessment teams;
at least until a decision can be made that they
are not major elements of the analysis.
• Separate human performance issues (e.g.,
stress and fatigue) from cognitive issues (e.g.,
decisionmaking) when possible, but recognise
that they interact.
• Use a checklist (Annex D) and hypothesis-testing
logic for reviewing human and organisational
issues. Remember that human and organisational
issues may interact as do the structural,
functional, and capacity arenas of organisations.
• Integrated analytic tools that focus on key
variables that drive human factors and
organisational issues will often prove useful in
simplifying analysis.
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• Sensitivity analyses are particularly important
when working with human factors and
organisational issues.
• Experiments for testing hypotheses on human
behaviour underlying the C2 analysis are
strongly recommended.

Chapter 6 Acronyms
ATS – Norman’s Activation Trigger Scheme
C2 – Command and Control
CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation
CISS – Center for Information Systems Security
CTA – Constructive Technology Assessment
DISA – Defence Information Systems Agency
DSTL – Defence Science and Technology Laboratories
MoM – Measures of Merit
OA – Operations Assessment
OODA loop – Observe, Orient, Decide, Act
OOTW – Operations Other Than War
OR/OA – Operations Research/Operations Assessment
STS – Science and Technology Studies
TA – Technology Assessment
TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
VTC – Video Teleconference
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Land warfare with one commander, air warfare with another,
each reporting directly to a joint commander.

CHAPTER 7

Scenarios

Before beginning operations you must,
without any indulgence or selfdeception, examine objectively every
step that the enemy might undertake
to thwart your plan, and consider in
each conceivable case what means
are open to you to fulfill your goal. The
more you anticipate the difficulties in
advance, the less surprised you will be
should you encounter them during the
campaign. Besides, you have already
thought about these obstacles
deliberately, and with composure you
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have perceived the means of avoiding
them, so nothing can surprise you.
—Frederick the Great
Plans that assume the likelihood of
one particular world run the risk of
being seriously wrong.
—James A. Dewar, Carl H. Builder, William M. Hix,
Morlie H. Levin from Assumption-Based Planning—
A Planning Tool for Very Uncertain Times

Purpose of Scenarios

T

he report of the NATO Panel 7 Ad Hoc Working
Group on the Impact of C3I on the Battlefield gave
extensive consideration to the role of scenarios in
operations analysis (OA). This chapter builds on that
material to discuss the role of scenarios in Command
and Control (C2) analysis. Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2
shows the role played by scenarios in the overall C2
assessment process. The analysts craft a set of
scenarios to provide the context or environment for
the conduct of the operational analysis. The scenarios
bound the arena of the analysis and are used by the
analyst to focus the analysis on central issues.

Definitions
These definitions are of particular relevance to this
Code of Best Practice (COBP):

Scenario
A description of the area, the environment, means,
objectives, and events related to a conflict or a crisis
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during a specified time frame suited for satisfactory
study objectives and the problem analysis directives.
As described in Chapter 4, scenarios consists of four
elements—a context (e.g., a characterisation of a
geopolitical situation), the participants (e.g., intentions,
capabilities of blue, red, others), the environment (e.g.,
natural—weather and manmade—mines), and the
evolution of events in time. In C2 assessments, the
purpose of scenarios is to ensure that the analysis is
informed by the appropriate range of opportunities to
observe the relevant variables and their interrelationships.

Approved Scenario
In order to support the analysis, the use of an approved
scenario is more relevant than to analyse a current
situation or future plans. The impact of all the elements
is simpler to analyse.
In some countries these scenarios are mainly
developed by a Strategic Committee and are designed
to meet the government strategy. The first step is to
implement a steering group, composed of
representatives of the government and members of
the Armed Forces, which has the responsibility to
describe all the commitments or the precise regions
in which any major event may have an impact on the
foreign politic or on the economy. This basic work is
then forwarded to a larger group or a next military level
which shares the responsibility for implementing the
main recommendations in a more strategic field. These
scenarios specify the elements that must be kept in
mind in the generic planning process or in the
operational studies in relation with the use of military
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forces. These scenarios also describe the global threat,
the geographic areas, the political and military
objectives and the level of force commitment.
With this basic approach done, the analyst or his
military counterpart has only to adapt those guidelines,
to compare his study to the scenarios and to propose
the more relevant alterations to his sponsor and his
assessment team (See Assessment Team paragraph
in Chapter 2).
At this stage the decision to keep this scenario, to
diverge or to choose another one will be discussed
among the stakeholders. The products of this process
are called approved scenarios.
After that, at any time the analysts may develop
vignettes using the approved scenarios as a base in
order to focus on a specific issue. These vignettes
can be used as small scenarios to explore a particular
topic. The use of prepared scenarios must not be
considered as a limitation for customers or analysts
because all the data could be adapted by the customer
or the assessment team, the only limitation is to avoid
the re-use of this particular scenario for a study not in
close relation with the original one.

Planning Scenario
A planning scenario is one in which these elements
are defined:
• Time frame of the analysis;
• Geographic area;
• Meteorological environment;

Chapter 7

167

• Political, historical, economic, and social context;
• Mission objectives and constraints;
• Level of threat;
• Friendly forces (and links between each
members of the coalition);
• Adversary forces (e.g., enemy order of battle);
• Neutral or uncommitted forces;
• Non-combatant (non-government organisations
[NGOs], international organisations, etc.) and
other relevant actors; and
• Media (when relevant).

Operational Scenario
An operational scenario contains additional details
especially with respect to threats, orders of battle,
tactics, rules of engagement, courses of action,
deployment, end state and reserves.

Vignette
The term “vignette” is sometimes used for a scenario
that is not approved. The term is also primarily used
for smaller scenarios, particularly as excursions from
the main scenario.

Role of Scenarios in C2 Analysis
In general, the ideal OA is scenario independent. All
relevant factors can be identified and dealt with
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empirically and algorithmically across a range of military
contexts. However, C2 involves human behaviour,
organisations, missions, and other complex
phenomena. Human behaviour is very difficult to put
into equations (see “Human Decisionmaking” in Chapter
6). There is no single linear dimension for organisations
or human issues. Moreover, military missions do not
form simple dimensions. Therefore, for most C2
analyses, the context must be defined. This is the role
for which the analyst defines the scenarios.
The formulation of the original problem dictates the
contents of the scenarios. There are no overall
scenarios that are independent of a specific problem.
Scenarios are never truly generic, but rather are
customised if only by the assumptions built into them.
The boundaries of the scenario space should be
defined in part by the issues unique to the problem
under analysis.
Organisational issues include the involvement of
various levels of military and non-military hierarchies,
including different command levels. This requires that
scenarios accommodate analysis across different
echelons of command. Information processing and the
characteristics of information must also be
accommodated. Human factors include the
decisionmaking process and supporting staff activities.
The analyst will need to design or select scenarios to
address C2 under a broad range of circumstances.
This taxonomy of C2 analysis might include:
• Defense-planning;
• Force structure and organisation;
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• Mission analysis;
• Doctrine/tactics development;
• Cost-benefit/effectiveness analysis;
• Training and education;
• Balancing C2 systems and weapon/sensor systems;
• C2 system procurement, which will often require
more detailed, task specific scenarios to cover
the range of relevant system uses; and
• Non-combatant actor’s access to C2 systems
and integration into the information flow, typically
through liaison officers, but increasingly through
a variety of other means.
In essence, the role of a scenario is to define a set of
conditions and restrictions to enable “good” analysis
as well as to create a structure within which the results
of the analysis can be understood and interpreted.

Understanding and Interpreting the
Results of Operational Analysis
The analyst uses scenarios to understand and interpret
the value of OA study results for the focus of the
analysis. The scenarios provide the context in which
the C2 system will be assessed. It should reflect the
scenarios envisaged by the originator of the
requirement for the system. Often artificial constraints
must be introduced into the scenarios, due to cost
considerations, to properly focus the analysis, or both.
The scenario developer must have an appreciation of
the objectives of the simulation, experiment, or
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exercise analysis plan in order to determine the artificial
constraints necessary to facilitate the analysis. The
analyst needs to be aware of scenario assumptions
and artificial constraints.
There are several essential questions in C2 analysis
that should be addressed in the scenario considerations:
• operational benefits of C2 to be translated in
the definitions of Measures of Policy
Effectiveness (MoPE) and Measures of Force
Effectiveness (MoFE);
• required or desired performance thresholds and
nominal Measures of Merit (MoM) values; and
• the impact of an improved volume, accuracy, and/
or quality of information on the final outcome.

Developing and Specifying Scenarios
Prerequisites in Scenario Definition
Several prerequisites are essential before using
scenarios for C2 analysis:
• Approval: the analyst should strive for the
creation of a family of approved scenarios. In
creating a family of approved scenarios, which
reflect the mission objectives and force
capabilities and cover all significant warfare
areas, the analyst facilitates the scenario
development process to a great extent, because
references to basic assumptions and conditions
can be made. This will also increase the validity
of the analysis in the eyes of the client and
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facilitate comparison of the results from different
studies and analyses that use the same
approved scenarios;
• Breadth: a scenario should reflect those factors
that are hypothesised to have a significant
impact on C2 issues;
• Capability: a scenario should stress C2
capabilities, including human and organisational
factors (military and/or civilian) where
appropriate; and
• Credibility: scenarios should include logical
assumptions about the environment under analysis.
Scenarios should represent plausible real world
situations. The synthetic scenario environment should
be consistent across OA studies. The scenarios will
gain credibility if a broadly based scenario team is
involved in the process from the outset. This team
should include a variety of perspectives and expertise,
such as:
• OA analysts for defining the required scenario
information, to avoid biasing the analysis by
selecting an inappropriate scenario space, and
for working out the process of framing of the
scenario space;
• Defence concept planners to propose options
and highlight the critical factors;
• Policy makers to ensure that the strategic
decision points and the alternative options for
each of these decision points are clear and
consistent with Defence Policy; and
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• Subject matter experts to credibly explore the range of
possibilities (scenario space) and foster discussions.
C2 Organisation Infrastructure and
Operating Environment
Organisation infrastructure and environment are often
pre-set conditions and not the subject of the study. They
include C2 concepts of operation, decision hierarchy of
the units under consideration, degree of technological
competence relative to that of the adversary,
requirements or objectives placed upon the system in
terms of speed, accuracy, flexibility, etc., and the
impacts of terrain, weather, and adversary activities.
C2 Processes
The scenarios need to provide for the realistic
execution of the C2 processes. These include the span
of control of the various military command levels and
civilian authorities, information management schemes,
information flows, the elements of the decision cycle,
the decision processes (course of action development,
planning, directing), and the communications
processes and capabilities (data update rates,
throughput, reliability, accuracy, etc.). All too often
these issues are characterised by simple performance
indicators and not examined in detail. They may also
be an important subject of the study. These factors
need to be explicitly built into the scenarios.
C2 Systems
Characteristics of C2 systems are directly related to
system improvements. They include system
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performance parameters, command and control
information systems (CCIS), data availability,
intelligence functions (fusion, correlation, aggregation,
etc.), surveillance, targeting and acquisition (STA),
communications systems, throughput, and so forth.
Human Factors
C2 studies are complex in nature. One of the
complicating factors is the involvement of human
beings and their interpretation of a situation, order, or
rule of engagement. These factors can be covered by
the “aggregation/de-aggregation” phenomena in the
command chain. Human factors have to be included
in the analysis and modelling activities, but guidelines
on how to integrate the “human in the loop” are partly
defined in the scenarios. (Chapter 6—Human
Decisionmaking discusses these in some detail.)
Miscellaneous
C2 studies usually cover various levels of hierarchy.
However, the nature of C2 issues does not materially
change for the various command levels. The analyst
may need to perform a cost/benefit analysis on the
inclusion of lower level C2 issues in a closed simulation
model. The analyst needs to consider to what extent
these issues (e.g., performance of a logistic information
system) need to be converted to enabling factors (e.g.,
sustainability, operational delays) at the higher levels.
These issues are mentioned to illustrate that in the scenario
definition a great deal of attention is required to ensure
that the scenario enables the proper C2 issue to be
addressed in problem definition. The elements are often
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dependent on each other. For example, some
shortcomings in C2 systems can be compensated for by
alterations in C2 processes. Similarly, inefficiencies in C2
processes can be met by an adaptable C2 organisation.
The relationships between these issues should be
recognised and taken into account in the scenarios.

Approach to Scenario Development
This section describes a framework for the definition
of a scenario. Then, based on this framework, some
specific aspects of actually using scenarios for C2
analysis are addressed.
Scenario Structure
The general scenario framework developed from the
NATO Panel 7 Ad Hoc Working Group on the Impact
of C3I on the Battlefield has been adopted (Figure 7.1).
At the first two levels, a description of the external
factors and the capabilities of the actors, including
national security interests; the political, historical, and
military situation; and the acting assumptions,
boundary conditions, and limitations related to
adversaries, threats, risks, coalition partners, warfare
domains etc. are given. Very often a reference to an
approved scenario will suffice.
At the third level, the mission environment is defined.
Whether it is a generic, virtual geographic environment
or a specific geographical area is not important. What is
essential is that the mission environment be addressed.
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Figure 7.1. The Scenario Framework

The intermediate level is the most challenging one. The
actual military problem has to be projected on the
mission, the military forces and capabilities, the civilian
capabilities, and the resources available. A scenario
must be developed by coherently aggregating a number
of components or dimensions with their attached values,
taking into account of the problem formulation. It should
address at least these components:
• Geopolitical situation, including historical aspects;
• Geographical area;
ž Availability/usability of civil infrastructure;
ž Terrain and climate;
• Political/economical/military objectives;
ž Level of violence, type of warfare areas, and
preparation times;
• Mission context and objectives;
ž Mission tasks and goals;
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ž National contributions and roles within the
coalition;
ž Order of battle;
ž Doctrines, procedures, (range of acceptable)
rules of engagement, and concepts of operation;
ž Temporal factors (e.g., anticipated duration
of operations);
ž Desired end states;
• Opposition/threat/risks;
ž Adversary forces and their organisation;
ž Other actors (neutral and uncommitted
forces, non-combatants, refugees, IOs,
NGO’s, Red Cross, etc.);
ž Level of threat and risk;
ž C2 structures;
ž Interaction between friendly, adversary, and
other information systems; and
ž Assumptions/hypotheses/axioms about level of
technology, impact on information defence, etc.
The actual military problem will be placed in the context
of the friendly and adversary military forces involved, e.g.:
• Force organisation, C2 structure, force components;
• Doctrines, tactics, rules of engagements;
• Courses of action;
• Information systems; and
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• Logistics.
The framing of scenarios begins with the identification of
the key dimensions relative to the problem being
addressed. The search of these dimensions is delicate
and requires thorough reflection, for instance, on the
results of a structural analysis. Once identified, each key
dimension or factor must be characterised by a range of
possible values or sectors, which enables the set up of
the sector-factor matrix. This sector factor matrix is then
analysed through a morphological analysis (construction
and reduction of the morphological space or space of
“all possible scenarios”), which provides the user with a
set of appropriate scenarios. The scenarios are
dependent upon the problem and the objective of the
study and can range from generic to very specific. The
analyst will select the level of detail required to drive and
focus the model.

Using Scenarios in C2 Assessment
It has already been noted that a well-formulated OA
problem definition, guidelines and directives for how
to approach the analysis should accompany a
scenario. Emphasis in this COBP is given to C2
elements in relation to:
• Mission scope: as stated before, one of the
characteristics of C2 is that it can not be studied
in isolation. C2 is an integrating and enabling
factor. As a consequence there is a tendency to
consider the entire mission, covering all the
arenas connected to it (from logistics to
manoeuvre, from artillery support to close
combat, from security/police issues to refugee
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management). Therefore, the typical mission
scope for C2 analysis will be broad;
• Levels of hierarchy: the C2 chain is not limited to
a special hierarchical level; information and
command flows are running from the lowest
levels to the higher echelons and vice versa. As
a consequence, there is a tendency to cover a
wide set of hierarchy levels in considering a C2
problem. Single layer analyses do not represent
the dynamics of military problems adequately to
answer most C2 issues; and
• Aggregation/disaggregation: the aggregation of
data flows, data fusion in support of intelligence
processes, merging C2 items to more abstract
levels, etc. is difficult but manageable. The
process of deleting, merging, and combining
information is reasonably well understood. The
integration of soft factors (e.g., human and
organisational) is less well understood and makes
the problem more difficult to simulate, study, or
analyse. In particular, the effects of interactions
between functional groups and echelons must be
considered when decomposition is undertaken for
analytic purposes.

Mission Scope versus Levels of Hierarchy
Experience with prior modelling efforts indicates that
the scenario developer needs to understand the
relationships between the scope of the mission, the
hierarchy assigned to conduct the mission, and the
level of detail at which the echelon operates. In general,
as shown in Figure 7.2, the broader the mission scope,
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the higher the echelon required to conduct the mission.
Also, higher command levels tend to use information
at higher levels of aggregation, or less detail, than lower
levels. The scenario developer should attempt to
operate in the shaded area of the diagram, matching
the echelon levels to the proper aggregation level and
mission scope.

Figure 7.2 Intersections in Hierarchy

In many complex problems, the analyst is required to
subdivide the problem into smaller parts, perhaps even
using different models or model federations to
represent different levels. The scenario developer
should work in conjunction with the analyst to ensure
that the hierarchical intersections and interactions (e.g.,
organisation and infrastructure, C2 processes, and C2
resources) are properly represented, that the models
are consistent, and their inputs and outputs are
properly linked. Figure 7.3 graphically depicts this
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relationship, with the rectangles X, Y, and Z
representing different models.

Figure 7.3 Segmentation Hierarchy Range

Aggregation/De-Aggregation: Non-Causality
Between C2 Issues At Different Levels
Analysis of C2 issues generally requires assessing
the effects of events and actions across command
levels to determine causality between actions at one
echelon and events at another. For example, the
analyst will want to know if the capability to make faster
decisions at battalion level has an impact at brigade
level or higher. Some C2 items have an impact
throughout the entire hierarchical range, some affect
only one other level, and some are purely local, i.e.,
level-specific. The scenario developer will need to be
aware of the analyst’s requirements in this area in order
to design the proper linkages between events.
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Additional Aspects
Additional Areas of Consideration:
• Specification: the purpose of the C2 analysis will
influence the kind of scenarios to be used. There
are no universal generic scenarios for C2
analysis. Some nations have “validated”
scenarios that can be taken off the shelf and
modified to support particular analyses;
• Merging mission operations areas: mission areas
for the various levels of intensity of conflict and
various level of civilians involvement are not
discrete, and it may be necessary to include
elements of more than one type into a scenario;
• Decomposition: sometimes it might be useful to
decompose a scenario into two or more detailed
scenarios that each deal with a certain subset of
C2 issues. This is more or less analogous to the
decomposition into one or more mission
operations areas. It may be necessary to add
some vignettes to look in greater detail such that
all C2 issues of interests are covered and that
the whole range of relevant OOTW is explored;
• Adversary-friendly interaction: the attention given
to adversary and friendly C2 processes should
be balanced in those cases where adversary
activities are germane to the problem, especially
if counter C2 (information defence) is part of the
analytic focus;
• Assumptions and guidelines: the scenarios are
part of the process in developing an analysis (See
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Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2). In the scenario phase, all
scenario assumptions, guidelines, and boundaries
for the study should be revisited. Each study is
executed within the framework of the scenario,
and therefore the study findings are only valid
within the limitations of the various assumptions
and artificial constraints of the scenario;
• Traceability: analysts should understand which
scenario assumptions and/or boundary
conditions are driving factors in the analysis. A
detailed description of past use of scenarios
should be maintained on a national level in order
to avoid duplication. Such a repository should
also contain Verification, Validation, and
Accreditation (VV&A) information on the
scenarios; and
• Awareness: create awareness of the robustness of
the overall conclusions and decisions and be
aware of the degrees of uncertainty in the scenario.

Conclusions
• Using a scenario for C2 analysis is only one part
of a larger analytical methodology. The context
provided by the scenario impacts in other areas,
and the scenario in turn is affected by those
same areas;
•Six prerequisites should be in place before using
a scenario for C2 analysis:
ž It should be approved for the assessment;
ž It should reflect the factors that have
significant impact on C2 needs;

Chapter 7

183

ž It should stress C2 issues;
ž It should be militarily credible;
ž It should be credible in terms of civilmilitary objectives;
ž It should facilitate the design process;
• At least three C2 elements should be reflected in a
scenario in order to make it useful for C2 analysis:
ž The C2 organisation and infrastructure,
including human issues;
ž The C2 processes;
ž The C2 systems;
• Scenario guiding directives should indicate how
the scenario has been used in a hierarchy of
scenarios (interpretation of input and output
events, etc.);
• The actual C2 analysis problem usually will be
broader in scope than OA will allow. Hence
Scenario Analysis in combination with military
and civilian judgement (including lessons
learned) must bridge this gap; and
• Analysts need to use multiple scenarios; no
single scenario is sufficient.

Recommendations
Practice
• Organise a set of scenarios and vignettes that
allow the analysis to cover or sample the
interesting problem space for the C2 analysis;
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• Create a (national) base of approved scenarios
and vignettes reflecting the civil-military
objectives within the national hierarchy of
operations and thus the required spectrum of
military missions including OOTW capabilities;
• Explicitly identify and describe the scenarios prior
to the execution of a study. However, it might be
necessary to revisit the scenario definition during
the conduct of the study;
• Information and hypotheses on threats,
adversary forces, and non-combatants should be
addressed in the scenario;
• Explicitly identify the C2 aspects under
consideration within the problem definition; and
• During the analysis, the key scenario assumptions
should be identified and documented.
Challenges
• Standards for judging the applicability and
accreditation of (existing) models should be
developed; and
• For coalition C2 assessments the scenarios should
be developed or adapted by teams including
representatives from all participating nations.

Chapter 7 Acronyms
C2 – Command and Control
CCIS – Command and Control Information Systems
COBP – Code of Best Practice

Chapter 7

185

IO – International Organisation
MoFE – Measures of Force Effectiveness
MoM – Measures of Merit
MoPE – Measures of Policy Effectiveness
NGO – Non-Government Organisation
OA – Operational Analysis
STA – Surveillance Targeting and Acquisition
VV&A – Verification, Validation, and Accreditation
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CHAPTER 8

Methods and Tools

The reasonable course of action in any
use of arms starts with calculation.
Before fighting, first assess the relative
sagacity of the military leadership, the
relative strength of the enemy, the size
of the armies, the lie of the land, and
the adequacy of provisions. If you send
troops out only after making these
calculations, you will never fail to win.
—Liu Ji, 1310-1375, Lessons of War
War is essentially a calculation of
probabilities.
—Napoleon
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If the only tool that you have is a
hammer, you tend to see every
problem as a nail.
—attributed to a Harvard anthropologist

T

he purpose of this chapter is to consider the best
methods for representing Command and Control
(C2) systems, processes, organisations, and their
interaction in order to support assessments of C2 over
the full spectrum of operations, to include Operations
Other Than War (OOTW). The key objective is to
establish an ‘audit trail’ from data or information
collected, through its processing, presentation,
dissemination, and use to the performance of C2
processes and organisation as well as to high-level
measures of their effects on battle or operations
outcome.
This chapter of the revised COBP extends the code to
cover method and tool considerations regarding
OOTW. The material in this chapter is a distillation of
the best approaches and ideas being considered in
current NATO research for representing C2 across the
full spectrum of operations in all models/tools.

Types of Methods and Tools
This chapter covers all tools (simulations or other
quantitative or qualitative techniques), whether used
for analysis, training, or operational purposes that can
be used to assess C2 processes, performance, and
effectiveness. Available methods and tools can be
categorised into four distinct groups:
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• Data collection/generation: methods and tools
used to either collect or generate subjective or
objective data for subsequent analysis from live,
virtual, or constructive sources, whether past,
present, or future;
• Data organisation/relationship: methods and
tools used to organise data in some logical way,
or used to establish relationships between data.
These methods and tools, rather than providing
a mathematical solution to problems, tend to be
more qualitative, subjective, and exploratory
techniques based on expert opinion, judgement,
and interaction, whether obtained directly or
through role playing. Although, in some cases,
these tools/techniques may totally solve the
problem at hand, more often they will illuminate
other associated or sub-problems, determine
areas for further analysis, or provide expert input
“data” for more quantitative “solving” tools;
• Solving: methods and tools which have been
typically associated with operations research,
business, mathematics, computer science,
information science, engineering, or
management science which tend to be
quantitative in nature and which usually consist
of techniques providing mathematically derived
solutions, even if the data analysed is subjective
in nature; and
• Support: methods and tools used to collect,
organise, store, and explore typically large sets
of empirical data.
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Table 8.1 provides some recommended methods and
tools that fall into each category. The intent here is
not to provide an exhaustive list or to debate into which
category a specific method or tool should be included,
but to give the range of methods and tools available
to the analyst for C2 assessment. While the range and
scope of potential methods and tools is broad, clearly
the emphasis of this chapter of the COBP, and of the
analysis community at large over recent years, is on
constructive modelling and how best to enhance,
orchestrate, and apply it to the assessment of C2
impacts on battle/operations outcome.

Table 8.1. Some Recommended Tools by Category Type
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Issues
The NATO analytic community has had many
challenges in the past analysing the effectiveness of
C2 related systems and determining what it is that sets
it apart from other types of operational analysis. The
added complexity and number of confounded variables
in OOTW make analysis of these operations even
more challenging. The key to the problem, no matter
where on the spectrum of conflict the analysis is
located, lies in making a properly quantified linkage
between C2 Measures of Performance (MoP), such
as communication system delays, C2 Measures of
Measures of C2 Effectiveness (MoCE), such as
planning time, and their resultant impact on higher level
Measures of Force Effectiveness (MoFE) or Measures
of Policy Effectiveness (MoPE), which capture the
effects on battle or operations outcome. These higher
level MoFE/MoPE are required in order to be able to
trade off investment in C2 systems against investment
in combat systems such as tanks or aircraft. At present,
there is no routine way of making this linkage, nor any
one tool that can be applied to generate the required
measures. Hence, all analyses of C2 issues demand
a high level of creative problem structuring and
approach, and selection and application of a range of
available analysis tools, to overcome this challenge.
The range of issues is very broad and challenging.
Particularly challenging are the following issues that
will be addressed in more detail later in this chapter:
• Representation of human behaviour (e.g. rulebased, algorithmic, or “human-in-the- loop”);
• Homogeneous models versus hierarchies/
federations;
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• Stochastic versus deterministic models;
• Adversarial representation;
• Verification, Validation, and Accreditation
(VV&A); and
• The conduct of sensitivity analysis and other
ways of dealing with uncertainty.
Of particular importance for analysis of OOTW:
• Selecting an orchestrated set of tools that
generate the required MoM;
• Scoping the analysis considering tool availability;
• Considering the human dimension in tool
selection early in the process; and
• Ensuring tools selected have the trust and
confidence of the decisionmaker(s).

Representation of Human Behaviour:
Rule-Based, Algorithmic, or “Human-inthe Loop”
In developing methods and tools that represent the
process and performance of C2 explicitly, most
approaches until very recently have been founded on
the artificial intelligence (AI) methods of expert
systems. These represent the commander’s
decisionmaking process (at any given level of
command) by a set of interacting decision rules. The
advantage of such an approach is that it is based on
sound AI principles. However, in practice it leads to
tools which are large, complex, and slow. The decision
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rules themselves are, in many cases, very scenario
dependent and, as noted in Chapter 6 – Human
Decisionmaking, human factors and organisational
expertise may be needed on a project team to treat
these issues correctly.
These factors were not a problem when the Cold War
prevailed. There was sufficient time to complete
extended analyses, and one key scenario dominated.
However, in the post-Cold War environment, such
certainties have evaporated. Indeed, uncertainty is now
one of the key drivers of analysis. There is an
increasing requirement to consider large numbers of
scenarios and to perform a wide range of sensitivity
analyses. This has led to a requirement for ‘lightweight,’
fast running tools, that can easily explore a wide range
of scenarios, yet still appropriately represent C2. Some
have begun to explore advanced algorithmic tools
based on Bayesian mathematics, catastrophe theory,
and complexity theory. Such approaches to the
representation of C2 are at the core of a new
generation of closed form constructive simulation
models that are beginning to be used for analysis.
(Moffat, 2002; Moffat, 2000).
Many analyses employ “human-in-the-loop” techniques
in order to ensure realistic human performance or to
check assumptions and parameters. However, “humanin-the-loop” techniques are expensive and require the
inclusion of soft factors and their attendant MoM. The
introduction of “human-in-the loop” introduces a source
of variances and uncertainty. The increased cost,
complexity, and uncertainty of “human-in-the-loop”
methods often requires analysts to limit the use of these
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techniques rather than employ them as the primary
analytical method.

Homogeneous Model-Tools versus
Hierarchies/Federations
In order to build an “audit trail” that traces the
interrelationships among individual C2 systems,
processes, and organisations, as well as their impacts
on mission operational outcomes, there is a need to
represent the key detailed processes involved, such as
the transmission of communications across the
battlefield and the impact of logistics on decisionmaking.
Taking this as an example, the question then arises as
to whether all the transmission media (radio, satellites,
etc.), with their capacities, security level,
communications protocols, etc., should be represented
explicitly, or whether these details should be split out in
a supporting model. Similarly, the details of logistics
could be undertaken as part of the main model or in a
specialised supporting model. Supporting models could
be run off-line, providing sets of input data to the main
model (giving rise to a model hierarchy) or they could
be run in real time interaction with the main model (giving
rise to a model federation). In the off-line mode, the
main model would generate demands on the
communications and logistics systems. The supporting
models would check if these demands could be
satisfied. If not, communication delays and logistics
constraints in the main model would be increased, and
the main model re-run. This would have to be done a
number of times to bring the main and supporting
models into balance. However, such an approach can
generate valuable analytical insights.
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Figure 8.1 shows the main model-tool producing (in
addition to its MoFE) a detailed set of dynamic
demands on the communications (such as capacity
required of different communications systems as a
function of simulated time), and logistics processes
(demands for transport and key consumables), in order
to achieve the assessed levels of MoFE. These are
then fed back into detailed model-tools of the
communications and logistics infrastructure. Those
supporting model-tools can then be matched against
the dynamic demand placed on the communications
and logistics infrastructure to the available capacity. If
there is a mismatch, the assumptions in the main
model-tools are adjusted iteratively to bring the two
model-tools into balance. This approach is more
flexible and reactive for a large set of C2 assessments.
However, this approach increases the complexity of
the architecture (number of linked sub-processes,
failure of the sub-model, etc.)

Figure 8.1. Model Linkage
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A similar approach can be applied to concepts of
operation. In some models, it is possible to describe a
concept of operations as a sequence of standard
missions (e.g. attack, defend, move). These missions
can then be analysed to determine the demands they
place on the supporting infrastructures. This can be
tested off-line to see if the infrastructure can cope.
Again, this would have to be iterated a number of times,
but provides an ability to relate, in an understandable
way, the infrastructure capacity to its ability to support
a defined concept of operations (and hence battle
outcome). In addition to the use of such hierarchies of
supporting models in an off-line mode, it is possible to
create real-time federations of such models to
represent, inter alia, combined or joint operations.

Stochastic versus Deterministic Models
Stochastic and deterministic models differ in how they
treat variables. Stochastic models incorporate the
attributes of the probability density (or distribution)
functions associated with model variable into run time
calculations. The actual values of model variables will
therefore differ each time the model is run. Thus, the
output of a stochastic model will yield different results
each time even when a set of inputs is “fixed.”
Deterministic models utilise point estimates for the
values of model variables, and hence for any given
set of inputs the model will produce a single output.
Stochastic and deterministic models each have their
advantages. The selection of which to use or how to
employ each type of model in an assessment depends
upon the nature of the problem and other elements of
the solution approach. Whether the model is time step
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driven or event sequence driven will also impact on
the selection of the appropriate models(s).
Deterministic Models
The merits of a deterministic approach are that run-times
are reduced, and there is a single ‘thread’ connecting
the input data and the results, making the analysis of the
tool output potentially easier. The justification for using
deterministic (expected value) tools is usually based on
the assumption that, due to the large number of stochastic
processes involved in combat on higher levels, their
results converge rather quickly to the mean values
obtained from stochastic models.
Stochastic Models
Stochastic models do provide significantly more
information than deterministic tools. They are deemed
to be indispensable for an assessment of the
robustness of the results as well as providing the “data”
needed for risk analysis. These additional benefits
come at the cost of significantly higher run time
requirements and a more complex analysis task.
Chaos theory shows that structural variance (or
‘deterministic chaos’) can occur when sets of decision
rules interact in the simulation of a dynamic process.
Small changes in initial conditions can lead to very
different trajectories of system evolution. Any
simulation model of combat, with a representation of
C2, has to face this kind of problem. The merits of a
deterministic approach are that run times are reduced
and there is a single ‘thread’ connecting the input data
and the results, making analysis of the model output
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potentially easier. However, the representation of the
C2 process (whether using decision rules or not) gives
rise to a number of alternative decision options at any
given moment, and can thus potentially give rise to
such ‘deterministic chaos’. If such effects are likely to
arise, one solution is to use stochastic modelling. The
use of stochastic sampling in the model, together with
multiple replications of the model, gives rise to a
distribution of outcomes, which is much more resistant
to such chaotic effects.
US Army Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
has been experimenting with Deterministic Combat
Models. “A potential alternative solution, when the issue
under study warrants, is to conduct analysis of multiple
runs of a deterministic model where the initial states of
information systems are varied.” (Bailey, 2001).

Representing Adversary Forces
Historically, adversary capabilities and behaviours
were often fully scripted or heavily constrained. This
was more appropriate in Cold War contexts than it is
today. However, it was never ideal for C2 analysis
because the dynamic interaction among friendly,
adversary, and other forces is a critical element of C2
representation. Today, much more robust adversary
representation of operational capabilities and choices
are employed and indeed are necessary. Analysts
must consider not only a range of scenarios, but also
the range of possible adversary actions and reactions.

Chapter 8

199

Verification, Validation, and
Accreditation (VV&A)
VV&A has historically been a challenge for model
development efforts, but is particularly challenging for
C2 modelling. This is due to the variability inherent in
most C2 processes, especially those that involve the
human aspects of information processing and
decisionmaking. The approach to VV&A needs to be
carefully considered, particularly in light of the need to
assess future C2 systems and capabilities in association
with new concepts of operation, new organisational
forms, new doctrine and asymmetrical adversaries.

Selecting an Orchestrated Set of Tools
The natural tendency of an analyst is to simplify a
problem. Part of that simplification is to select a tool,
preferably only one, which will meet the analysis
requirements. In the analysis of C2 of combat
operations, this may be possible if the analysis is
properly scoped. In the analysis of OOTW C2, the
issues are typically too numerous, the variables too
confounding and the scope too broad for one tool to
satisfy all analysis requirements. An orchestrated set
of complementary tools will normally be required.

Scoping the Analysis Considering
Tool Availability
An analyst must always scope the analysis during
problem formulation to enable it to be accomplished
within available resource constraints. During problem
formulation, however, the consideration of available
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tools has typically not been a driving factor. Also, in
the analysis of C2 combat operations this may not be
a problem because selection of the tool(s) to be used
is more obvious based on past experience. However,
for OOTW C2 analysis, the availability of tools, and
their orchestration, requires more consideration early
in the process (i.e. during problem formulation).

Consideration of the Human Dimension
C2, by its very nature, is closely linked to human
behaviour, and its analysis requires careful consideration
and inclusion of the human dimension. Often, as a way
of simplifying the analysis, the C2 assessment team
eliminates these considerations by assuming that human
commanders and their staffs are not affected by their
environment and will always make the best decision, and
the same decision, given the required information. This
is unsafe and not good practice. This has been especially
true for the analysis of OOTW C2, even though this
analysis is often more impacted by the human dimension
than C2 for combat operations.

Ensuring Trust and Confidence in the Tools
Analysts select and apply the tools of their trade based
on what those tools can do for them in accomplishing
their analysis objectives. Over time they become
comfortable with certain tools and the customers for
their analysis also develop a trust in the tools and
confidence that they will produce valid results for them.
For OOTW C2 analysis, given that the tools are more
numerous, must be orchestrated to work together, and
are sometimes unknown or not understood by the
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customer, the development of trust and confidence in
these tools is difficult to achieve.

New Methods and Emerging Practices
Given the inherent problems associated with the issues
described previously, a best practice for the application
of analysis tools for C2 analysis is still emerging. This
best practice is described below, first for tools in
general, then for models, both at the model level itself
and at the algorithm level.

Selection of Methods and Tools
The selection of tools to apply to C2 analysis should
be based both on evaluation of the candidate tools
themselves against a set of evaluation criteria and on
consideration of the type of study to be undertaken.
The evaluation criteria for tool selection includes criteria
related to the functionality of the candidate tool and to
the performance of the candidate tool. The following
are established evaluation criteria for tool selection.
They are as applicable to tool selection for OOTW C2
as for combat C2 analysis.
• Functionality-related tool selection criteria:
ž Resolution: the level of detail in
representation of entities within the tool;
ž Completeness/scope: the extent to which the
tool is able to address analysis issues;
ž Functionality: the extent to which the tool
represents the full range of functions;
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ž Explicitness: the ability of the tool to explicitly
represent required entities;
ž MoM Generation: the ability of the tool to
generate the MoM required;
ž VV&A: the determination of whether the tool
has been verified, validated, and/or
accredited for it intended use; (Note: Not all
NATO member nations recognise the term
“Accreditation.” Accreditation here refers to
some form of formal approval to use the
model for the analysis intended.)
• Performance-related tool selection criteria:
ž Responsiveness: the amount of time between
request and receipt of information;
ž Simplicity: the ease of preparation and use
the tools;
ž Preparation/use time: the length of time
necessary to prepare and use the tool;
ž Data availability and parameters: the ease in
acquiring or generating the necessary data or
parameters for tool use;
ž Interoperability: the ability of the tool to
interoperate with other tools;
ž Resource requirements: the amount of
resources (time, personnel, and funds)
required; and
ž Credibility: the extent to which the customers
and users accept tool results.
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Using Models
The potential for exploiting recent advances in
mathematics in order to create fast running modeltools was noted earlier. Such models have exploited
emerging approaches, such as complexity theory,
chaos theory, catastrophe theory, and game theory in
order to produce a ‘good enough’ representation. They
can be used to complement more complex, detailed
models of the problem area. In many cases, a tailoring
of models, or other tools, will be required to properly
address the analysis issues at hand. (Moffat, 2002;
Moffat, 2000).
Model Federations
A number of new approaches share a key set of
characteristics. First, an object-oriented approach
within the model-tool allows different objects to be
brought together to represent the complete command
process, rather like ‘Lego™ bricks.’ Such a philosophy
also encourages the development of model-tools
based on holistic and evolutionary principles. In other
words, always capture a complete model of the
process, including the parts whose representation is
still unclear. As understanding develops, improve those
parts (or objects) which were rudimentary at the start.
At the next level up, the use of run-time interfacing
allows different model-tools to be brought together to
create a federation to represent the process under
study. This federation then may also have to be
integrated with the use of a mix of tools, which include
techniques other than modelling, to fully address the
study issues.
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Agent-Oriented Modelling
A second key aspect is the description and
representation of the C2 process through agent
modelling and programming techniques. Modelling of
the C2 process as a group of agents, based on artificial
intelligence concepts, favours the capture of the
cognitive nature of command tasks. Agents can be
implemented, in an object-oriented environment, as
either objects (e.g., actor or “applet” type of agents),
or aggregates of objects (coarse-grain agents). Such
agents interact with each other through a messaging
infrastructure. The term “agent-oriented modelling” is
suggested as a way of capturing this idea.
Linking of Performance Model-Tools to
Effectiveness Tools
This third idea, used in a number of NATO countries,
uses a structured hierarchy of model-tools to create
an audit trail from C2 systems, processes, and
organisations through to battle operations outcome.
The idea is to create supporting performance level
model-tools of particular aspects of the process (e.g.,
communications, logistics) which can be examined at
the performance level. These then form inputs to higher
level force on force models. This ensures that the
combat models themselves do not become overly
complex. We have already discussed this in the sense
of hierarchies of support models.
For example, in Figure 8.2, a detailed model of the
intelligence system can be very complex, if we wish to
take account flow of intelligence requirements, tasking,
collection processes, fusion processes, and
intelligence products. In order to analyse the impact

Chapter 8

205

of intelligence, it is important to have all of this detail,
but it does not necessarily have to be represented
explicitly in the main model. A supporting model-tool
which captures all of this detail can be created (or used
if one already exists) in order to produce outputs at
the MoCE level, such as speed and quality of
intelligence. These can then form inputs to the main
simulation model. The main model-tool then takes
these into account in producing its own outputs. These
will now be at the MoFE level. Examples are friendly
casualty levels, adversary attrition, and time to achieve
military objectives.

Figure 8.2. Model-Tool Hierarchy

Scanning Scenario Space
The use of very fast model-tools to scan the overall
space of possibilities and to identify areas of concern
for further analysis appears to give a good balance
between the use of simple and complex modelling

206

NATO Code of Best Practice for C2 Assessment

approaches. Fast models, which are simpler but may
have less analytic depth, allow the analyst to scope
the problem and determine the degree of complexity
a model-tool must represent in order to conduct the
desired level of analysis.
Decisionmaking Process
It is important to have a proper representation of the
decisionmaking process in order to establish the link
from C2 performance through MoE to overall MoFE
and to represent information operations (IO) effects
such as Counter C2 or digitisation of the battlespace.
Representation of the decisionmaking process itself,
however, remains difficult because of the difficulty in
representing human performance, command styles,
and organisational relationships.
Parameter Development Context
Finally, it may become necessary to generate new or
additional data to validate new or existing model-tools
to incorporate C2 factors. This may be especially true
in the case of integrating soft factors into C2 analysis.
Possible methods include field trials, “model-testmodel”, or advanced warfighting experiments. Field
trials are used if uncertainty revolves around
measurable factors that are only observable in the field
or are not reproducible in the laboratory. Model-TestModel (M-T-M) or Model-Exercise-Model (M-E-M) is
used as part of an iterative process to develop and
apply systematically more in-depth and sophisticated
model-tools and, in some cases, more simplistic
model-tools to increase their validity. The original
model-tool is executed, modified based on results of
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the test or experiment, and executed again until it has
developed a sufficient representation of a complex
process. Experiments, like advanced warfighting
experiments, are useful in modelling new, large scale,
and complex interactions for which little data or few
validated tools exist. Each approach requires additional
time and resources, and the data sets may not be
validated for some time.

C2 Modelling Guidelines
A number of common ideas have emerged which are
worth consideration for new modelling and tool
developments. Figure 8.3 shows how each of the
following common ideas are represented within an
ideal command and control model:
• Understanding of adversary intent can be
represented by having a number of prescribed
intents or options, which are updated in an
advanced data architecture, or Bayesian way, as
more information becomes available;
• Representing headquarters explicitly in the modeltool allows proper representation of Information
Warfare (IW) effects such as counter C2;
• Explicit representation of the “recognised picture”
within each headquarters (HQ) allows the modeltool to run based on different perceptions by each
individual unit on each side represented. This
allows the effects of aspects such as deception,
shock, and surprise to be explicitly considered;
• Represent information as a commodity. This
consideration is the most critical and difficult to
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implement, but is the foundation for the other
guidelines, as well as for the model itself.
Information should be considered as a resource
that can be collected, processed, and
disseminated. It includes information about
adversary, friendly, and other forces,
considerations such as political-military factors and
rules of engagement (ROE), as well as
environmental information such as weather and
terrain. Information should posses dynamic values
such as accuracy, relevance, timeliness,
completeness, and precision. These values should
in some way affect other activities within the model,
to include, when appropriate, combat functions;

Figure 8.3. Modelling Guidelines

• Represent the realistic flow of information
throughout the operational environment.
Information has a specific source, and that source
is usually not the end user of the information. A
requirement exists, therefore, to move information
from one place to another in the operational
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environment. Communications systems of all
forms exist to accomplish this movement. These
systems can be analogue or digital. Information
can be lost and/or degraded as it flows around the
operational environment. The model-tool should
represent the communications systems and
account for these degradation factors as it
represents information flow;
• Represent the collection of information from
multiple sources and tasking of information
collection assets. This guideline applies equally
to adversary, neutral, and friendly and other
force information. For the collection of adversary
and other force information, the model-tool
should represent a full suite of sensors and
information collection systems, and the ability of
these systems to be tasked to collect specific
information. For the collection of friendly
information, this consideration is just as critical.
Knowledge of one’s own capability in combat, as
well as that of the adversary and other forces, is
essential for effective decisionmaking;
• Represent the processing of information.
Information is rarely valuable in its original form. It
usually has to be processed in some way. Typical
processing requirements include filtering,
correlation, aggregation, disaggregation, and
fusion of information. These processes can be
accomplished by either manual or automated
means. The ability, or inability, to properly process
information, and the time it takes can have a
direct bearing on combat operational outcome;
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• Represent C2 systems as entities in the
operational environment. C2 systems perform
information collection, processing, dissemination,
and display functions. They should be explicitly
represented as entities that can be targeted,
degraded, and/or destroyed by either physical or
non-physical means. Additionally, the model-tool
should account for continuity of operations of
critical functions during periods of system failure
or degradation;
• Represent unit perceptions built, updated, and
validated from the information available to the
unit from its information systems. This is a
critical requirement. Each unit should have its
own perceptions, gaining knowledge from
superior, subordinate, or adjacent units only
when appropriate;
• Represent commander’s decisions based on the
unit’s perception of the battlefield. Each unit
should act based on what it perceives the
situation to be informed by its commander’s
intent of mission, goals, constraints, and biases,
not based on ground truth available within the
model. When a unit takes action based on
inaccurate perceptions, it should suffer the
appropriate consequences; and
• Represent IO for each/all combatants. With
information so critical to combat operations
outcome, the model-tool should be able to
represent the deliberate attack and protection of
information, information systems, and decisions.
This applies to all sides represented in the model.
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As shown in Figure 8.3, explicit representation of these
information operations elements within a command
and control will facilitate the assessment of human
factors, psychological operations, deception, C2
systems effectiveness, and staff structure issues.

Conclusions
The following conclusions are made regarding the
strengths and weaknesses of current C2 tools/
modelling approaches.

Strengths in Current C2 Tools/Modelling
An assessment of current C2 modelling approaches
employed against the guidelines above show that,
while they may not yet be satisfied, there are some
strengths in the C2 tools/modelling approaches
currently being implemented:
• There is a common understanding of issues. This
has not always been the case. With the inherent
complexity of C2, as well as the challenges in
modelling such a complex subject, there has
been a tendency in the past to ignore the
subject, or just to accept it as something that is
too complex to address. This does not seem to
be the case now. Perhaps through the
emergence of new technologies and through the
work of groups such as the NATO SAS groups,
the analysis and modelling of C2 is now
considered possible. Member nations now seem
to have both an understanding of C2 and its
importance to combat and OOTW operations
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and a common understanding of the modelling
challenges that exist.
• There is wide application of C2 modelling.
Member nations now apply C2 modelling and
analysis to a wide range of issues. These issues
include those associated with investment,
requirement identification, force structuring and
operational support. In all of these areas, there is
understanding of the sensitivity and criticality of
C2 to the proper analysis of combat operations
outcome. Selection of the model-tools to apply to
a particular problem should be based on
evaluation of specific criteria, as discussed
previously in this chapter.
• Although each nation develops its models for
different purposes and tailors their models and other
tools for specific issues, there exists a commonality
of approaches in different nations that serves to
strengthen their collective merits. These common
approaches are an outgrowth of the modelling
technologies now available, but also result from
shared experiences by member nations.
• Most of the progress and success in C2
modelling has been with regard to high-intensity
combat. This is perhaps due to the belief by
many that a high-intensity combat scenario is still
most appropriate for the analysis of combat,
particularly for analysis of primary combat
systems. Progress, therefore, has been focused
on embellishing high-intensity combat analysis
with C2 improvements to models. Unfortunately,
low-intensity combat and OOTW modelling and
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analysis have not received the same level of
attention until recently.
• There is wide use of evolutionary development
approaches. After many years of neglect, a
problem as complex and difficult as C2 modelling
requires years of focused research and
development. There are no simple fixes to the
problem. It is evident that member nations
recognise this and are willing to approach the
problem in an incremental manner, applying
evolutionary approaches.
• There is progress in linking and federating
models. Significant progress has been made by
several nations in linking performance modeltools with combat effectiveness models, either
directly or through off-line approaches.
Additionally, creating federations of models
through standard interface protocols has
significantly improved the use, and reuse, of
existing models and has provided a promising
approach for future modelling. The inherent
difficulties in federating models, given today’s
state of the art, must be considered when
contemplating this approach.
• There is progress in modelling “soft factors.”
Several nations have made real progress in
modelling phenomena that have non-physical, or
soft impact, on combat operations outcome.
Among these factors are morale, fatigue, and
training proficiency. These and other soft factors
have increased importance on combat
operations outcome as C2 modelling improves
combat models.
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• Standard interface protocols, data standards, and
other standards either now exist, or are under
development. These standards serve to make this
difficult task easier. Continued development of such
standards is envisioned for the future is essential.
• There is widespread use of Commercial Off The
Shelf (COTS) products. These products are
generally available to all member nations. This
use of COTS has served to help further
standardise individual modelling approaches and
will continue to do so in the future.
• There is application of new information
technologies. New technologies, such as those
supporting animation, have been applied to the
challenge of C2 modelling simulation, and
analysis. Additional technological advancements
will no doubt continue and will be similarly
applied to this problem.

Weaknesses in Current C2 Tools/Modelling
An assessment of current C2 modelling approaches
employed against the guidelines above show that
weaknesses exist in current approaches. These
weaknesses, rather than being enumerated here, are
expressed as challenges below.

Recommendations
It is recommended that analysts take advantage of the
strengths available in current approaches and in the
new methods that are evolving. They should also be
aware of the challenges that must still be resolved and
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should attempt to play their part in helping address those
challenges both through study activities and research.

Challenges: OOTW
As discussed previously, recent world events and
current projections call for an emphasis on OOTW.
C2 in these environments can be quite different and
may require fresh C2 tool/modelling approaches to link
C2 to outcome in these environments. The following
challenges with tools-models for C2 Assessment exist:
• Orchestrating a set of applicable tools. Because
there is no one universally accepted tool that will
satisfy OOTW C2 analysis requirements, a set of
tools must be selected, based on evaluation of
potential tools against selection criteria, and
applied to the analysis. Orchestrating a set of
tools that complement the strengths and
weaknesses of each to satisfy the analysis
requirements is difficult. Proper consideration of
assumptions and constraints during tool
selection, and careful scoping the analysis
issues, will help to simplify the orchestration of
tools. Additionally, it must be remembered that
not only the tools, but trained, skilled users of the
tools are required.
• Breadth of tool application. Because of the
complexity of OOTW analysis, the full set of
potential tools should be considered for
application throughout the study process, from
problem formulation through sensitivity analysis.
Additionally, the more subjective nature of
OOTW dictates that tools, heretofore not
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typically applied to the analysis of C2, be
considered for use throughout the study process.
• Relationship of tools to data availability and MoM
generation. Tools must be selected for OOTW
C2 analysis that have necessary data available,
or able to be generated or obtained from the
application of other tools. Reliance on more
subjective data, especially for higher C2
echelons, may be necessary. Additionally, tools
must be selected that generate the MoMs that
will help answer the study issues at hand. The
OOTW C2 analyst will be challenged to be
creative in establishing the strong relationship
between data, tools, and MoM required for a
successful OOTW C2 analysis. It must be
remembered that analysts, not the tools
themselves, answer the analysis issues.
• Consideration of M-E-M or M-T-M. Capitalisation
on testing or training events for C2 analysis
purposes can be highly beneficial, both from a
resource and analytic point of view, but doing so
can be difficult. Such approaches are more
subjective, take more human involvement, and
are inherently more complex than more classical
analysis tools/approaches. The advantages of
having live players/subjects in the analysis,
however, generally outweigh the disadvantages.
These approaches are becoming more
commonplace and more accepted as a
legitimate analysis approach, especially for more
subjective issues such as those associated with
OOTW C2.
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• Sharing of tools between different communities.
Given the nature of analysis of OOTW C2 and the
emergence of M-E-M and M-T-M approaches, the
boundaries between the testing, training, analytic,
and operational communities are blurring and tools
once considered for use in only one of these
communities are finding application in another. The
sharing of available tools among these communities
is considered even more appropriate now with the
rise in importance of complex OOTW C2 analysis
requirements. This sharing, however, is difficult due
to differences in terminology, as well as cultural
differences between the different communities.
• Reuse of operational schemas and data models.
OOTW typically involves many more
organisational entities than combat operations,
making interoperability of organisations and
systems critical to successful operations. C2
analysts, therefore, are challenged to ensure
they use, to the extent possible, existing
operational schemas, such as orders and
reports, and data models used for C3I systems
integration, whenever possible to further
standardization and interoperability goals.
• Analysis of architectures. Technical, operational,
and system architectures are sometimes
developed in order to facilitate integration and
interoperability of C3I systems. For NATO,
required architecture frameworks are contained
in the NATO C3 Interoperability Management
Plan (NIMP), Volume II. Considerable challenges
exist in developing and applying analytic tools for
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evaluation architectures, to include analysis of
alternative architectures and their implications.
• Management of customer expectations and
relations. OOTW C2 analysis is so difficult that it
is necessary for the analyst to ensure the
customer for the analysis understands the
inherent difficulty and to attempt to manage the
customer expectations for the analysis. This
includes informing the customer of the tools to be
employed and to gain an understanding and trust
in those tools by the customer. It also implies a
special relationship between analyst and
customer for OOTW C2 analysis. This is even
more critical when the customer is a subject of the
analysis, such as when a commander has his/her
own command analysed.

Challenges: Modelling C2
The following challenges with modelling C2 exist:
• Better representation of cognitive processes. C2
can be incorporated at one level of resolution in
combat tools through representation of the
effects of particular decisions. At another level,
representation of the decision process itself is
desirable. It would enable alternative
decisionmaking styles and the effects of soft
factors such as stress, training level, fatigue, and
morale to be more easily assessed. These
factors become more important as the full range
of IO representation is attempted;
• Long standing challenges associated with both
stochastic and deterministic models. The
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advantages and disadvantages associated with
stochastic and deterministic modelling
approaches will remain as C2 modelling
improves. The objective is to select the best
modelling approach for the issue at hand.
Recognising the inherent advantages and
disadvantages, and then capitalising on the
advantages while minimising the disadvantages,
are the challenges;
• Better standard definition of C2 terms. This
challenge has plagued the C2 community for
many years, because of both the scope and
complexity of the subject. This is particularly true
across service boundaries and across the
international community. A standard set of
definitions would greatly simplify the C2
modelling challenge;
• The definition and application of C2 scope. This
challenge, related to the previous challenge, is
especially critical to modellers. The C2 of a
fighter aircraft or a carrier group is very different
from the C2 of an army corps or an army squad.
On the other hand, there are C2 aspects of each
of these combat elements that are similar.
Modelling of C2, however, can be vastly different
in each case. The scope of each modelling
undertaking must be properly considered and
discipline must be applied throughout model
development to focus on the proper scope. Once
the scope is established, a mix of tools may be
required to address the full scope of the analysis;
• Multiple application of C2 model-tools to analysis,
training, and operational requirements. C2
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phenomena are relatively constant whether they
exist within the analytic, training, or operational
environment, and they should be consistently
modelled in each environment. This fact, as well
as the obvious need to conserve expensive
model-tool development resources wherever
possible, leads to the challenge of developing C2
models, or at least component software modules
that can be used to support analysis, training,
and operational requirements;
• Level of resource application to the breadth and
depth of C2 modelling. Because of the large
scope of C2, there has been a tendency by
some to model C2 at great breadth (multiple
applications), at the expense of modelling C2
phenomena at a corresponding depth. In a
constrained resource world, sufficient resources
are not usually available for both. The challenge
is to either apply sufficient resources or to
recognise the shortfall and to level the available
resources across the breadth and depth of the
problem. Models and other tools must, therefore,
be tailored to the extent possible to fit the study
issues being addressed;
• Differences in the level of modelling of friendly
and adversary forces. Many combat models do
not represent adversary forces to the same level
of resolution as friendly forces. In the past, there
may have been good reasons for this. Besides
the obvious resource savings, the lack of C2
representation often precluded further
representation of adversary forces. Valid
representation of C2, to include full play of IO
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such as deception and psychological operations,
will require equal representation across both
adversary and friendly forces, as well as any
other supporting or neutral forces in the
simulation. All discussion and recommendations
in the COBP, therefore, are equally applicable to
modelling of adversary forces as it is to
modelling friendly force C2. This represents a
significant challenge to many modelling efforts;
• Continuing lack of “soft factor” representation and
data. As discussed previously, a robust C2
representation in combat models will permit soft
factors to be better represented. The bigger
challenge, perhaps, may not be the modelling
methodology itself, but the acquisition of data to
support it. The effects of such things as stress,
training proficiency, morale, fatigue, and shock, for
example, necessitate new data generation
approaches, which will take some years to
implement. The tasks of VV&A and Verification,
Validation, and Certification (VV&C) are most
severe in their soft factor arena. The certification of
soft factor data, as well as most all C2-related data,
is particularly difficult to achieve. Innovative and
focused C2 data VV&C programs are required;
• VV&A of C2 model-tools and the parameters that
drive them. This is always a challenge for modeltool development efforts, but is particularly
challenging for C2 modelling, due to the variability
inherent in most C2 processes, especially those
that involve the human aspects of information
processing and decisionmaking; and
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• Sensitivity Analysis. The challenges associated
with the proper conduct of sensitivity analysis of
C2 is as great as, or perhaps greater than, that
associated with other analyses. This is because
of the uncertainty associated with C2 itself, and
the relatively immature modelling of C2 that
exists today. Innovative, yet cost-effective
approaches to sensitivity analysis are required.
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CHAPTER 9

Data

Know the enemy and know yourself; in
a hundred battles you will never be in
peril. When you are ignorant of the
enemy but know yourself, your
chances of winning or losing are
equal. If ignorant both of your enemy
and of yourself, you are certain in
every battle to be in peril.
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War
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Definitions

D

ata are factual information that are organised for
analysis and in a form suitable for machine
processing. Data are usually thought of as anchoring
an epistemological scale with understanding or wisdom
anchoring the other end. Information is data that have
been put into context.
Metadata are “information about information.”
Metadata can describe data as well as metadata,
therefore there are several levels of metadata possible.
An example for metadata on a higher level is the
reliability of the source that data have been derived
from. In general, metadata are documentation of the
attributes of data directly attached to the data, and
therefore can be archived along with the data.

Role of Data
The role and importance of data in C2 assessment is
underestimated by many people, often including the
decisionmakers and the assessment team itself. Figure
9.1, Data Taxonomy, lays out a number of the types
of data including broad categories of sources that will
be of interest to the analyst. The ability to determine
the needed data and the ability to assemble or collect
this data determine the solution strategy. The capability
to obtain or collect the appropriate data:
• Will often reflect the difference between the desired
or “ideal” measures of merit (MoM) and the set of
MoM actually available and used in the assessment;
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• Frequently either constrains or determines the
scenario or set of scenarios that are used;
• Is a key or major factor in determining the set of
tools appropriate for the assessment; and
• Often acts as a schedule and cost driver for
the analysis.

Figure 9.1. Data Taxonomy

Reuse of Data
Because of the centrality of data to the assessment,
there is increasing interest in data reuse. While the
amount of data potentially available for a given study
is growing exponentially, the real opportunities for the
reuse of data have proven to be limited because:
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• The rapid change of technical data derailing
performance of systems or sub-systems must be
identified by version and data;
• Assessment teams do not always know that data
exist and have no easy way to find out about
such “legacy” data;
• The data that are available are seldom in an
easily accessible form;
• The conditions under which the data were
collected are not documented;
• The definitions, languages, and measurement
instruments used in different analyses vary
widely; and
• Restrictions arising from security considerations.
Despite these barriers, an effort should be made to
find and reuse data. Sources that should be considered
include “official sources” such as the customer, open
sources such as those available on the Internet, and
prior studies on similar topics. Because the data
needed will seldom be available in a form and format
ideal for the assessment, data engineering is often
needed to gather, organise, and transform the
available data.
Data generated by a given assessment phase may, in
itself, be valuable as an input later in the research or
to other project teams. To enable appropriate
reusability of data, every modification, constraint,
assumption, etc. has to be documented adequately.
To facilitate the reuse of data, it is best practice to use
metadata for this purpose.
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In order to facilitate the reuse of data across community
boundaries, alignment of the processes and methods
for data and metadata modelling on the mid term—
resulting in shareable data and metadata models and
a common ontology on the long term—is necessary.
Furthermore, the issue of verification, validation, and
certification (VV&C) for data becomes an issue of
increasing significance. It is good practise to use
certified data whenever possible.

Definition of Data Domains
Data can be directly connected to the other sections
of the Code of Best Practice (COBP) by respective
data domains. These data domains categorise what
the information is about—and what data are
available—as well as the assessment needs of the
study—and what data are required. Some of these
categories are:
• Scenario data: the set of data describing the
scenarios and vignettes;
• Human organisational issues data: the set of
data describing the scenarios and vignettes;
• System performance data: the set of data
describing system performance in different
scenarios; and
• Tool data: the set of additional data used for the
tools that are not covered by any other category.
Hard-wired assumptions belong here as well as
study-specific configuration parameters used for
technical calibration of tools. It is good practice
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to be aware of the hidden data as well as the
input parameters for each tool to be used within
the study, especially when it is planned to build
federations of tools.

Data Sources
Data can be obtained from various sources. The most
common sources include:
• Official sources: sources such as military
databases, governmental data, data owned by
the United Nations, etc. The customer, or other
stakeholders, controls the access to this data or
is at least aware of the existence and structure of
the data. It can be assumed that the customer
will support the analyst in getting access to the
data or a sanitised version, in case the original
data are not releasable to the study.
• Open sources: data sources that are neither
influenced nor controlled by the customer. The
Internet, commercial organisations, as well as
open data sources of non-participating
organisations are examples.
• Legacy study results: data sources derived from
other studies conducted by the operations
analysis and operations research (OA/OR)
community, including political, psychological, and
sociological studies and Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) tests
and evaluations. They may be the delivered as
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the result of a former study as well as having
been an intermediate result.
If needed data are not available from empirical sources,
subject matter experts should be used as sources to
estimate needed values.

Data Classes
Data classes describe the technical aspects of datum
format, datum types, and stage of processing. Data classes
identified in the context of this section are the following:
• Raw data are unprocessed. Raw data may come
from observations of reality or artificial reality, the
product of an instrumented reality, experimental
situations, or selected artificial realities.
• Processed data and information are the result of
transforming one or more raw data elements into
another variable. For example, one or more
radar returns are transformed into a track
(friendly or not).
• Aggregate data and information are properties of
a collection of elements. For example, the
movement of individuals on a battlefield versus
the movement of a squad or a platoon.
• Statistical values1 are assessed on a sample of a
population and characterised by this population.
These include mean, modes, medians, standard
deviations, and kurtosis. Statistics are often used
as parameters in assessments.

236

NATO Code of Best Practice for C2 Assessment

• Derived data and information are outputs from a
formula or simulation model that implicitly incorporates
a set of assumptions. For example, loss-exchange
ratios given sensor and weapons assumptions.
• Intermediate data and information are the
products of one phase or component of the
assessment that provides input to another phase
or component.
Some C2 assessments use assumptions or preset
parameters in place of data or statistics.

Use of Metadata
Data that are collected without adequate
documentation are frequently viewed as suspect. To
avoid having good data discarded due to a lack of
documentation, acceptable community standards for
documentation should be employed. The data must
be clearly described in a manner that is understandable
to a subject matter expert, not directly involved with
conducting the study. The data description must be
robust enough to inspire user confidence in the data.
It is good practice to record these considerations in
the metadata associated with the data to facilitate the
data use and reuse.
Data may be in any of the relevant levels of
measurement—ratio, interval, ordinal, or nominal. In C2
assessments, some significant factors may be nominal.
It is good practise to record all of the assumptions,
constraints, and limitations in the metadata.
In general, every time data are modified or processed
to create new data, appropriate metadata
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documentation should be provided to ensure
traceability of results, validation, verification, and
certification of respective data, and reuse of data in
later phases or within other studies. This also allows
dealing with the challenge of multiple instances of data
in different studies.

Data and Problem Formulation
The initial data available will often be vague, uncertain,
incomplete, and contradictory. Analysts usually prefer
data to be sharp, certain, complete, and consistent. It
is necessary to be explicit about the assumptions
inherent in this transformation.
If the assessment team finds it necessary to transform
“soft” data to “hard” data in order to use tools that
require “hard” data, it is best practice to record the
source, perceptions etc. in the metadata associated
with the data.

Obtaining Data
It may be safely assumed that not all of the required
data will be available pre-packaged for the study
question. Some relevant data will likely be submerged
among a pool of irrelevant information.
Not all data will be under military/government control.
Data belong to the stakeholders who are not
necessarily connected to (or even friendly toward) the
customer of the study. A lot of information is available
from open sources. The challenge is to find, organise,
verify, process, and convert it into the data needed.
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The team should be aggressive and persistent in the
pursuit of required data.
The data needed will seldom be available in its raw
form. Often, data have been transformed and
aggregated. When tools have to be applied to derive
data, the derived data should be tagged with
explanatory metadata to record that information in a
form that will facilitate its reuse.
If the data are not available and can neither be
aggregated nor derived from the available sources, it
is good practice to use the knowledge of subject matter
experts to generate the necessary data. Increasingly,
when C2 assessment teams are tasked with exploring
new concepts of operation, empirical data can not be
expected to exist. It is further best practice to document
this in respective metadata and replace such
assumption based data as early as possible with
empirical data, e.g., as soon as another study delivers
the needed inputs. It is recommended to check the
respective study results if subjectively generated data
are replaced, particularly when the study result has
been shown to be sensitive to this data element.
The team needs to know:
• What data are needed/structure of data;
ž Preferred data (independent variables within
the MoM);
ž Necessary data (to be able to drive the tools);
ž Available data (derivation, extraction,
collection, etc.);
• Who owns this data;
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• Security issues, possibility of declassifying or
otherwise obtaining release may be another issue;
• Costs to;
ž Buy data;
ž Collect data (people, time, resources); and
ž Generate data.
It is essential to make the value of data clear to all levels
of decisionmakers and operational planers to ensure
that data collection issues are included in all phases of
the study. The data collection and engineering plan, as
introduced in section 4-E-4, as part of the solution
strategies, has to take this into account.
The process of data acquisition is important, but data
acquisition should not be emphasised over data interpretation.
There is an increasing urgent need for data describing
operations over the complete mission spectrum. It is
good practise to collect and exploit operational data
whenever possible. It is therefore recommended to
synchronize respective data collection and engineering
plans, ensuring from the start that the desired data
will be collected and archived appropriately.

The Use of Data within the Study
The archiving of data in retrievable form is essential.
This is necessary both to support the ongoing study
and also to be of value for future study efforts. The
team should establish and adopt process models that
ensure the build-up of archives within a respective
infrastructure. Metadata have a critical role to play in
data archiving and retrieval.
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The discussion of data, and the development of a
community database, must be driven by agreed upon
definitions of data that are sufficient to support the
community. This should be a high priority item.
Data can be described as the “glue” that holds together
the different phases of a study. As the results from
one phase are transported to the next it is unlikely
that both will use identical processes and procedures,
therefore harmonised data formats will allow for
smooth transition and continuity of effort.
The analyst will be faced with data in various forms
and formats. In order to consider all available data,
find it if necessary, and format it in the required manner
(e.g., as an input parameter for the MoM or a model)
data must be stored appropriately. One standard for
storing data is the Information Resource Dictionary
Systems (IRDS) [ISO 1990].
IRDS is a layered database that not only comprises
the data, but also the metadata describing the meaning
of the data, the format, the constraints, the intended
use, the source, degree of certainty, vagueness and
reliability, etc. It comprises data as well as metadata.
A common understanding of the problem between the
customer and the study group as well as among the
interdisciplinary study team is essential for the success
of the study. Therefore, a study glossary—based on a
general and evolving OR glossary (e.g., the NATO
JOINT Pub 1-02 [US DoD 1999])—is needed. The data
definitions stored as metadata have to be aligned with
the definitions found in the study glossary. This provides
a basis for standardised documentation of study results
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in a highly reusable form that can be manipulated easily
and reliably, perhaps by automated systems.
Using the right toolkit for the management of data
within the IRDS, such as the Shared Data Environment
(SHADE), can create the initial state of every future
data driven application. (DISA, 1996; Krusche and
Tolk, 2000). The same techniques and tools can and
should be used for information systems delivering the
needed functionality to the warfighter and
decisionmaker. (Tolk, 2000).

Conclusions and Recommendations
Data transcend all phases of an assessment and may
be seen as the “glue” that holds the phases of an
assessment together. Given its importance, resources
must be committed to ensure effective data acquisition,
management, and availability for reuse.
There is an urgent need to agree on standards for
data, metadata, and data management, including the
conditions under which the data are collected, data
element definitions, metrics, etc. It is good practise to
use established standards, where appropriate, such
as the Source for Environmental Representation and
Interchange (SEDRIS™), or to use de facto standards
like Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED).
As the data being used today by the analysts will be
the data needed tomorrow by systems engineers,
decisionmakers, and commanders for their operations,
alignment of the standardisation processes and the
respective toolsets as early as possible with the
command and control systems community is good
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practice. A significant first step in such an alignment
would be using the same IRDS [NATO 1999]. A
common C4I and Modelling and Simulation (M&S)
community is needed, to make visions like integrated
alternative course of action analyses become a reality.
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C2 – Command and Control
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OA/OR – Operations Analysis and Operations Research
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Statistics is a branch of mathematics dealing with the collection,
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(Webster Online Dictionary).

CHAPTER 10

Risk and
Uncertainty

We may at once admit that any
inference from the particular to the
general must be attended with some
degree of uncertainty, but this is not
the same as to admit that such
inference cannot be absolutely
rigorous, for the nature and degree of
the uncertainty may itself be capable
of rigorous expression.
—R.A. Fisher, The Design of Experiments
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T

here are risks associated with the decisionmaker’s
situation that are an inherent part of the analysis.
There are also risks related to the conduct of the
analysis itself. This chapter deals with both of these
sets of risks, focusing upon reducing uncertainty and
other contributors to risk as well as the mitigation of
their effects. Failure to deal effectively with risks will
jeopardise the accomplishment of the goals of the
study, namely to provide high quality decision support.
It should be noted that, by the end of the assessment,
the team will generally be aware that the initial study
plan will have been changed, whereas flaws in the
conceptual model or in the assessment design may
remain hidden for some time from both the analyst
and the decisionmaker.
While the adoption of the guidance contained in this
Code of Best Practice (COBP) will help minimise the
risks, it will not eliminate them. This chapter discusses
a number of issues related to the risks and
uncertainties that the assessment team needs to
explicitly address.

Risk
Risk is commonly defined as the possibility of suffering
harm or loss; in other words, an exposure to harm or
loss.1 This includes an opportunity loss. The difference
between risk and loss is that risk inherently involves
before the fact probability, while loss is an after the
fact certainty. Insurance is about estimating and
covering an exposure of value to uncertainty. Risk often
has a negative connotation, yet “taking risks” can also
be a positive act when a proper balance or trade-off is
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made between good and bad outcomes and the
respective probabilities associated with the outcomes.
Perceptions of risk can substantially differ from more
objective assessments of probability and impact. This
is particularly important in command and control (C2)
problems, which have a high sociological content.

Uncertainty
Uncertainty can be generally defined as an inability to
determine a variable value or system state (or nature)
or to predict its future evolution. Uncertainty is inherent
in risk. Even if a person is certain about the possible
outcomes and the probabilities associated with these
outcomes, there is uncertainty about which outcome
will in fact occur. When this situation applies we can
say that we have a known risk. For example, the
possible outcomes and the probabilities associated
with the toss of a coin (and many other popular forms
of gambling) are known. What is uncertain is the
outcome. Hence there is a risk, in this case a known
risk, associated with obtaining a particular outcome.
There are other types of uncertainty, including
uncertainty about the possible outcomes (or their
values) and uncertainty about the probabilities
associated with these outcomes. Uncertainties arise
from other uncertainties, namely uncertainties about
the potential actions of others or what is referred to as
“states of nature” and their associated probabilities.
In C2-related assessments, in particular, perceptions
of uncertainty may substantially differ from a more
objective assessment of lack of knowledge. There are
also a number of uncertainties that are associated with
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the assessment itself. These are discussed later in
this chapter.

Dealing with Risk
There are three basic ways to deal with risk. The first is
to reduce the uncertainty that underlies the risk. The
second is to mitigate risk by developing and selecting
risk-averse strategies. The third is to effectively
communicate the nature of the risk involved.

Reducing Uncertainties
In effect, all methods for reducing the uncertainties
that underlie risk involve the collection or analysis of
information. This is, of course, a major focus of an
assessment. Clearly the assessment team needs to
identify the most important uncertainties—a
combination of the degree of uncertainty and the
consequences of that uncertainty. However, there will
always be some significant residual uncertainties. The
aim of the assessment team, at this point, is to reduce
the risk associated with the study by learning more
about the robustness (or lack thereof) of the study
findings and conclusion. Sensitivity analysis is one
method to accomplish this purpose.

Sensitivity Analysis
The goals of sensitivity analysis are fourfold:
• To establish the regions for which established
results are valid;
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• To isolate those factors that contribute most to
the uncertainties that exist and identify the risks
associated with these uncertainties as they
relate to study findings and conclusions;
• To make study results more robust for decision
support by allowing the decisionmaker to see the
immediate consequences as external factors are
changing; and
• To give the decisionmaker a richer understanding
of the decision problem, highlighting the
consequences of limited changes relative to a
solution proposed by the study.
The team should take a three-step approach:
• Identify the variables that are associated with the
greatest combination of risk and uncertainty;
• Perform sensitivity analyses that vary across the more
likely region of key parameters (often the
neighbourhood of the initial estimate) to see how the
result is influenced. A sensitivity analysis investigates
the main region of the output space; and
• Investigate the extremes of the same output space,
focusing most strongly on the negative regions.
The assessment team also partially takes an inverted
approach, looking for possible failures, and then
seeking possible sources of each kind of failure.
Together, these three steps should provide the team
with a better understanding of residual uncertainties
and associated risks. The need for and results of
sensitivity analyses must be stressed in discussions
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with the decisionmakers. This will help avoid the underresourcing of this critical activity.

Uncertainty and Risk in C2
Assessments
Uncertainty and the risks associated with it can not be
totally eliminated in any real world C2 assessment
problem. Moreover, in most real-life problems, one
cannot even identify all of the unknowns. This has
given rise to the term the “unknown unknowns.”
Strategies to minimise risk have evolved to handle
these facts of life. Therefore, even the best possible
assessment approach will result in residual uncertainty
and risks.
In general, assessments should be judged by their
ability to reduce uncertainty so that the decisionmaker
is in a better position (less risk) after the assessment
than before the assessment. Looking at the absolute
uncertainty that remains is not as useful a measure
since it may say more about the nature of the problem
than the success of the assessment.

Dealing with Uncertainty
It is important to treat uncertainty consistently and
explicitly. This allows information from two given
sources or results to be fused, (e.g., by taking the most
precise assessment of each factor from the two
results). Thus the resulting knowledge will be better
than either of the two separate results. On the other
hand, if uncertainty is not treated explicitly or
consistently, the best one can do is to pick the single
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result that seems best. This makes it more difficult for
a study to add value to a decisionmaker.
C2 issues are complex, and it is an understatement to
say they are incompletely understood. C2
requirements and solutions tend to depend heavily on
the nature of the operating environment. Thus, a C2related study will rely on factors that are imprecisely
determined and change frequently over time. Almost
regardless of the assessment effort, parts of the
problem-space will have been investigated less
thoroughly than would be ideal. Sensitivity analyses
are required to give high quality study results.
C2 assessment problems (particularly in operations other
than war (OOTW) contexts) generally have many
interacting factors. It is unwise to rely upon single factor
sensitivity analysis (i.e., testing sensitivity to one factor
at a time). Multi-factorial experimental design methods
are good practice in such circumstances. (Keppel, 1973).2
OOTW studies typically have less well-formed
quantitative factors and more qualitative factors. The
“softer” nature of these factors makes assessment
more difficult. The types of factor seen in OOTW
problems include:
• Social and political activity impacting the tactical level;
• A strong influence of negotiation and persuasion
as opposed to coercion;
• Non-optimal performance of military capabilities
from a technical perspective due to their poor fit
to the problem;
• Severe rules of engagement (ROE) constraints; and
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• Unclear or evolving goals and objectives.
The team must be aware of the assumptions and
limitations included in models, scenarios, and data
structures, which should be captured in the metadata.
In particular, it should be noted that humans involved
in C2 experiments (as analysts or subjects) always
bring assumptions with them. These need to be
identified and collected to form an audit trail. This is
one place where the project leader’s log of
assumptions and decisions made during the
assessment pays off. Uncertainty over the validity of
these assumptions and limitations provide a source
of uncertainty in study results to which study
conclusions must be made robust.
In C2 assessments, in particular, all aspects of a study
and study-problem may be connected to uncertainty.
Thus, different sorts of uncertainty should be
addressed explicitly at appropriate stages in the study.
Examples of these are:
• Parameter value uncertainty—many of the
parameters and factors in C2 assessment are
difficult to evaluate confidently;
• Model-based uncertainty—i.e., over whether
underlying models are valid and representative;
• Uncertainty of focus—i.e., over whether the
assessment covers all of the important factors
and/or issues (this includes uncertainty of
scenarios); and
• Complexity of uncertain factors (i.e., their
dimensionality)—when a sufficiently complex
factor (e.g., scenarios or future technology) is
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uncertain, the team can not expect to overview
the set of all possible true states.
Uncertainty in complex factors, such as scenarios,
should be addressed thoroughly. Even though it is
philosophically impossible to know everything about
a problem, an adequately complete knowledge can
be better assured by explicit use of checklists that
highlight the breadth of factors typically involved in C2
assessments, such as:
• Technology—disruptive uncertainty and
disruptive innovation;
• Organisational use of technology;
• Scenarios, tasks, and nature of operations;
• Data;
• Context or environment of the assessment; and
• Co-evolution of factors (e.g., summarised in
doctrine, organisation, training, material,
leadership, personnel, and facilities
[DOTMLPF]).
Nonetheless, the team should not rely completely on
checklists, but rather complement them with critical
thinking in the specific study context.
Within electronic systems, organisations, and battle
concepts, there is a lot of opportunity for disruptive
technology, producing substantial uncertainty. In
human-in-the-loop experiments there is a greater
danger of bias in subjective judgements.3
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In considering sensitivity analysis, it is important not
to associate it only with statistical variance in parameter
values. Qualitative consideration, such as variation of
model, perspective, or assumptions (i.e., categorical
variations) should also be used to test for and assess
sensitivity. Variations in ranking (ordinal variation) can
also be a powerful tool for sensitivity analysis. Other
analytic tools and constructs relevant to sensitivity
analysis are:
• Non-parametric statistics (Siegal and Castellan, 1988);
• Belief-functions (as an alternative to probability);
• Judgmental uncertainties (Wilson and Corlett, 1990);
• Fuzzy numbers, theories of semiorders, scoring
criteria (Siegal and Castellan, 1998);
• Multi-dimensional scaling; and
• Mathematics applied to non-ordinal scales.
Semiorders constitute the intermediate level between
ordinal information and value. They apply to many
fields but in this context especially to scored data or
preference data—in that account is taken of the
intervals of imprecision around the measuring systems
used. Analysts should be aware of the thresholds
associated with the collected data above which
differences can be legitimately distinguished to
produce values. This idea is very useful when the
measurements cannot be repeated (as in statistical
theory) (Prilot and Vincke, 1997).
Keeping C2 assessment rigorous and robust in the
face of the many uncertainties and complexities of the
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subject matter, as well as the need to use a rich
combination of methods, can be difficult. Again, it is
good practice to use checklists and structured
appraisal, in this case to maintain an objective view of
study rigour. The choice of checklist or appraisal
structure can depend upon personal preferences, but
Annex F lists a number of structures, which have
proved useful in the experience of the nations
contributing to this COBP. These include:
• Repeatability, independence, grounding in reality,
objectivity of process, uncertainty and
robustness (RIGOUR); and
• Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and
threats (SWOT).
Where an assessment uses experimentation or
observation of exercises it is important to identify
independent and dependent variables and, for the
former, which are controllable, which are measurable,
etc. Figure 10.1, for example, illustrates the variety of
variables that need to be considered when studying
decisionmaking.
A thorough understanding of the variables of a study
is essential for effective treatment for uncertainty.
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Figure. 10.1. Illustration of the Variety of Variables
Relevant to Decisionmaking

Risk-Based Analysis
In cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses there has
historically been a tendency to focus on the single most
likely value (its expected value) for each input factor
(including scenario and course of action) and to “solve”
the problem based upon these point estimates. This
can lead to fragile solutions, which do not provide
decisionmakers with help in dealing with the
uncertainties and associated risks inherent in the real
problem. A risk-based approach can overcome some
major pitfalls by adding a focus on the multiplicity of
possible outcomes and opening up the possibility of
richer solutions involving portfolios of action that produce
robustness rather than narrow optimality. Portfoliobased solutions can be associated with cost-benefit
approaches, but this has not been common in practice.
The subject of C2 assessments is typically both highly
uncertain and opaque in nature. The team should,
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therefore, expect a complex and partly hidden set of
risks to C2 studies and C2-related decisions. It is
recommended that serious efforts be made to illuminate
the risks, and it is good practice to include an explicit
risk-based analysis in the study and in study planning.
Different people have different worldviews and different
approaches to risk taking. Analysts should seek to find
out about how risks are traded for expected gain by
the study sponsor so that their worldview can be
appropriately represented in the assessment.
Risk-based analysis needs metrics for risks and failure
as well as success and benefits, which means that
one needs a way of expressing various levels of all of
these dimensions.
In C2 assessments, analysts need to be particularly
alert to the possibility of chaotic behaviours arising from
dynamic interactions. Human and organisational
factors are particularly prone to this type of instability.
A sound and explicit treatment of boundaries and
system definitions during problem formulation is
essential to managing this aspect of the assessment.
Holistic systems thinking and complexity-based
analysis may be needed for this purpose.
When dealing with problems involving human
decisionmaking the analyst must be aware of the
diversity of courses of action that are possible as the
situation evolves. The analyst must ensure that these
courses of action are represented in a way that allows
for the possibility of a discontinuous set of possible
future states. If wide divergence in course of action
selection is possible over the timescales under
consideration, then the treatment of scenarios may
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be particularly problematic and may require explicit
consideration under the risk and sensitivity heading.

Managing Study Risk
C2 assessments are inherently complex. They often
contain poorly understood study problems. These
factors enhance the level of risk in the design and
conduct of the assessment.
It is good practice to try to make a complete list of
risks and then treat them in appropriate detail. A topdown approach may be useful in assuring a certain
degree of completeness. Independently of the depth
of each concrete study, it is good practice to use a
risk perspective to explicitly assess the robustness of
a conclusion or recommendation. If possible, one
should try to keep track of which mechanisms underlie
each risk, the probability that it will occur and how it
can be mitigated, then consider cost of mitigation and
cost of risk impact, before taking a cost-benefit
approach in managing the study risk level.
C2 problems are often weakly bounded. There is a
particular risk associated with problem formulation and
the identification of factors. Annex F lists a number of
checklists, which have proved useful in ensuring an
adequately complete treatment of the multiple risk areas.

The Generic Risk Register
The generic risk register for C2 assessment (GRR) is
a good starting point for a risk-based analysis of a
study project (not the decision problem supported by
the study). The lists of risks, consequences of impact,

Chapter 10

261

and mitigation recommendations are directly derived
from the COBP. They are, therefore, generic in their
form and should only be taken as a starting point for a
project-specific risk analysis. The GRR has
functionality, which allows it to be used as a basic tool,
or the list of risks can be copied into a more elaborate
tool used for risk handling in the project.
An illustrative example is the case study undertaken
by the SAS-026 study group, when a brief journey of
only an hour through the generic risk register turned
out very useful. Although the study team was well
aware of the advice and possible pitfalls in advance,
explicitly addressing them with a risk perspective led
to the recognition of two significant flaws:
• The low number of planned iteration had the
potential to lead to a risk of an inefficient and
unfocused study with possibly misleading
results; and
• The relatively narrow selection of methodological
approaches entailed a risk of misleading
conclusions. There could be important
consequences of varying the C2 system that
were not reflected in the study, and the possibly
biased representation would represent a hidden
flaw in conclusions.
The example illustrated both the usefulness of making
the risk assessment explicit, since these problems were
actually known to all participants prior to the risk
management session, and also illustrated that even
surface scratching (as was the case here) may lead to
significant results. It is, therefore, advisable not to skip
risk analysis even when time and resources are limited.
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Communication of Risk and Uncertainty
The high level of uncertainty (and hence risk) in C2
problems and their assessment mean that the
communication of risk and uncertainty to study
customers, sponsors, and stakeholders is of particular
importance. The value of a quality assessment is that it
provides decisionmakers with the evidence they need to
make better decisions. The nature and quality of evidence
required depend upon the decisionmaker’s approach to
and tolerance for risk-taking and his/her level of prior
knowledge of the problem area being assessed.
Communication is about giving the receiver of a
message a right impression, not about formulating a
statement that is formally correct on its own. This might
seem obvious, but in communicating uncertainties and
risk, it should be given particular attention, since the
complexities of the subject, human limitations in
reflecting on uncertainty, and the lack of a common
set of concepts (and also hidden agendas) often will
make communication far less than perfect.
As discussed earlier, some uncertainty can be reduced
by analysis. However, some uncertainty is inherent in
the problem and needs to be exposed to the
decisionmaker. A failure to do this can lead to false
confidence in study conclusions. C2 assessments, in
particular, will contain many areas of unresolvable
doubt and uncertainty. These should be openly and
honestly communicated to decisionmakers to avoid
misinterpretation of study conclusions. Support to
decisionmaking under uncertainty is a vital
complementary activity to C2 assessment.
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Different ways of framing results and uncertainties may
strongly influence the way results are perceived. This
should be considered thoroughly to assure compliance
with ethical standards. One should be aware that
stakeholders (including customers) might have a tendency
to gloss over or alternately over-focus on uncertainties.
An analyst should take care in communicating an objective
impression of risks and uncertainty.
Limitations and shortcomings in a study are a crucial
part of the study result and should be communicated as
effectively as possible. This enables alignment of study
results and background knowledge on the problem.
Human ability to understand and reason on uncertainty
is limited. (Kahnmann et al., 1982). These limitations
should be given particular attention when
communicating risk and uncertainty to stakeholders
and decisionmakers.
People with different backgrounds will have different
concepts of uncertainty (e.g., people without some
mathematical background won’t necessarily intuitively
understand Bayesian concepts). Thorough dialogue
may be needed to find a common language.
Visualisation techniques will be helpful in this regard
since they are usually more powerful than verbal
reference to abstract concepts.
One should be careful not to overwhelm an audience
with details on uncertainties and possible
shortcomings. However, a continuing dialogue about
uncertainty will facilitate a common understanding.
Also, the analysis team should be aware of the
possibility that residual uncertainties may make it
impossible to draw robust conclusions.
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Conclusions
The explicit treatment of risk and uncertainty is best
practice in all studies and is of particular importance
in C2 assessment. A variety of dimensions and aspects
of C2 assessments carry risk and uncertainty,
particularly because they are liable to include complex,
interacting factors. Even when study resources are
limited, it is best practice to include both an assessment
of most likely outcome (result), to do sensitivity
analyses looking for other likely outcomes, and to take
a risk-based approach looking for the more extreme
possible outcomes (in particular failures).
The use of checklists is recommended to ensure a
rigorous treatment of risk and uncertainty. The best
choice of checklist depends upon personal preference,
but a number of examples are presented that have
been found useful by the nations contributing to this
COBP. Additionally, the GRR has proved useful as an
aid to C2 study risk management.

Chapter 10 Acronyms
C2 – Command and Control
COBP – Code of Best Practice
DOTMLP – Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material,
Logistics, Personnel
DOTMLPF – Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material,
Leadership, Personnel, Facilities
GRR – General Risk Register
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METT-TC – Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, Troops,
Time, and Civil considerations
OOTW – Operations Other Than War
PESTLE – Political, Economic, Social, Technological,
Legal, and Environmental
RIGOUR – Repeatability, Independence, Grounding in
reality, Objectivity of process, Uncertainty, and Robustness
ROE – Rules of Engagement
SWOT – Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
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Tom Lucas’ work in Project Albert.
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These types of experiment are typically unrepeatable due to
resource constraints.

CHAPTER 11

Products

We are what we repeatedly do.
Excellence, then, is not an act, but
a habit.
—Aristotle

T

he purpose of study products is threefold: to
communicate results to sponsors and
stakeholders; to provide a lasting record of what went
into the planning; and to establish credibility within the
technical community. Verbal communication and
progress reports may be necessary, especially for a
short study, however a thorough written record is
essential to the credibility and longevity of study results.
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Study products that are delivered to the customer
generally include a study plan, periodic status/progress
reports, and a final report. Several other products may
be produced and delivered to the customer. Some
study products are created and maintained primarily
for internal study support. These products are not
unique to C2 OOTW studies or to general C2 studies.
Products that are typically produced from a study include:

Study Plan
The study plan described here is a subset of the Study
Management Plan of section 4-E. It generally includes
the initial problem formulation and solution strategy,
emphasizing a general understanding of the problem,
deliverables, budget, time line, and solution approach.
The study plan includes at a minimum:
• Statement of the problem (problem
formulation)—“the what”;
• Solution strategy “the how and the when”;
ž Tasks and their relationships; and
ž Milestones.

Periodic Status/Progress Reports
Periodic status reports describe the activities of the most
recent period and the expected activities of the next
period, and link the activities to the tasking statement.
Status reports also contain cost information and track
adherence to the planned schedule. One of the most
important sections of the status report is the “Problems
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Encountered” section. This section should include
technical problems, budgetary problems, and most
importantly problems relating to sponsor/assessment
team relations. These reports may be delivered:
• To the sponsor and other stakeholders; and
• To the peer review team.

Final Report
The final report contains sections that address the following:
• Objectives (customer question and the
problem formulation);
• Scope and assumptions;
• Approach (solution strategy);
• Findings/conclusions (with caveats);
• Recommendations (optional);
• Future challenges (optional);
• Appendices;
ž Data collection instruments or discussion of
instrumentation (optional);
ž Data dictionary (optional);
ž Data (optional);
ž Glossary of terms/acronyms; and
ž References.
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The findings/conclusions and recommendations (if
present) should address each of the objectives.
The final report should be produced as an archivable
document that can be readily accessed by the
community. This means that the document is produced
in electronic form using commercial standards. Ideally
these documents should be made available through
web sites. However, it is recognised that security
considerations and language will limit the availability
of many documents. Briefings are a useful form of
communication. It is desirable that a briefing
accompany the more formal final report. However,
when only a briefing is produced, it must be annotated.
Command and control (C2) problems tend to be multidimensional and highly complex. Therefore, they pose
unique challenges to the assessment team in
communicating the result effectively to the
decisionmaker. There are several steps that can be
taken to facilitate this communication. First, if the product
is an architecture, it is recommended that the templates
developed by community to depict alternative
architectural perspectives (e.g., operational, system,
and technical architectures) be employed. Second, it
has proven useful to employ “stop light” charts (red,
yellow, and green) to characterise measures of
performance/effectiveness. However, such techniques
are useful only in conveying qualitative insights. A
tendency to rely heavily upon this presentation
technique may result in assessments that do not drive
to quantitative results. Third, there is a need to develop
and employ visualisation techniques to capture the full
richness of the insights, particularly risk and uncertainty
(e.g., depicts the distribution rather than just the
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statistical) that are derived in assessments. Preliminary
research is underway in this area. It needs to be
extended and translated into application.
Because C2 data are rare, every effort should be made
to retain the data and make it available to other
recorders. Sometimes others will require “sanitising”
the data to prevent anyone knowing which units or
exercises produced it. When archiving data the
metadata labels that identify the conditions under which
it was collected should also be preserved.
A peer review process is an essential part of producing
a final report. It should begin with the preparation of
the study plan and continue throughout the life of the
assessment. Draft products must be provided to
reviewers in ample time for them to review and
comment on the product and for the team to reflect
their comments. A failure to institute an adequate
review process can compromise the quality, credibility,
and utility of the assessment.

Other Delivered Products
Several products may be created and delivered,
depending on the needs of the project:
• Description of the assessment participants
(including assessment team) and their
relationships (defined in 2-B);
• Description of the budget and time constraints to
provide context information for future studies;
• Human and Organizational Factors Checklist;
• Scenario details
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• Video and audio presentations; and
• Created models, spreadsheets, decision support
tools, etc.
• Simple models and tools (EG for the sponsor and
other parties to interactively explore interrelationships
between the variables of the study);
• Experimentation Campaign Plan (if the C2
Assessment makes use of a series of linked
events such as seminars, wargames, command
post exercises (CPX), field training exercises
(FTX) etc).

Other Products
In addition to study products that are delivered to the
sponsor there are a number of products that best
practice demands are produced and maintained during
the course of a study. These include:
• A project journal;
• Study Management Plan (defined in 4-E)
• Data collection plan;
• Data analysis plan; and
• Study Glossary

Conclusion
A study is generally appraised based on the quality of its
study products. This Code of Best Practice aims to
highlight important areas that will improve both the
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assessment process, and the quality, longevity, and utility
of the study products. The goal is to make the state of
practice one and the same with the state of the art.
Of all the communities available to us
there is not one I would want to devote
myself to, except for the society of the
true searches, which has very few
living members at any time…
—Albert Einstein
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Acronyms
A
ACCES

Army Command and Control Evaluation
System

ACE Resources Allied Command Europe Resources
(part of SHAPE)
AF(N)

Regional Command

AHWG

AC/243 Panel 7 Ad Hoc Working Group

AI

Artificial Intelligence

AMF(L)

ACE Mobile Force (Land)

ANT

Actor Network Theory

ARRC

ACE Rapid Reaction Corps

ATS

Norman’s Activation Trigger Scheme

B
C
C2

Command and Control
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C3

Command, Control, and Communications
or Consultation

C3I

Command, Control, Communications or
Consultation, and Intelligence

C4

Command, Control, Communications or
Consultation, and Computers

C4I

Command, Control, Communications or
Consultation, Computers, and Intelligence

C4ISR

Command, Control, Communications or
Consultation, Computers, Intelligence,
and Surveillance and Reconnaissance

CIMIC

Civil-Military Co-operation

CIS

Command Information Systems

CISS

Center for Information Systems Security

COBP

Code of Best Practice

CPX

Command Post Exercise

CTA

Constructive Technology Assessment

D
DCEP

Data Collection/Engineering Plan

DISA

Defence Information Systems Agency

DOTMLP

Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material,
Leadership, Personnel

DOTMLPF

Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material,
Leadership, Personnel, Facilities/Forces
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DP

Dimensional Parameters

DSTL

Defence Science and Technology
Laboratories (UK)

E
EEA

Essential Elements of Analysis

F
FS

Feasibility Study

FTX

Field Post Exercise

G
GRR

Generic Risk Register

H
HB(A)

UK Historical Branch (Army)

HEAT

Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment
System

HQ

Headquarters

I
IO

International Organisation

IRDS

Information Resource Dictionary Systems

B-4

NATO Code of Best Practice for C2 Assessment

IRTF(L)

Immediate Reaction Task Force (Land)

J
JCSC

Joint Sub-Regional Command South
Centre

JCSE

Joint Sub-Regional Command South
East

JFCOM

Joint Forces Command

K, L
M
MAPEX

Map Exercise

MAUT

Multi-Attribute Utility Theory

MCES

Modular Command and Control Evaluation
Structure

M-E-M

Model-Exercise-Model

METT-TC

Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, Troops,
Time, and Civil considerations

MND(C)

Multinational Division (Centre)

MoCE

Measures of C2 Effectiveness

MoE

Measures of Effectiveness

MoFE

Measures of Force Effectiveness

MoM

Measures of Merit
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MoP

Measures of Performance

MoPE

Measures of Policy Effectiveness

MORS

Military Operations Research Society

M&S

Modelling and Simulation

M-T-M

Model-Test-Model

N
NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NC3A

NATO C3 (Consultation, Command &
Control) Agency

NGO

Non Governmental Organisations

NL MOD

Netherlands Ministry of Defense

O
OA

Operational Analysis

OOTW

Operations Other Than War

OR

Operations Research

P
PESTLE

Political, Economic, Social, Technological,
Legal, and Environmental

PfP

Partnership for Peace

PRL

Policy Requirements Land
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PVO

Private Volunteer Organisations

Q
R
RIGOUR

Repeatability, Independence, Grounding
in reality, Objectivity of process,
Uncertainty, and Robustness

ROE

Rules of Engagement

S
SACLANT OA Supreme Allied Command Atlantic
Operational Analysis Cell
SCOT

Social Construction of Technology

SFS

Strike Force South

SHADE

Shared Data Environment

SHAPE

Supreme HQ Allied Powers Europe

SMP

Study Management Plan

SOW

Statements of Work

STA

Surveillance Targeting and Acquisition

STAFFEX

Staff Exercise

STS

Science and Technology Studies

SWOT

Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities,
Threats
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T
TA

Technology Assessment

TRAC

TRADOC Analysis Center

TRADOC

US Army Training & Doctrine Command

TTP

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

U
V
VTC

Video Teleconference

VV&A

Verification, Validation, and Accreditation

VV&C

Verification, Validation, and Certification

W
WBS

X, Y, Z

Work Breakdown Structure

ANNEX C

The MORS Code
of Ethics
The MORS Code of Ethics and Responsibilities for
Practitioners of Military Operations Research
Military OR Professionals must aspire to be:
• Honest, open and trustworthy in all their relationships;
• Reliable and consistent in the conduct of
assignments and responsibilities, always doing
what is right rather then expedient;
• Objective, constructive and accurate in what they
say and write;
• Accountable for what they do and choose not to do;
• Respectful of the work of others, giving due
credit and refraining from criticism of them
unless warranted; and
• Free from affiliation with others or with activities
that would compromise them, their employers, or
the Society.
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ANNEX D

Human And
Organisational
Issues Checklist
This checklist presents a summary of a particular set
of human and organisational issues that is specifically
relevant to behaviour and performance of humans in
command and control situations. Its purpose is to
sensitise the analyst and help him to assess whether
human or organisational issues are part of the problem
domain and should be addressed in the solution space.
Also, it should assist him in identifying human sciences
disciplines for consultation.
It should be pointed out, however, that this checklist is
preliminary and must not be considered to be
comprehensive. The field of human sciences is too
large and the set of human and organisational issues
to ill defined to provide the analyst with an exhaustive
checklist, at this time. Research in this area is ongoing
and we expect that later editions of this document will
provide the analyst revised and improved checklists.
1.

Human Issues

• Physiological factors
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This refers to bio-medical and environmental
factors that influence behaviour and performance
• Stress
• Fatigue and lack of sleep
• Blood sugar
• Fitness conditions
• Weather conditions
• Geographical terrain conditions
• Ergonomic factors (e.g. performance
degradation due to working in protective suits)
Ergonomics is a science discipline that studies
human work and work environment relationships.
• Behavioural factors (related to functioning in a
C2 group)
• Social Competence & Experience
Capability to interact with others
• Communication skills
• Language skills
• Empathy (Social Awareness/
understanding)
• Conflict handling style
• Frustration handling style
• Military Competence & Experience
• Handling Danger
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• Defining mission objectives
• Task Competence & Experience
• Cognitive factors
These factors are related to how humans
perceive their environment, how they give
meaning to what they see.
• Information processing style
• Information processing capacity
• Creating Situational Awareness
• Individual decision making
• Risk tolerance
• Pre-disposition!
• Receptivity to new information
(open / closed)
• Expertise
• Prior training and knowledge
(operational codes)
• Emotional factors
• Morale
• Attitude
• Separation from Family
• Fear
• Stress
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• Resilience (ability to overcome
negative feedback)
• Leadership factors
There exists no clear-cut concept of leadership
effectiveness, but we do know some of the
factors that affect the effectiveness of a leader
• Expectation and behaviour of superiors
• Expectations and behaviour of
subordinates
• Expectations and behaviour of colleagues
• Personality and experience
• Organisational Culture and policy – with
regard to leadership and command.
Allocation or responsibility and authority.
• Ability to Motivate and to Direct others
• Moral and Judicial responsibilities
• Coaching capabilities (towards
subordinates)
2.

Organisational Issues

• Structure
• Number of echelons or layers
• Span of control for nodes
• Pattern of linkages between nodes (e.g.
hierarchical, multi-connected)
• Permanent versus transitory
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• Formal versus Informal
• Function
• Distribution of responsibility
• Distribution of authority
• Distribution of Information
• Functional Specificity
• Ambiguity in command relationships
• Capacity
• Differences in communication systems /
Architectures
• Differences in information processing
systems / architectures
• Differences in field training and operational
experience
• Differences in personnel
• Experience
• Training
• Cognitive ability
• Roles
• Allocation of Responsibility / Authority
• Role Conflicts. The interference of multiple
Roles in one individual
• Sociological factors
• Understanding of environment
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• Political
• Social
• Cultural
• Interoperability Issues
• National and cultural differences
• Organizational approaches and values
• Communication standards and technology
• Differences in perceptions
• Organisational command style
• Decentralised or Centralised
• Collaborative versus Authoritative
• Formal versus Informal
• Command products: orders, objectives,
missions
• Organisational Culture
Shapes patterns of organisational behaviour and
reflects thought and activity patterns by
members of the organisation.
• Belief systems
• Organisational norms & how are they
expressed
• Organisational values & how are they
expressed
• Open to organisational learning
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I.e. does the organisational culture embed
characteristics that enable and facilitate
organisational earning?
3.

Interaction between Human and
Organisational Issues

• Group decision making
Groups can exert social pressure on members
that affect the decision-making capability of
individual members.
• Group Dynamics
The behaviour of individuals in a group will be
influenced by the fact that they are interacting in
a group. This interactive process contains a
number of dynamic dimensions and does effect
the result of interaction. A command post is a
group of people and its performance is affected
by it group dynamics.
• Social interaction & communication
• Communication
• Social Identity and social conflicts
• Individual dominance/leadership
• Cohesion
• Teambuilding, teamwork
• Trust in group member’s competence and
loyalty.
• Cultural factors
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Culture is more or less the whole of beliefs and
assumptions, including norms and values, about
things and behaviour in a group. As such it
guides the behaviour of people, also in the
military and in command posts.
• Note! Culture itself is immaterial, intangible.
It can only be distilled form observed actions
by members of an organisation or societal
group
• Note! Culture is learned through interaction
with others.
• Especially in multi-national OOTW,
members of different cultural
background have to interact. Mutually
acceptable norms of behaviour will
have to be developed in the process.
• Socialisation process
• Culture lag
Changes in the environment or to the
organisation often require adaptations in
behaviour. Sometimes these changes are
required or introduced so fast that an
organisation hasn’t had the time to the whole
of its culture to adapt to the new situation,
i.e,. to embed the changes in its culture. This
may lead to friction.
• E.g.1: The introduction of new
technologies may change the way we
work. If this is done too fast, or without
thoughtful guidance it may have a
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disruptive effect on behaviour and thus
on organisational effectiveness.
• E.g.2: Peace Keeping and War
Operations each require different
types of behaviours which is often
quite different from the type of
behaviour in the peaceful environment
at home. Western armies operate on
personnel rotation schedules whereby
individuals change frequently from one
situation to another. This may also
result in culture lag causing friction.
• Sub-culture
Within the larger set of culture, groups may
develop specialised cultures, such as, e.g.,
distinct unit cultures.
• Sometimes these sub-cultures may
conflict over some issues with the
dominant organisational or societal
culture. Understanding these
differences is often the first step in
resolving these situations.
• Social Control.
Individual (group, organisational) members
watch and correct each other if they accepted
procedures of behaviour aren’t followed.
• If this corrective action pattern is too
strict, the group becomes rigid and is
less able to adapt to new situations.
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• If it is too loose, and no culture or
norms are enforced, chaos and
uncertainty may rule the group.
• Commanders Intent.
A leader can effect the current (sub)
culture of his unit by setting the example
and by establishing and enforcing required
procedures and behaviour.
• Both must be synchronized, else
friction will occur.
• By action and word a leader sets the
level and direction of (social) control.
• Ethics
• Cooperability
• Effectiveness of communication
• Willingness to co-operate and collaborate
4.

Environmental factors
These factors affect individual, organisational
and group issues.

• Noise
• Visibility
• Temperature / humidity
• Terrain type
• Infrastructure in area of operations. (E.g.
transport, communication, healthcare,
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agriculture, food distribution, water, civil
administration -infrastructures)
• Military support infrastructure
• Social, economic, and political situation in area
of operations
• Rules of Engagement
• Ease of interaction
• Command Post layout
• Communication mechanisms (e.g. voice,
teletype, VTC)
• Geographic distribution of the command

Related Human Science Disciplines
This list provides an overview of the relevant scientific
disciplines with the expertise to answer questions
arising in the context of human and organizational
issues in command and control. The list implies a rough
taxonomy of disciplines only. Even though boundaries
between disciplines are frequently fuzzy, an attempt
was made to minimise the overlap.

1

Psychology

1.1

Individual Psychology

1.1.1 Cognitive Psychology
1.1.2 Learning Psychology
1.1.3 Action Theories
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1.1.4 Differential Psychology
1.1.5 Psychometrics
1.2

Social Psychology

1.3

Clinical Psychology

2

Educational Sciences and
Pedagogics

3

Sociology

3.1

Social Morphology (e.g. Social Stratification,
Demography)

3.2

Sociology of Political Power (See Also Political
Sciences)

3.3

Mass Communication

3.4

Sociological Methodology (Empirical Social
Research)

4

Organisational Sciences

5

Economic Sciences

6

Political Sciences

6.1

Science of Domestic Politics

6.2

Science of International Relations

6.3

Political Disaster Research
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7

Ergonomics, Human Factors
Research

7.1

Physiology and Anthropometrics

7.2

Technical Ergonomics (Man-Machine-Interface,
Workspace)

7.3

Cognitive Ergonomics (See Also Individual
Psychology)

7.4

Crew Ergonomics (See Also Social Psychology)

7.5

Safety and Health Hazard Prevention

8

International Law of War,
International Humanitarian Law

9

Ethics

9.1

Deontology (Theories of Ethical Norms and
Values)

9.2

Theories of Ethical Practise and Morality

10

Social and Legal Philosophy

11

Cultural Anthropology
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ANNEX E

Alternate
Definitions of Risk
and Uncertainty

A

number of different definitions of risk and
uncertainty are in common use, and this can lead
to confusion and misunderstanding. This COBP adopts
specific working definitions of risk, uncertainty, and
sensitivity; however, this annex lists a range of others
for information.

Risk
Risk is defined in this COBP as the possibility of
suffering harm or loss. In other words, exposure to
harm or loss. This includes an opportunity loss.

Alternate definitions of risk in common
use include:
• not achieving your objective;
• the likelihood of not achieving your objective;
• a threat to successful outcome;
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• an assessment of the probability of failure;
• an uncertain future scenario; and
• a perception of consequential pain.
The alternate definitions may be seen as subtle
variations of each other and are all equally valid.
However, this very subtlety can be a source of
confusion and doubt within a study unless a clear
working definition is adopted.

Uncertainty
Uncertainty is defined in this COBP as an inability to
determine a variable value or system state (or nature)
or to predict its future evolution.

Alternate definitions of uncertainty in
common use include:
• a lack of clarity in the definition of a system
or variable;
• a lack of confidence in an assumption or
result; and
• a lack of knowledge about a subject of interest.
All of these definitions have some validity, but this
should not be allowed to cloud the thinking during
C2 assessment.
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Sensitivity
Sensitivity, as used in this COBP, describes a predisposition to respond strongly to a stimulus or
variations in an input factor.

Alternate definitions for sensitivity in
common use include:
• an indication of the importance or criticality of a
feature or variable of an analysis; and
• a measure of the political profile of the subject of
study.
Sensitivity, as it relates to the production of robust
analysis, must be clearly defined in terms of response
to stimulus rather than importance or criticality. In C2
systems many insensitive factors are critical and many
sensitive ones are relatively unimportant.
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